Manzoor Pashteen’s PTM: A ‘Rights Movement’ or a new ‘Regional Agenda’?
Moeed Pirzada |
Ahmed Khan, (not his original name) waits in his car behind a long line of other vehicles, for his turn to be checked. He can spot army soldiers with smart tablets putting in CNIC numbers of motorists for verifications. They are probably connected with NADRA records, he thinks. After more than 30 minutes, of increasing frustration, he reaches the point and was asked to get out for a physical body search. He finally managed to cross the check post in about 45 minutes. Ahmed, originally from a rich SWAT landed family and traveling from Islamabad was furious. He was not alone, many others described similar scenes.
This was a few days after a suicide bomber blew himself at Army’s sports unit, in Sharifabad, in Kabal Tehsil of Swat killing 13 soldiers including a Captain. The attack in the first week of February was worst since 2013 and brought back memories of TTP’s reign of terror. It also brought back those check posts that dotted the landscape of SWAT after the army operation of 2009.
Ahmed, the traveler from Islamabad, was not alone, for feeling the way he felt. Hundreds of others soon took to protesting, a tribal Jirga threatened a strike and local MNA, PTI’s firebrand, Murad Saeed, took up the issue in the parliament. Check posts disappeared – replaced in many instances by Aerial Drones that silently hover over the heads.
Manzoor Pashteen in Swat, Why?
On Sunday, 29 April, Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) supporters, lead by Manzoor Pashteen, staged a rally in a Kabal ground attracting almost 5000 people. Local sources describe Pashteen speaking only in Pashto, to a crowd that had less than 500 locals (from within 15 Km radius); he thanked all those who have traveled, on his call, from Kohat, Zhob, Qila Saif Ullah, DI Khan, Swabi, Bannu, South Waziristan and even Quetta. Pashteen’s supporters traveled in at least 270 vehicles, mostly coasters, counted at Dargai check post located near the Dargai fort. Local politicians claimed that they had told the administration to not let outsiders enter Swat (enjoying peace and tourism) in such large numbers from outside but their protests were turned down.
The attack in the first week of February was worst since 2013 and brought back memories of TTP’s reign of terror. It also brought back those check posts that dotted the landscape of SWAT after the army operation of 2009.
Pashteen and others including Mohsin Dawar spoke about extrajudicial killings, missing persons and mistreatment of Pashtoons in Pakistan. Strong words were uttered against army which itself has a huge component of Pashtoons. Rally was mostly a function of the support it had from Mehmood Khan Achakzai’s “Pakhtoon Khwa Milli Awami Party” (PkMap) whose local leader, Khurshid Kakajee, Senator Usman Kakar and KP President, Mukhtar Yousafzai also addressed the crowds. One day earlier, on Saturday, another large rally was organized, in the Grassy ground (Cricket Stadium) by a local movement which calls itself, “Pakistan Zindabad Movement” supported by local MPA, Abdul Hakim, and Abdu Rahim, leader of the Traders Association Mingora. Local politicians with representation in parliaments of KP and Islamabad see Pashteen’s PTM as trouble makers working on foreign agenda. Local elite vividly remember TTP’s reign of terror and are grateful for peace in Swat, that has brought increasing investments and tourism and are worried that this disruptive political activity in the name of “Rights movement” may drive away tourists that flock Swat and its several adjacent areas in three months of summer starting from June.
Who is financing PTM?
A PTM supporter claimed that local elite who organized “Pakistan Zindabad Movement” and its rally are stooges of establishment and Saturday rally was financed. Criticism is valid, since holding political rallies is expensive. But this raises the question: who financed Manzoor Pashteen’s rally and why? This question becomes even more important because its apparent that Pashteen had no local support, in Swat; he brought his followers from far flung areas – as he admitted himself – at great expense. Why? This 27-year old’s grievances – admittedly genuine – are centered on issues inside the war battered South Waziristan, where he belongs to one of the tribes (Mehsud); why is he turning that into a generalized Pashtun victimhood all across the country?
Issues in Swat, as locals point out, are very different from South Waziristan. TTP’s reign of terror, of public executions and floggings, of Khooni Chowk, was quickly routed by Army action in summer of 2009 which saw one of the biggest heliborne operations, through attack helicopters, in recent history, around Peochar, a hill resort near Mingora. Several hundred young Taliban fighters were killed, unaccounted dead bodies kept floating in river Swat – many still counted as “missing” by their families. There were reports, and even unconfirmed videos, of extra-judicial killings especially after some SSG commandos were beheaded by TTP after abductions – but the issue died then in 2009. Army check posts were troublesome to the local population but were gradually removed. Life returned to normal with civilian administration, police, judiciary and investments.
Read more: What is Pashtun Tahafuz Movement and what are its objectives?
In recent years’ tourists have thronged Swat, with such vengeance that it often creates road blockages. However, Swat Expressway kick started in September 2016, with an estimated capital investment of Rs. 40 billion, is about to be completed; 81 km long, 80 meters wide, the highway will connect areas in Swat with Islamabad-Peshawar motorway and increase connectivity all over as it stretches from M1 motorway to Chakdara; passing through Nowshera, Swabi, Mardan and Malakand. It will reduce the three-hour travel time to just 45 minutes. The road will be 80 meters wide and will reduce a three-hour travel time to just 45 minutes – giving a huge boost to trade and economy in the region all around Swat.
A PTM supporter claimed that local elite who organized “Pakistan Zindabad Movement” and its rally are stooges of establishment and Saturday rally was financed. Criticism is valid, since holding political rallies is expensive. But this raises the question: who financed Manzoor Pashteen’s rally and why?
What bothers Swat’s intellectual elite is lack of effective criminal justice system; those who still remember Swat of pre-1969 merger with central legal authority, point out that local western style courts fail to deliver. Under Wali of Swat, a quarter million population spread over 8000 sq. Km area, had access to 32 Tehsil Courts headed by Qazis that provided for swift, inexpensive justice that was rapidly implemented by the state authorities. Currently, an expanded population, two million strong, is being served by 12 police jurisdictions and modern courts that are often marred by inefficiency, lethargy and corruption delaying justice.
Local elites point out that failure of criminal justice system and inability to resolve property and personal disputes is what had created the space for Taliban to enter with their promises of quick justice – and those issues still exist. But all this is very different from the hot molten lava of a wounded Pashtun nationalism which PTM is trying to sell to disaffected communities of Pashtuns wherever they may exist from Waziristan to Lahore to Karachi. Swat has obviously not been a success in this endeavor but its struggle continues and much has to come.
Read more: Pakistan Zindabad Movement: Turning tide against the new wave of sub-nationalism
Pashteen’s Little Heard Meeting with DG ISPR?
DG ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations) office located in Pindi, not far from British Era Hotel Flash man, received an unusual call on Feb 8. It was from Manzoor Pashteen’s supporters, then doing a protest in Islamabad, requesting a meeting with DG. A surprised ISPR team – that had heard little of this “Pashteen” questioned: why Pashteen wants to meet DG ISPR? How can ISPR help him? PTM supporters – many of whom had previously met ISPR as part of FATA Youth Jirga- requested that he wants to come and discuss his demands in person and this may lead to the end of their ongoing protest in Islamabad – centered around the arrest of SSP Rao Anwar of Karachi who allegedly killed Naqeeb ullah Mehsud.
Consequently, Pashsten and Mohsin Dawar, along with a total of 15 PTM workers or supporters (including many from SWA, verified through their CNIC cards) met DG ISPR. In a meeting that lasted more than 4 hours, they complained of problems in South Waziristan and presented five demands related to: Arrest of the murderer of Naqeeb Ullah Mehsud, Watan Card & harsh treatment at Check Posts, land mines, missing persons and compensations for loss of property. During this meeting, they were shown videos of development works across FATA and inter-dependent regions of KP (including: SWA, NWA, Khyber Agency, Malakand & Swat) and were connected on phone with Garrison Commanders (GOC) South Waziristan and North Waziristan and meetings were fixed with them. PTM leaders including Mohsin Dawar subsequently had those meetings, by around 15thof February, and text messages of thanks were duly received in ISPR. It was a result of those meetings that Watan Card checking was suspended, check posts were reduced, measures were taken to reduce waiting time at check posts, separate check posts for women were promised and efforts are being done to expedite removal of landmines.
The records of this 4 hours long meeting – and the positions Manzoor Pashteen adopted subsequently – helps us to understand that, 27 year old, Manzoor Pashteen’s movement is less about issues inside South Waziristan and more about shaping a larger agenda – relying upon different changing causes to use them as excuses from time to time. From the first moment, it has been acknowledged, by almost everyone in Pakistan, that these demands are genuine and they make sense and all issues should be addressed step by step. But when, in the third week of April, Corps. Commander Peshawar, Gen. Nazir Butt, commented, while talking to media, that he thinks that demands of PTM are genuine – and he wants a Jirga to meet PTM leaders to resolve these issues – many in the international media and think tanks misconstrued that as a great achievement of PTM protests, or rallies, that they are now being listened – ignoring the basic fact that they were being listened even before.
Waziristan: Struggle towards Normalcy
Reality is that overall political and administrative system of Pakistan, a poor developing country, is under tremendous pressure because of its 15-year-old war against terrorism – ever since it decided to side with the US lead war in Afghanistan after 9/11. Pakistan is the only country that has regained its stability and maintained its center of gravity after the developments of 9/11 – it could have also followed the path of Iraq, Syria and Libya.
Read more: Is the ‘Pashtun Tahafuzz Movement’ being exploited?
It is therefore understood that many new challenges have appeared while winning a difficult war. For instance, land mines were not laid by Pakistan Army but were deployed by TTP and its various affiliates to check the mechanized movement of a regular army that moves with armored personnel carriers, trucks jeeps and paraphernalia. Hundreds of soldiers and officers succumbed to these land mines often referred to as IED (Improvised Explosive devices) in media. Maj. Gen. Sanaullah Khan Niazi was a famous case that generated global headlines. Locals, however, point out, that when Army allowed residents of South Waziristan to return, in 2015, it failed its responsibility in fully clearing the areas of these IEDs and several children and adults lost their lives. Army sources assert that removal of land liens is tedious and 100% success is not possible since IED’s drift from actual locations due to rain and winds. But locals have a point and its Army’s responsibility to expedite removal of land mines. Also, the compensations of Rs. 400,000/house for repair or reconstructions offered by federal government through Political Agents (PA) were insufficient – and this needs a better and more generous solution.
Having said this, one cannot ignore the context; normalcy and the local residents are returning to these areas after more than 10 years, thousands have died anonymously in these areas in hundreds of battles and skirmishes; Taliban always took away their dead bodies and buried them on their own and many went on to fight in Afghanistan – so there might not be as many “missing persons” or in custody as being claimed. But all these issues can be addressed professionally one by one – as it happens after the end of protracted wars. Pashteen’s continuing rallies, creating the impression that he is not being heard – despite being in touch with Army establishment on his own request – represent clearly a different set of ambitions. It has also given rise to suspicions that he and his young crowd don’t have a mind of their own but are mere pawns in a larger scheme of things.
It was a result of those meetings that Watan Card checking was suspended, check posts were reduced, measures were taken to reduce waiting time at check posts, separate check posts for women were promised and efforts are being done to expedite removal of landmines.
Watan Card has also been misrepresented to media or perhaps misunderstood. Official records reveal that Watan Card was initiated to help the Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs) after the 2009/10 operations against TTP in the agencies on the request of the locals of South Waziristan who were displaced from heights and were relocated to low lying areas in Tank, Bannu, Laki Marwat and DI Khan and so on. Displaced persons were given money (Rs. 12,500/card/month) food and rations and these locals insisted that cards be issued to them to distinguish those who have voluntarily displaced, to facilitate operations, from those who have been living outside the agency on their own. Later, after 2015, army and FC at their posts started using ‘Watan Card’ as an additional ID card to distinguish locals from those who may come from outside. Though, these cards have been suspended now on PTM’s insistence but it is interesting to point out that most Afghan refugees in these areas have Pakistan’s NIC cards but they don’t have ‘Watan Cards” and this may have led to issues in the area. It is believed by the locals that Afghan refugees constitute a significant support for Mr. Pashteen.
Pashtun Nationalism: Rise & Fall?
Pashtun nationalism in itself is not a new thing. Most areas that today constitute north and north west of Pakistan made the corridor through which Central Asian, Turkish and Persian warriors – and whatever then constituted modernity – entered the vast low lying plains of Indus and headed south and east down towards Lahore or Delhi. For greater part of history, these areas, inhabited by Pashtuns or related tribes, at least up to Indus at Attock, have remained with undefined borders; kingdoms were identified with the cities they held. Afghan rulers of Kabul finally lost Peshawar valley to Sikh rulers of Punjab in earlier 19thcentury. Once Sikhs lost to British, in 1849 – India’s new rulers moving upwards from South – Afghans tried their level best, through war and pleadings, to regain control of Peshawar valley – but lost more territory in every effort. Most of what constitutes today’s Baluchistan was lost by Kabul in last quarter of 19thcentury. This is how Baluchistan has large Pashtun population and Mahmood Khan Achakzai represents a certain sentiment – but mostly misunderstood and against the tides of history. Britain developed a modern commercial enterprise in South of Lahore leading to the rise of large metropolises like Bombay, Calcutta and Madras; areas upwards of Lahore were mostly frontier of the British empire.
By 1870’s Rawalpindi emerged as the largest military garrison in British India; objective was to contain threat from north and north west, present day KP had no name in British minds except calling it: North West Frontier Province (NWFP); a term that irked Pashtun nationalists. After British withdrawal, rulers in Kabul thought of renewing the old claims. Afghanistan objected to Pakistan’s membership of United Nations in 1947/48 and encouraged tribesmen in FATA to rise against Peshawar and Karachi. Tribes guaranteed their freedoms by Jinnah never sided with Kabul. In 1960’s when Sardar Mohmmad Daud became Zahir’ Shah’s Prime Minister he sent troops across the Durand line into Bajaur Agency to stir an insurgency but tribes stood with Pakistan and routed the Afghan forces. Dauod was confronted by another Pashtun, in Pakistan: Ayub Khan.
Field Marshal came down hard against rulers in Kabul, he shut down Afghan transit trade indefinitely creating a crisis for land locked Afghanistan. Issues were somewhat resolved by interventions of Britain and Saudi Arabia but Daud lost his hold on power mostly for this crisis – and had to resign in March 1963; Pakistan only then resumed normal trade routes for Afghanistan, in May 1963. Irrespective of these set backs, NAP (now ANP) of Bacha Khan and later Abul Wali Khan continued feeding on to the dream of a Pakhtunistan; whatever Pakistani establishment did from Karachi or Islamabad it could not suppress the idea. But strange things happen in history. Pakhtunistan died its death in the Afghan war of 1979-87; confronted by the cultural differences of millions of Afghan refugees, now in their midst, the natives of the then NWFP (now KP) realized that they – in their outlook on life – are not the same people. Pakistani Pashtuns had moved on in the process of history deep into Pakistani identity, whereas Afghans due to their own peculiar experiences had moved in a different direction.
Read more: US Interest: Kiss of Death for PTM?
Pashtuns: An Integral Component of Pakistani Identity
Recently a naïve American writer defined Pashtuns as a “suppressed minority in Pakistan”. This is hilarious. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, shaped modern Pakistan from 1955 onwards laying the basis of its industrial structure. Yahya Khan, his successor in power, presided over the end of united Pakistan; Ghulam Ishaq Khan, respected civil servant turned President sacked first PM Benazir Bhutto and then PM Nawaz Sharif and when Nawaz insisted that he will take President along, it was the third member of the troika, Gen. Waheed Kakar, himself a proud Pashtun who fired them both. Gen. Naseerullah Babar, often credited, though erroneously, for the creation of Taliban was a Pashtun who headed Pakistan’s first civilian lead operation against MQM in early 1990’s under Benazir Bhutto.
From Hashim Khan, to Jehangir Khan to Jansher Khan to Younas Khan to Umar Gul to “Boom Boom Afridi” Pashtun faces have defined Pakistani sports; from Capt. Karnal Sher Khan, Nishan-e-Haider, in Kargil, to Gen. Tariq Khan who fought in tribal areas, as IGFC, and headed Pakistan’s first Strike Corps at Mangla, from Ahmed Faraz to Jamal Shah, from ageless Zeba Bakhtiar to unforgettable Marina Khan Pashtuns are an integral, proud and assertive component of Pakistani mosaic. From Army, Airforce, Central Superior Services, Corporate Board Rooms to roadside businesses and from talk shows to film and tv dramas, Pashtuns of all accents are a force inside Pakistan. Imran Khan, the most well-known face of Pakistan across the globe, often not referred to as Pashtun, had his mother from Waziristan and father from Mianwali. And it was the tragedy of Army Public School in December 2014, in Peshawar, that defined the national moment towards action against Taliban changing Pakistani laws and politics.
Lar o Bar Yo Afghan?
Is this interlocking embedded identity of “Pakistani Pashtun” now under threat by the antics of Manzoor Pashteen and his mentor Mehmood Khan Achakzai – shouting “Lar o Bar Yo Afghan” (Up and down, we are one Afghan nation; an old ANP era slogan meaning that from up in Afghanistan down in Pakistani territory we are one nation) in rallies and ably supported by US led media and think tanks?
While they may not succeed against the force of history and the strength of Pakistani nationhood, there is much to suggest that something like that is being conceived or promoted under the garb of a “rights movement”. Read Manzoor Pashteen’s twitter handle, connected with his Facebook page, fortunately in Urdu, and you can see that he is far less interested in finding solutions to the local problems and far more interested in inciting strong emotions of victimhood around an ethnicity and thus hate towards perceived aggressors.
But, no record exists of his taking any position against the hundreds of drone strikes that targeted FATA; this is a surprising disconnect, because for most Pashtuns the elephant in the room has been US presence in the region and attacks against Pashtun identity after 9/11. US media and think tank persons have suddenly started to present Pashtuns as an aggrieved helpless minority in Pakistan who are somehow dependent upon PTM to regain their confidence or win rights.
A Kashmiri writer from Srinagar, analyzing the situation, recently wondered if a “Pashtun Spring” is being manufactured; and we know that “Spring Revolutions” originate and evolve less on ground and more on media and cyberspace and sudden interest of publications from New York Times, Washington Post, Foreign Policy to Asia Times Online and many many others points towards systematic efforts to create a “narrative”. BBC Pashto, VOA –Deeva and France 24 all have been overactive – and all are state funded broadcasters. This is being reinforced by plethora of newer western web sites that are all using different words but more or less the same substance, a consistent message moving from different directions to create and reinforce a mental reality. This is further reinforced by teams of activists connected with NGO’s and international media inside Pakistan.
Most in Pakistani media and the strategic community had seen that video – thanks to WhatsApp traffic; however, it was dismissed as too ambitious and far too diabolical an accusation against the American friends. Tarpley is believed to be a conspiracy theorist. But then anyone who disagrees with the mainstream US narrative is declared conspiracy theorist – and has a funny post against him in Wikipedia.
All those, so-called “liberals” inside Pakistan, who had vociferously demanded army action against Islamist or religious Pashtuns and supported drone strikes and “army action” are now shedding crocodile tears for ethnic Pashtuns. So a full-fledged effort is going on to add muscle, fiber and fabric to the narrative of Manzur Pashteen – it had taken Gandhi and Jinnah several years of struggle before getting this kind of attention. A respected US think tanker has even suggested in alarming fashion that Pakistan Army may use force against this movement. This is shocking and, apart from unusual interest, represents a “forward development of narrative” – totally disconnected from ground reality. Analyzing this propaganda, Pakistani authorities should instead be worried that any third force may harm any PTM rally or leader to manufacture a crisis inside and around Pakistan.
Read more: Pakistan Army ready to negotiate with Manzoor Pashteen; Corps. Commander calls…
Short-Term and long-term Implications of PTM?
What can PTM achieve in near future? PTI – sounds different from PTM only for one letter- had won in KP, in 2013 elections, riding on a wave of popularity, a kind of definite shift in politics. While widespread stories of ANP/PPP corruption did help, but it was mostly a Pashtun feeling – in a war-torn province hard hit because of post 9/11 events – for Imran Khan who had taken a strident position against US drone strikes. ANP and PPP were seen as pro-American and thus not nationalist enough. Both parties were also hamstrung for being in the government and did not have that free hand to take positon on regional and international issues.
Now PTM, that sounds very similar to PTI (just like TTP sounded similar to TTA; though very different in motivations) is trying to shape a new kind of “wounded Pashtun nationalism”. And it is merely using “localized grievances in South Waziristan” disguised under a “Rights Movement” to create a bigger political capital; if it succeeds it can be in a positon to affect the overall direction of politics before the general elections that are scheduled in end July 2018. PTI having serious prospects of getting around 45-50 seats in Punjab, is now hamstrung and cannot fully identify with a “wounded Pashtun nationalism” – and if it failed to counter the movement, it may suffer in polls in KP. PTM can throw its “political capital” with any player – perhaps decision will lie with Mehmood Achakzai whose main constituency lies in Baluchistan, and had hitherto no serious presence in FATA or KP.
Long-term implications?
In 2014, Webster Tarpley, a controversial American historian, author and analyst, appearing on Russian TV (RT) – Putin’s nemesis for CNN – argued that while President Obama is talking of special relationship with Pakistan, his agencies are planning to create secessionist movements in Pakistani Baluchistan and FATA – to disrupt the possibility of a new energy corridor that can connect China with the Middle East. (CPEC was little heard then). A bemused, Anchorwoman asked how is it even possible? And Tarpley explained that by agitating Pashtuns living on both sides the Pak-Afghan border and forcing an autonomous area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Most in Pakistani media and the strategic community had seen that video – thanks to WhatsApp traffic; however, it was dismissed as too ambitious and far too diabolical an accusation against the American friends. Tarpley is believed to be a conspiracy theorist. But then anyone who disagrees with the mainstream US narrative is declared conspiracy theorist – and has a funny post against him in Wikipedia. Tarpley also claimed, several years ago, that US and Israel are encouraging insurgent groups to split Syria in several parts. Today, almost all world, outside the transatlantic mental corridor, can readily understand that US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia tried using insurgent groups to dismantle Syrian state and have failed due to the Putin’s unusually muscular intervention. Tarpley’s forgotten video clip, from RT, is now again in circulation, on WhatsApp, focusing minds from Peshawar to Karachi.
Read more: Manzoor Pashteen spoke up in Lahore; what’s the solution to their…
The real solution for grievances in FATA lies in its mainstreaming and the best way forward remains its earlier integration with KP. A govt. The commission headed by Sartaj Aziz, adviser to PM, had submitted a detailed report recommending the same. However, despite having a massive demand from all political parties, FATA members and KP government and support from Army establishment, Nawaz Sharif kept dragging his feet. His argument was that “not without Maulana on board”. So Maulana Fazal ur Rehman and Mehmood Achakzai singlehandedly did not allow FATA merger into KP – thus setting a stage on which now PTM is dancing. And now both Maulana and Achakzai are supporting PTM. Nawaz – whose daughter recently joined PTM bandwagon – had thus not failed Pakistan on one or two counts but on many fronts. But, then this is what happens when someone suited to be a Mayor of Dina or Kamonkey becomes prime minister of a 200 million strong, strategically important, nation.
Moeed Pirzada is a prominent TV Anchor and Editor Strategic Affairs with Dunya News Network and a known columnist. He previously served with the Central Superior Services in Pakistan. He studied international relations at Columbia University, New York and Law at London School of Economics, the UK as a Britannia Chevening Scholar. He has been a participant in Chaophraya Dialogue, has lectured and given talks at universities and think tanks including Harvard, Georgetown, Urbana Champaign, National Defense University, FCCU, LUMS, USIP, Middle East Institute and many others. The writer is grateful to all those politicians, journalists, intelligence officers, supporters of PTM and businessmen who agreed to speak off the record on this subject. The views expressed in this article are authors own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Global Village Space.
Zulfi Bhutto: The man and his legend lives on
Moeed Pirzada |
There remains a powerful, persistent, possibly growing, but certainly undying, mystic belief held by millions of Pakistanis, not only Sindhis but Punjabis, Baluchis and Pathan Frontiersmen as well, that “Shaheed (martyr) Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was never hanged, that he never died, “Zulfi Bhutto lives on”, they say, “and he always will”..
Stanley Wolpert had written these prophetic lines somewhere in 1993, the last lines in his biography of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, some 14 years after the midnight execution of April 2, 1979; but these sound even truer almost 40 years after his death. Zia’s henchman may have extinguished the physical expression of Bhutto, but in the process Zia immortalized him for all times to come – and earned his own place as the most despised and dark character in Pakistan’s history. Countless thousands, each year, appear to sing, to pray, to cry, to seek Lord’s benevolence at Bhutto’s mausoleum in Garhi Khudda Baksh while few, even in Islamabad, know that body parts of General Zia were buried in a lone corner of Faisal Mosque.
Those who came to bury Zia in August of 1988 – his political creations and inheritors – have since then been compelled to abandon Zia, they are afraid and ashamed to mention his name in public; continuing their own politics instead under Bhutto’s references. CouldBhutto – with his innate sense of history – have asked his Lord fora bigger revenge?
Bhutto: A Pakistani House of Mirrors
But Bhutto’s place in Pakistan’s history is far more complex than what these lines can ever reveal: his saga of quantum success and painful failure is a quintessential Pakistani tragedy; an emotional mosaic, a colourful kaleidoscope, an “Alice in Wonderland” experience with thousands of mirrors in which we all can find ourselves with our desires and contradictions, our beauty and our beastliness.
He was a polarizing character in his life inspiring unbelievably strong emotions: adored for championing the cause of downtrodden; hated for being a feudal; accepted as founder of Pak-China special relationship; blamed for wrongly advising President Ayub Khan for Operation Gibraltar in 1965; loved for his position on Kashmir in the UN and his campaign against Tashkent Agreement; credited for the creation of Pakistan’s only political party of the “masses” that still survives after 50 years of traumas and tribulations; often blamed for separation of East Pakistan – Idharhum udhar tum; ridiculed for being the first ever civilian Martial law administrator; praised endlessly for giving Pakistan its first ever consensus constitution but blamed for making person-specific amendments; worshipped for giving millions of workers and farmers their human dignity but condemned for unwise nationalizations and land reforms.
He is remembered for his liberal values, his secularism, his promotion of arts and culture and carries the burden of accepting in public that he “drinks alcohol but not the blood of poor” – but then also condemned for exploiting the Ahmedia issue for courting the ultra-religious right.
Is that all? No! ZAB was endlessly demonized for arrogant treatment of his colleagues like JA Rahim, for tortures and murders of his political opponents, for Dhulai camp and Lahore Fort, for vulgarity to PIA stewardesses and flirting with wives of his friends; blamed for being an American creation in 1960’s, for calling Ayyub Khan “Daddy” for campaigning against Fatima Jinnah in 1964 elections, for being secular, for being atheist, for being uncircumcised Hindu, for an agentof Jews, for massively rigging March elections, for calling PNA’s 1977 Islamist movement a CIA agenda, for literally everything – but despite all this almost 40 years after his death he has become the most uniting, cementing factor in Pakistani politics and history.
Read more: PPP’s guarded approach to Nawaz’s confrontation with judiciary
Bhutto: Divisive in life but Uniting in Death?
Today in Pakistan’s political gossip, drawing room discussions, college debates and ferocious TV Talk Shows – where consensus is rare – most remember him for his razor-sharp intelligence, his intellect, for his passionate nationalism, for his incomparable worldview, his brilliant writings, his vision, his charisma, his powerful oratory, his ability not to woe women but Muslim leadership; turning Pakistan into center of global attention.
He is remembered for his discovery of China as a friend, his courage to stand up against United States and the west and above all for being the political father of Pakistan’snuclear program and for giving common man this exaggerated false but seductive idea that he matters in a realm dominated by feudal lords, rapacious industrialists, cunning bureaucrats and arrogant generals.
In a country where today, almost 70% of citizens are less than 35 years of age – born after Bhutto’sfateful execution – he is the most known and cherished historical figure after the founder of nation: Mohammad Ali Jinnah. This is called “legacy”. Zulfiqar Ali was third child of Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto and Khursheed Begum, born Capricorn, 5th Jan, 1928. His father was influential Dewan of the princely state of Junagadh; he tried unsuccessfully for state’s accession with Pakistan – an attempt that failed with Indian intervention.
After initial schooling in Bombay he landed in University of Southern California in 1947 from where he moved to Berkley in 1950 completing his BA studies there before reaching Christ Church, Oxford for law – a place later cherished by his able progeny: Benazir. While defending his life from Zia’s assembled circus of henchmen, he had once written, “my wife will mourn me”. That was true. Blamed for being a flirt all his life, scandalized for his affair with Husna, he was nevertheless madly in love with his Iranian born wife, Nusrat Ispahani, whom he married in Karachi in 1951 – after she refused eloping with him to the UK.
Benazir was the first child in 1953. Karachi, in 1950’s, with its free spirit, nightclubs and Arabian sea’s balmy seductive breeze, was what Dubai has become in the first quarter of 21st century. Nusrat was not only stunningly beautiful with her high cheekbones and aquiline features but she also opened gates into the corridors of power for him. She was friends with Naheed Iskander wife of Iskander Mirza who later became the governor general. This is how young Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto entered the closely knit power circle of 1950’s Pakistan becoming youngest cabinet member in 1958.
Read more: Pakistan People’s party celebrates its 50th Foundation Day
Political Founder of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program
As Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources he got the opportunity to shape Pakistan’s nascent Atomic Energy Commission. He played an important role in successful negotiations to obtain from Canada, Karachi’s 157 MW nuclear power plant. Together with Dr. Usmani, ICS from Imperial College London, and Dr. Abdul Salam (who later became the first Pakistani to win Nobel Prize) Bhutto created a powerful team inside Karachi, then Pakistan’s capital, building an argument for nuclear energy in a country which, at least then, had sufficient potential hydro-electric resources.
But unlike Usmani who believed in the atomic potential only for peaceful purposes, Bhutto the strategist knew that Pakistan will need nuclear weapons – and he was determined to acquire them. When he finally assumed power, in December 1971, in the peculiar circumstances of the division of Pakistan through Indian armed intervention, one of his first steps was creation of Ministry of Science and Technology. Pakistan Atomic EnergyCommission (PAEC) was made directly answerable to the Prime Minister.
He went on a “talent hunt program” and got rid of pacifist, Dr. Usmani, replacing him with Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan as Chairman of PAEC. Munir had previously headed the Nuclear Power and Reactor division of IAEA. This“talent hunt” also imported the man who later became the controversial figure of the Pakistani nuclear establishment: Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan. Khan was a brilliant metallurgist, with experience of working in Urenco’s Gas Centrifuge plant at Almelo in Holland and played an important part in Pakistan’squest for Uranium enrichment, through gas centrifuges, at Kahuta.
In later years, when Bhutto was fighting United States, defying his old friend, Kissinger, in the pursuit of French Reprocessing Plant, he knew fully well that French would budge under the US pressure but his wailing across the world focused all attention on “Reprocessing Plant” and away from the uranium enrichment his scientists were making progress with.
Read more: Civil-military relations in historical perspective
Did CIA Dislodge Bhutto from Power?
Was he punished for his nuclear quest? Was Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a motley combination of all opposition parties, assembled against him, in January 1977, dominated by Islamists, was a creation of CIA? Was General Zia, Allah’ssoldier – who overthrew his troubled government in the early hours of 5th July 1977, when he had almost struck a deal with PNA opposition – acting in cahoots with Langley and Foggy Bottom? Two generations of Pakistanis have struggled with these awkward questions without finding clear unambiguous answers.
Bhutto had created sharp polarizations in Pakistani politics and society; his open admissions of secularism, his nationalization of industry, his land reforms, and his undisguised contempt for his opponents had ended up collecting and uniting a formidable opposition of notables – who used all kinds of slogans and below belt tactics against him. While he enjoyed tremendous support in rural hinterlands his enemies were concentered in large urban centers like Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore. These enemies were reinforced by rising Islamist identity of Pakistan – something that rapidly happened after the separation of former East Pakistan.
A foot in Dacca, till 1971, had kept Pakistan positioned between South Asia and South East Asia; it had seen itself– though wrongly perhaps – as a broken cultural part of India in South, but loss of East Pakistan quickly made Pakistan identify with Muslim Middle East. (something that has seen reversal after 9/11). Bhutto’s attempts of rallying around causes in Middle East, his Islamic summit in Lahore, spread of mass democracy without widening and deepening of liberal education of 1960’s, strengthened the common man’s Muslim identity of Pakistan.
The arrogance of his rule and use of force projection against his political enemies remained unchallenged by a defeated army and tamed bureaucracy. The army, after surrender in Dacca in 1971, till the prolonged agitation of PNA (March– July 1977) was never in a situation to breathe on to him(military dictation: a phenomenon that effectively developed since the return of civilian rule in 1988; but did not exist in1977) and he had effectively neutralized the power of erstwhile CSP class which offered reasonable checks on political elites in 1950-60s – being part of power elite themselves till the civil services reforms and purges of 1972-73.
PNA agitation, spearheaded by Jammat-e-Islami militant gangs and its student wings (Jammiat) from 10th March onwards played havoc. Benazir, in her memoirs, “Benazir Bhutto: Daughter of the East”, has deliberately played down the significance of these ferocious agitations which according to government figures had taken more than 300 lives and unofficial figures were above a thousand; school and colleges remained closed for several months, children were promoted to next grades without exams, government offices were attacked across the country, private and public properties and transport worth billions (in today’s figures) were burnt down. Bhutto’s twenty thousand strong Federal Security Force (FSF) – headed by Masood Mehmood,
the man who later became the state approver against him – battled endlessly against the agitators till Army had to be called. Troops used force and bullets in several cities before producing a moral effect but it brought them into power play and the agitation of the streets penetrated the officer ranks who started seeing Bhutto as the ultimate problem.
Could all these elements alone – without invoking CIA theory – explain what happened between March and July 1977? To anyone who reads from books and periodicals that should be sufficient to explain the dynamics of his fall. But most who have existed as players, or direct observers of what was happening on ground – in Karachi, in Hyderabad in Lahore and Islamabad – would not agree to describe all that merely a domestic battle ground. Even Bhutto’s worst possible enemies – those who played a definitive role in his final execution – remain convinced to this day that American strategy, money, direction and support was at play.
Bhutto himself was convinced that he was facing an international situation, a conspiracy if we may like to call it; but calling it a situation, a play of international forces against him will be more appropriate. Bhutto discussed this endlessly with foreign diplomats – especially of Muslim countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia and Soviet Union – brought it up in his public speeches, argued in his court defense and wrote extensively in his book, “If I am assassinated”.
His biographer, Wolpert, faithfully narrates all those discussions. We don’t have access to what most diplomats thought, but from Wolpert’s book we know that Soviets were clear that Americans stood behind all the circus and were afraid of a possible change in Pakistan’s foreign policy under Bhutto. Almost all Pakistanis are convinced that Bhutto was removed and made into a horrible example the way Mossadegh, in Iran, was made two decades earlier and Qaddaffi and Saddam were made two decades later.
Read more: Benazir Bhutto Leadership Program at Harvard: Who is putting the bill?
Problem is that Mossadegh saga – at the hands of MI6 and CIA through a rented crowd in Tehran in 1953- was later declassified, much has been written by credible western researchers about Allende in Chile, removal of Faisial in Iraq, Farooq in Egypt, (read for instance recent “Silk Roads” by Oxford researcher, Dr. Peter Frankopan) and US supported insurgency in Syria but forty years on nothing has been declassified by CIA or MI6 (which is more secretive than CIA) and no western academic has touched the subject.
Bhutto had mentioned Kissinger’s threat of August 1976 of turning him into an “extreme example”; Benazir mentions it in her memoirs and almost everyone in Pakistan remembers that by heart. But few have bothered to correlate that with the timeline; in January 1977, Jimmy Carter Administration had taken over and Cyrus Vance had replaced Kissinger. And in hindsight, one wonders: what CIA gained by the overthrow of Bhutto?
If the objective was to prevent Pakistan from becoming nuclear then Zia and his junta relentlessly pursued the nuclear option; Pakistan for all practical purposes was a de-facto nuclear power by 1984/5. Would CIA sponsor PNA movement only to punish Bhutto for his past sins – meddling in middle east’s politics and pursuing nuclear option – or there was something bigger at stake? Was a turbulent Afghanistan, where Russians finally intervened in 1979 already on chessboard?
Benazir in her autobiography had most carefully touched the subject. She had returned back to Pakistan to a hero’s welcome in 1986, seven years after the execution of Bhutto, with tacit approval from Washington. Under the new understanding call it a deal, she, perhaps humbled, matured or wisened by the tyranny of her times, toned down her rhetoric against the United States and all firebrand leftist extremists of erstwhile PPP were given a shut up call. What she then headed was a new tamed PPP, just like now Bilawal heads another new PPP. But she brings this up in her book published in 1988.
She admits that Cyrus Vance had replaced Kissinger but argues that CIA often acts autonomously, it has its own “worldview” and is not tied to changing administrations. She narrates that at the height of PNA movement, almost two months before the coup, Pakistan’s then foreign secretary was sent to meet Cyrus Vance in Paris; he took a 50-page long report of Pakistan’s foreign office that elaborated why Pakistan suspects American involvement in its politics. Vance kept the report on one side and said: “No, Mr. Aziz, we want to start a new chapter with Pakistan” and added: “we value greatly the long and close friendship we have with your country.”
Read more: “Pakistan’s “Kaliyug” began 5th July 1977″?
Apart from telling us few bits from intelligence reports– recorded chats of US diplomats, 30% fall in dollar price in Karachi markets and regular payments to striking PNA agitators – she tells us of her efforts, through friends in the US, to acquire information from CIA under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). She cites from the letters she received in which CIA refused providing any information on ZA Bhutto around 1977.
Though Wolpert remained far more suspect of Bhutto’s claims of direct US interventions he, being the credible investigator did reach out to CIA under FOIA and was turned down. He reports that in the “Notes” of his book. Given the opprobrium that exists after the declassification of Mossadegh drama, of 1953 Tehran, can we blame CIA for keeping its mouth shut? May be a future generation of US researchers and historians will be able to find out exact role played by CIA in the stormy days between March and July 1977. We will have to wait – meanwhile, Bhutto and his legend lives on…
Moeed Pirzada is a prominent TV Anchor and Editor Strategic Affairs with Dunya News Network and a known columnist. He previously served with the Central Superior Services in Pakistan. He studied international relations at Columbia University, New York and Law at London School of Economics, UK as a Britannia Chevening Scholar. He has been a participant in Chaophraya Dialogue, has lectured and given talks at universities and think tanks including Harvard, Georgetown, Urbana Champaign, National Defense University, FCCU, LUMS, USIP, Middle East Institute and many others. The views expressed in this article are authors own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Global Village Space.
Hafiz Saeed: Albatross around Pakistan’s Neck?
Dr. Moeed Pirzada |
While FATF (Financial Action Task Force) proceedings at Paris, were non-transparent and Pakistan’s troubles at FATF are not single dimensional, perhaps more political than professional; better understood in the context of difficult US Pakistan relations over Afghanistan and China’s emerging role inside Pakistan, but nevertheless from the narrative shaped around all this, Hafiz Saeed, Mumbai terrorism, Let, JuD and FIF loom large in terms of debate and narrative shaping and most who have definitive opinions against Pakistan are more often possessed by this dark narrative around Mumbai –than what may actually have been discussed in FATF behind closed doors.
While Hafiz is not among defendants facing a trial in Pakistan (Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi & others), all Indians, all diplomats, all those who work in think tanks and international media and most in Pakistan are convinced that Hafiz Saeed, of JuD is either the mastermind of Mumbai attacks as charged by the Indian government or is somehow linked with these; how else to explain what happened? The way Bollywood has shaped a narrative around LeT (defunct since 2002), since 1990s and more passionately since 2008, the figure of Hafiz looms large, in common Indian minds; many imagine Hafiz to be running the show in Pakistan with the help of a rogue army.
If many imagine that they have to take steps to free Pakistan of Hafiz and his gang, to make Pakistan a “normal country” as it is being said occasionally, then one cannot blame them. Narrative is shaped skillfully by media, facts are often not needed; claims made earlier can be repeated ad-nauseam till they assume a reality of their own and then become part of a new international discourse. After FATF decision an editorial in “The Hindu”, most prestigious paper in India, mentions Hafiz Saeed along with Taliban and Al Qaeda in such a way that passive reader absorbs them as one and the same thing.
No wonder that a columnist, Hannah Kuchler, recently argued in Financial Times (FT) that “news literacy should be taught like sex and drug education to protect individuals and society as a whole”. What she did not mention was that in this “brave new world” journalists who disagree with the dominant narratives do this at the risks to their careers. Almost all Indian and western media keep mentioning the $10 million bounty on Hafiz Saeed’s head announced by the US, without even hinting that Secretary Clinton actually announced $10 million as a reward to anyone providing information that can link Hafiz Saeed with Mumbai terrorism. Her actual words, while speaking in New Delhi were:
“As part of our “Rewards for Justice” program, we have offered a $ 10 million reward that could lead to the arrest or conviction of Hafiz Saeed in those attacks. Our “Rewards for Justice” offer demonstrates our seriousness in obtaining additional information that could withstand judicial scrutiny at least to arrest or conviction and brings the perpetrators and planners of the Mumbai attacks to justice.”(Clinton, New Delhi, April 3 2012)
Clinton’s initiative was clearly yet another US concession to India which uses its burgeoning relations with America essentially to constrain and contain Pakistan, but US Media, brewing on their own and Indian narratives, were shocked; questions were raised in state department briefing next day, April 4, that what have been talking all these years, if we did not have any evidence. Mark Toner, state department spokesman, clarified the next day in these words:
“Just to clarify, the $10 million is for information that – not about his location, but information that leads to an arrest or conviction. And trdhis is information that could withstand judicial scrutiny, so I think what’s important here is we’re not seeking this guy’s location. We all know where he is. Every journalist in Pakistan and in the region knows how to find him. But we’re looking for information that can be usable to convict him in a court of law..”
Will any reputable western or Indian journalist dare report that? Reality is that most even in Pakistan are afraid to take a clear position on these issues. It will thus be interesting to revisit the original Indian case against Hafiz Saeed. Much has been written in newspapers, magazines, online publications, Facebook and Twitter and much has been debated by think tanks and diplomats behind the scenes and by Bollywood through celluloid products but what evidence was exactly offered by the Indian government, in Mumbai Police Case No. 175 of 2009, that linked Hafiz Saeed (Accused No.1 of 35 accused) with the terror attacks in Mumbai on 26 Nov 2008? This question must possess journalists, columnists, authors and researchers but also diplomats, lawyers and intelligent citizens. So what is this evidence?
Indian Ministry of External Affairs Cable, 222018 of Aug 2009
Thanks to Wikileaks and the Australian bravo, Julian Assange, we can access, read and ponder on the cable No. 222018 that was sent by T.C.A Raghavan, the then Additional Secretary Foreign Affairs, Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) on 24 Aug 2009 to White House, Secretary of State, National Security Council (NSC), CIA, CENTCOM, PACOM, and several US embassies and Missions (Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo, Geneva and London among others). Raghavan, the polite diplomat, who later was Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad and is now, after retirement, an author of an interesting book “The People Next Door” informed the key US institutions and diplomatic posts that Indian govt. is finding it difficult to reengage with Pakistan since Pakistan is not making any progress on Hafiz Saeed.
This cable, sent three days after a dossier was handed over to Pakistan High Commission in Delhi and western embassies, (Aug 21) then lists the charges and the evidence against Hafiz Saeed. The evidence, as summed up in Raghavan’s cable, is essentially coming from three accused persons in the case no. 175 of 2009. These are: Ajmal Kasab, Fahim Ansari and Sabeeh-ud-Din. What do they tell? Ajmal Kasab informs prosecution that he had joined LeT in Dec 2007 (did’nt exist under this name or banner after 2002) and went to a training camp in Azad Kashmir and there he saw and heard Hafiz Saeed who exhorted all for Jihad in Kashmir, he gave names to all recruits and named Kasab as Abu Mujahid.
Later, he saw Hafiz in an operations center in or near Karachi who gave instructions regarding the forthcoming attack on Mumbai. Fahim Ansari, who was already under arrest since Feb 2008 in Rampur Attack Case, confessed on 18 December 2008 that he was recruited by LeT in 2007, he too went to a training camp in Pakistan and towards the end of his training Hafiz Saeed visited the camp. Sabeeh-ud-Din, the third accused (also in custody in Rampur Attack Case, since Feb 2008) confessed, also on 18 December, that during his training inside Pakistan he was taken to Muridkay where (he perhaps believes) Hafiz and others were based.
After his release from house arrest, Hafiz offered a special prayer at Mochi Darwaza in Lahore; it was where Sabeeh-ud-Din first saw Hafiz and claimed that “he was enlightened by his preaching during the prayer.” T.C.A Raghavan had sent his cable in Aug 2009, and it is obvious that Indian government was merely relying upon confessions of men in Indian custody and the statements even then were sketchy. This is like Pakistan demanding action against current RAW Chief, Anil Kumar Dhasmana, on the basis of statements of RAW Officer, Kulbhahsan Yadav who has admitted, while in Pakistani custody, to supervising several acts of terrorism across Pakistan and has told his investigators of his meetings with Anil Kumar (before 2016; when Anil Kumar was RAW’s second in).
But we don’t need to go in that direction; something more interesting happened when in 2010, Indian sessions court, the trial court, acquitted both Fahim Ansari and Sabeeh-ud-Din. Indian charge sheet against Fahim Ansari, and Sabeeh-ud-din, linking them with Mumbai terrorism was that both were hired by LeT in 2007 (that does not exist; replaced by JuD for all practical purposes) to do reconnaissance and provide maps to the attackers. According to prosecution, Fahim had done the reconnaissance, made sketches and maps and then Sabeeh-ud-din handed these to LeT and these maps were used by the attackers on 26 November. The prosecution had produced confessional statements from another accused, Sheikh, and the maps.
Indian Judge examining the maps and the evidence concluded that Mumbai police had made a bogus case because the quality of information (maps on record by the prosecution) Fahim Ansari allegedly provided or could provide was far inferior than what was easily available from Google and the witness against them was not reliable. The prosecution challenged trial court decision all the way till Indian supreme court and their case was rejected by courts at all levels. Finally, Fahim was acquitted from the Indian Supreme court in 2013. All this has been reported by Indian media and anyone can access this. Sabeeh-ud-Din case, linked with Fahim Ansari, followed a similar trajectory.
Cables of Ambassador Anne Patterson
If Wikileaks had leaked, T.C.A Raghavan’s cable of Aug 22, 2008, then it also leaked Ambassador. Anne Patterson’s cable of April 2009 to her principals in Washington. Patterson, then Washington’s point person in Islamabad, was one of the senior most US diplomats that earned the respect of her interlocutors wherever she worked. I recently met ex-President, Asif Ali Zardari and as we talked casually about international relations, I was struck by the level of respect he showed for Anne Patterson and her integrity.
Patterson in her cable No. 206598, of 12 May 2009, (SUBJECT: MUMBAI PROSECUTION UPDATE: PAKISTAN LACKS EVIDENCE TO CONVICT TOP SUSPECTS) informed Washington that India (GOI, as she refers in her cable) has failed to provide any certified substantive evidence against the accused in Pakistan. She demands that Washington must persuade India to come forth with more substantive evidence otherwise the case in Pakistani courts will soon collapse; following is an exact excerpt from the summary of this cable:
“While the FIA and prosecutors have been able to use the repeated extensions to gather more evidence, time is running out, and the prosecution does not/not have enough evidence to convict the top Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) suspects, Lakhvi, Zarar Shah, and al Qama. If the FIA does not receive the necessary third-country evidence from the GOI (or the FBI after GOI approval), these three suspects will likely be acquitted and released. Repeated USG interventions at several levels with the GOI have not yielded any certified evidence being passed to the GOP. If the top LeT terrorists are released, India will certainly accuse Pakistan of a lack of good faith in prosecuting and of directly sponsoring terrorism against India..”
Ambassador Patterson’s cable in para 4 also mentions that, “FIA does not/not have enough independent evidence to successfully prosecute the senior LeT leaders, Lakhvi, Shah, and al Qama. Unfortunately, due to political pressure, the FIA was put in the position of arresting and charging the three individuals before it had conducted a complete investigation or collected the proper evidence..”
Pakistan, however under tremendous pressure being exercised by India through the US, kept moving with a flawed legal process that ended up creating more and more “media narrative” and increasing indictment of Pakistan in public imagination worldwide. At the eve of 17th SAARC summit, the media dialogue that took place between Rehman Malik, the then Pakistani interior minister and Ranjan Mathai, his Indian foreign secretary further helps to understand the nature of Indian evidence and sum total of Indian position on it.
Rehman Malik stated that “Indian side is giving us lots of information and dossiers but no credible evidence” (Rediff.com, Nov 2001; Addu City, Maldives). Responding to Malik’s statement, Ranjan Mathai, India’s respected Foreign Secretary, stated, “If the Pakistani Interior Minister thinks that Kasab must be sent to the gallows then he is saying that based on the information we have provided” (Rediff.com – SARRC Summit, Addu City, Maldives). What becomes obvious from T.C.A Raghavan’s cable of 22 Aug, 2009 and Ranjan Mathai’s response in Maldives is that Indian government totally relied upon – for its case against Hafiz Saeed and others – on the confessional statement of Ajmal Kasab and two other accused.
As mentioned earlier, both Fahim Ansari and Sabeeh-ud-Din (66% of the evidence Indians relied upon against accused in Pakistan) were soon acquitted by Indian courts of all charges related to Mumbai terrorism. Ajmal Kasab recanted his confession later and took the stand that confession was extracted from him under duress. This makes his confessional statement legally inadmissible to be used against others he had earlier accused. However, problems with Indian position on Ajmal Kasab do not end there. While Pakistani government never sought consular access for Kasab, Pakistani investigators did.
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and police officers who were working to piece the story together for the trial of accused in Pakistan wanted to cross-examine Kasab on his confessional statement. They were repeatedly denied by Indian authorities. Same happened to the lawyers of the defendants; they under law had the right to cross-examine the person whose statements and evidence was being used to frame their clients. However, after several months of wrangling, and frustrating debate, all what they could get was access to the Mumbai police officers who had recorded Ajmal Kasab’s statement.
Did Ajmal Kasab enter India from Nepal?
Why Indian authorities were so afraid of granting access to investigators and lawyers to Ajmal Kasab? Why they consciously weakened the case knowing fully well that defendant’s lawyers and investigators had to get access to the man whose statement creates the basis for FIR? Why denying access was so important that it superseded all other considerations? There is no satisfactory answer to this question. Nature abhors vacuum and Indian diffidence on this has lead to interesting theorizing in Pakistan.
As soon as name Ajmal Kasab had appeared on horizon, immediately in the aftermath of Mumbai terrorism, in December 2008, there were murmurs in Islamabad that Ajmal Kasab might be an agent of LeT or even some Pakistani agency but he was someone who had entered India from Nepal, 2-3 years ago and was considered lost; he was believed to be in Indian custody – just like Col. Habib who recently disappeared from Nepal (after RAW Officer Kulbhashan’s arrest in Pakistan) and is believed to be in possession of Indian external agency.
These arguments, from hushed hushed discussions in drawing rooms, soon reached television programs and such programs do exist on YouTube – and have been written about in major papers. When Kasab’s confessional video, from a hospital bed, appeared on Indian TV and on YouTube, Pakistanis were struck by the fact that he spoke Urdu/Hindi in a local (Marathi) accent, and did not sound like a young Punjabi lad from Pakistan.
Most Indians easily ignored this aspect, westerners off course had no capacity to pick up such subtle shades of ethnicity and dialects, but Punjabi Pakistanis, native to Punjabi street, were intrigued that this young man, from dusty Farid kot, not formally educated, does not exhibit the usual rough Punjabi accent, of how you utter words and syllables, that easily creeps into the Urdu expressions of all less educated Punjabis. Many satisfied themselves that may be he did penetrate from Nepal, was in Mumbai for a while and had picked up local accent –and could have joined the gunmen from Mumbai.
But Ajmal Kasab on hospital bed, singing like a canary, also used word, “Bhagvan” and Indian prosecution case states that he came from Karachi on the boat and had joined the Hafiz’s LeT in 2007. If that is the case, then his “Bhagvan” and local accent did not make sense. This theory does not deny that Ajmal Kasab was a Pakistani born in Farid Kot, or he could be recruited by Hafiz’s militia but it certainly raised the question: If the man, singing like a canary, on hospital bed, and repeating words like, “Kaha maro maro” was in fact the same Ajmal Kasab? Or he was someone, a look alike, who was needed to fill in the gaps in prosecution’s case?
Whatever the reality, this theory does help to explain the possible Indian anxiety in providing access to this man, Ajmal Kasab, to the lawyers of defendants and Pakistani investigators. Perhaps it will be a safe conclusion to argue that in terms of media and public narrative, carried by tv broadcasts, columnists, think tankers, news agencies and counter-terror specialists of all kinds Hafiz Saeed is definitely the evil master mind of Mumbai terrorism but in terms of evidences on record, provided by the Indian government, the case was always a non-starter.
This is nothing to do about innocence or being guilty; its about the evidence. Could it be possible that Indian imperative to focus on Hafiz – even if evidence had to be stretched or fabricated – was driven by the strategic realization that he had been, from 1990’s, an instrument of Pakistan’s state policy on Kashmir and getting him implicated was a necessary step in getting Pakistan in the dock. In 1992, the then Indian PM, Narasimha Rao, had ordered Indian intelligence, in what has been described as “Rao Doctrine” to initiate a strategy of isolating Pakistan by getting it declared as a “terrorist state”.
Al Faran terror group, that abducted western tourists and beheaded some, appeared soon afterwards. Pakistanis and their jihadi assets in Kashmir had immediately cried that “Al Faran” appears to be an Indian ploy. Almost 18 years later, two British scholars, Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott, armed with massive research, in their book, “Meadow- Kashmir; Where the terror began” argued, as cautiously as they could, that Al Faran was under the control of Indian intelligence that did not want a negotiated outcome and wanted to prolong it. Pakistanis had always argued that Al Faran was a narrative shaping bombshell.
Altaf Hussain & London: An interesting comparison Case of MQM leader, Altaf Hussain, offers an interesting extension – and perhaps international dimension – to the strategic battles being fought in South Asia. Even before the Sept 2010 murder of Dr. Imran Farooq, on Green Lane, London hundreds of people in Pakistan – police officers, MQM insiders, media reporters of Karachi, intelligence officers etc – were convinced, beyond any degree of doubt, that Altaf Hussain was directly responsible for widespread extortions, abductions and the cycles of violence that hit Karachi again and again.
And thatscores of people, including MQM workers, police officers, businessmen and at least one Army officer were tortured and killed on his orders. At the time of infamous NRO deal struck between Gen. Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto, in 2007, more than thirty murder charges (police FIRs) existed against his name – and were dropped. So most Pakistanis, especially denizens of Karachi, immediately concluded, in the Sept of 2010, that Dr. Imran Farooq’s murder in London will be nothing but work of Altaf Hussain.
They were however sure that this time, Karachi’s mafia don has murdered a man in the wrong place – and will be punished. London police showed lots of activity, interviewed hundreds, made preliminary arrests and things kept on moving from one to the other level –but almost eight years down the line justice for Dr. Imran Farooq remains more elusive than ever. In the end, the matter remained stuck on a strange point. UK Home office wanted the extradition of only Mohsin Ali Syed (main murder accused; since Kashif Khan Kamran had died in Pakistani custody) but Pakistani interior minister, Ch. Nisar, and intelligence community insisted on handing over Khalid Shamim and Muazzam Ali along with Moshin.
Why? Difficult to be sure, but some sources argue that Pakistanis remained worried that British are only interested in the man, Mohsin, who was the actual killer of Dr. Imran Farooq, on Green Lane whereas killing was planned and ordered on instructions of Altaf Hussain and Khalid Shamim and Muazzzm Ali allegedly – as per their confessions – the masterminds who, as per orders from Altaf Hussain, had sent Mohsin and Kashif to London for killing Dr. Imran Farooq. During the murder investigations, London police, in 2012, trampled upon almost half a million pound of cash in Altaf’s office and home.
In post 9/11 and 7/7 legal and political atmosphere this was worst than committing blasphemy in Mecca or Vatican. Money laundering investigations were initiated; once again hopes were up that now he is done; after all this is London and not Karachi or Mumbai. Four years later, a defeated London Metropolitan police dropped the charges and returned the cash. “The return of the money to Mr Merchant and the MQM marks a humiliating climb-down for the UK police” observed Owen Bennet Jones, respected British journalist and author who himself had assiduously followed the whole case against Altaf Hussian.
He further revealed that “sources close to the police investigation always insisted that they would not return the MQM’s cash. Asset confiscations require a lower burden of proof than money laundering charges. But it turns out the UK authorities have been unable to meet even that lesser threshold” UK-based lawyers argue that one of the reasons the money laundering case against Altaf Hussain failed was the UK authorities’ reluctance to use “terrorism legislation” as opposed to the Proceeds of Crimes Act. Although the US describes the MQM as a Tier 3 terrorist organization, neither the UK nor Pakistan has made a similar designation.
Then in August 2016, Altaf was caught on TV cameras instigating a mob attack on offices of a TV station in Karachi, one man died several were injured. Though this kind of activity was nothing new for him but this time watertight evidence existed; London police was first least interested and then it was busy finding the right English transcripts and translations of his speech to determine if it constituted hate speech.
Indian funding to MQM in London
During the murder and money laundering investigations, interesting things poured out. One of these was a statement, which Tariq Mir, Chief Accountant of MQM London, gave to British police in an interview under caution. It was leaked to the media. It revealed that MQM and Altaf Hussain were receiving substantial funds from Indian intelligence agency RAW, from 1994 onwards. “Indian government funded us because they thought it was good to support us” he explained. Tariq Mir provided details of meeting with RAW officials in Rome, Vienna, Zurich and a small city of Austria (Salzburg); they were getting around $800,000 a year. Payments were initially in US dollars but later due to exchange problems they started getting in pounds.
A few days later, London police, through a short email, denied the possession of any such transcript. However, Sarfaraz Merchant, one of the co-accused in the same case along with Tariq Mir later filed a report with Pakistani Agency, FIA (FIR: 5/17) in October 2017 stating that “After I was granted bail and during the course of the investigation, a document, ‘pre-interview briefing’ dated April 15, 2015, was handed to me by the police, which gave the entire background of the case. The police sought for me to read it and prepare answers to the queries of the investigation officer,” Merchant added that in this pre-interview document he was told that among other charges, Tariq Mir and Mohammad Anwar, MQM leaders, had revealed that MQM was receiving funds from the Indian government.
UK police investigations did not go anywhere despite the fact that during this time period, courts in the UK were increasingly getting cognizant of the terrorism related nature of MQM politics in Karachi. In 2011, a British judge, Lord Bannatyne, adjudicating an asylum appeal case, of an ex-police officer from Karachi, recorded that “the MQM has killed over 200 police officers who have stood up against them in Karachi”. In 2016 another British judge hearing another such case found: “There is overwhelming objective evidence that the MQM for decades had been using violence.”
Why British police miserably failed to prosecute Altaf Hussian on any of these charges – murder, money laundering and incitement of violence – remains a mystery at best. There are three kinds of arguments: One, British interests in Pakistani politics did not permit a conclusive outcome against Altaf Hussain and its external intelligence agency, MI6, considered Altaf and his key elements of MQM as their “strategic assets”- and James Bond 007 is powerful even outside the movies. Second, the Indian government was alarmed by the kind of confessions being made and breathed onto British government to block a possible prosecution.
Off-course British Foreign and Home Offices strongly deny these “conspiracy theories”; their “mainstream narrative” sanctioned by Her Majesty’s government is that London Metropolitan Police and Crown Prosecution Service are totally independent and Crown Prosecution was not convinced that a court case exists. Maybe Her Majesty’s Government is right and there was no real case; may be facts in front of British police were different than the media disclosures, maybe pieces of evidence were weak and maybe London did not get the needed cooperation from Pakistan.
But let’s move backward to Hafiz Saeed and others accused in Pakistan. While workings, investigations of London Metropolitan remained mostly hidden and non-transparent, FIA in Pakistan, under political pressure, quickly charged the accused; it presented whatever evidence it had from Indians in court, court proceedings were widely reported and discussed world wide – again and again accused had to be released because there is apparently no logical evidence that can stand legal scrutiny. But international narrative on these proceedings is driven mainly by the Indian media and keeps repeating the same old charges.
Who benefitted from Mumbai terrorism?
Elias Davidsson’s book, “The Betrayal of India: Revisiting the 26/11 Evidence” was published in June of 2017; despite excellent book reviews by Prof. McQueen and others it was mostly ignored in Pakistan. Only with developments at FATF, it found interest on Pakistani websites. Davidsson, in 920 pages, offered a threadbare examination of the case – evidence, testimonies – and conduct of prosecution and courts.
In his conclusions at the end of the book, Davidsson encourages his readers to assess separately the actual attacks and the Indian state’s overall investigation of the attacks (865 ff.) It is “highly plausible,” he argues, “that major institutional actor in India, the United States and possibly Israel, were complicit in conceiving, planning, directing and executing the attacks of 26/11” (873); but the evidence of a deceptive investigation is even stronger; quoting Prof. McQueen:
“The first definite conclusion of this book is that India’s major institutions, including the Central government, parliament, bureaucracy, armed forces, Mumbai police, intelligence services, judiciary, and media, have deliberately suppressed the truth regarding 26/11 and continue to do so. I could discover no hint of a desire among the aforementioned parties to establish the truth on these deadly events (865).”
This judgement may be too strong and harsh and sounds like another “conspiracy theory” from the opposite direction – especially the role of US and Israeli institutions – however his conclusions that Mumbai terrorism benefitted Indian institutions (Defense budget hiked by 21% immediately) and helped India, US, UK, and Israel come together and strengthened right-wing Hindutva politics in India makes lots of historical sense. Mumbai terrorism, on the other hand, gave nothing to Pakistan for its supposed actions – and its obvious on a glance that such act of mass terrorism on an urban center –through groups linked with Pakistan – would not have benefitted Pakistan in any way.
If things be seen a bit objectively then Pakistan emerges as the net loser of Mumbai terrorism; its international standing nose-dived, its relationship with the US for which it made major adjustments and painful sacrifices by supporting an ill-defined war in Afghanistan (braced itself to several insurgencies, supported covertly by India leading to almost 100,00 dead since 9/11) suffered immensely. Ten years after the Mumbai terrorism, Pakistan is still battling its ghost and India has acquired a “strategic tool” in the form of an unending multiplying narrative that it uses to isolate Pakistan across the world and is trying to force a “political re-engineering” of Pakistani state as per its own needs.
What appears as India’s final success at FATF, courtesy US help, may be the beginning of a new long drawn struggle toward United Nations Security Council. “Rao Doctrine” of 1992 had never become obsolete; it is on track and is assuming new forms and dimensions. Today, it is not about Hafiz Saeed or LeT or JuD; its also not about Kashmir; this is not 1990’s, now it is about isolating and reengineering Pakistani politics, and its state institutions, through international pressures without the engine of traditional war.
It is about CPEC, about access to Central Asia, it is about isolating Pakistan from the western world and disrupting its relations with China; it is about the battle for global commons in and around South Asia. Walking down a slippery path, under Indian dictations, coming via Washington, will not give any security or peace to Pakistan – it needs “out of box solutions”. Apparently Pakistan’s decision-making elites – in the foreign office, army, strategic community and political parties – have no idea how to get rid of the “Albatross” around their neck. It’s not about Hafiz Seed, stupid! It’s about Pakistan; it’s about all of us. Wake up and smell the coffee.
Moeed Pirzada is Editor Strategic Affairs and a prominent TV Anchor with Dunya News in Pakistan. He writes extensively and lectures widely on international issues. He studied international relations at Columbia University, New York and law at London School of Economics and Political Science as Britannia Chevening Scholar. He tweets at: MoeedNj
