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The Triple Agent’: The final days of the suicide bomber who attacked the CIA…!

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Moeed Pirzada | FB Blog |

The Triple Agent’: The final days of the suicide bomber who attacked the CIA

By Joby Warrick, Published The CIA believed he was a “golden source,” a top-secret informant who had penetrated al-Qaeda and brought the agency within striking distance of the terrorist group’s senior leadership. But Humam al-Balawi, a Jordanian pediatrician turned spy, was not what he seemed. In late 2009, several months before the CIA learned of Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani hideout, Balawi appeared to offer the agency the best chance in a decade to find and kill al-Qaeda’s then-No. 2 leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. But his stunning reports from inside the terrorists’ camp were part of an elaborate trap that culminated in the deaths of nine intelligence operatives, including seven Americans, at a CIA base in eastern Afghanistan. The strike was the deadliest blow against the agency in a quarter-century. In this excerpt from his forthcoming book, “The Triple Agent,” Washington Post reporter Joby Warrick traces Balawi’s treacherous final days as he first avoids, and then commits to, the sacrifice of his own life to kill his enemies. The Pashtun tribesman known as al-Qaeda’s tailor lived in a house near the village of Datta Khel in the Pakistani tribal region of North Waziristan, where he made a living making suicide vests. One morning in mid-December, he sat at his antique sewing machine to fill yet another order, this one very different from the vests he usually made.

The man was celebrated for his ingeniously simple designs that were both reliable and cheap. He started with a sturdy cotton vest, often surplus military gear from the local bazaar, and attached thick straps so it could be secured snugly against the torso. He added fabric pouches and stuffed them with packets of white acetone peroxide powder, an explosive that can be cooked up at home using common ingredients. Next came the shrapnel layer, which consisted of hundreds of nails or other bits of metal glued to sheets of thick, adhesive-backed paper or cloth. Finally, he inserted blasting caps in the powder and attached them to wires that ran to a small nine-volt battery and a cheap detonator switch. The latter item he sewed into a separate pouch that closed with a zipper. That, he explained, was to prevent excitable young martyrs-to-be from blowing themselves up too quickly. An extra second or two of fumbling with the zipper would remind the bomber to move in closer to his target to ensure the maximum possible carnage.

On this day a group of young Pakistani recruits, some of them tapped as future suicide bombers, gathered to admire the vestmaker as he worked. One of them took photos with his cellphone as the man reached into his explosives chest and pulled out a surprise: not the usual bags of powder, but doughy sticks of a far more powerful military explosive called C4. He kneaded the sticks to flatten them and began to pack them into a row of 13 fabric pouches he had sewn onto the outside of the vest. Next he dipped a paintbrush into a bucket of industrial adhesive and slathered the white goo over a large square of sturdy cotton. The man then patiently studded the sheet with metal bits, piece by piece and row by row, alternating marble-size steel ball bearings with nails and scrap and, finally, some children’s jacks.

Among the spectators, there had been lively discussions about the man who was likely to wear the special vest. Most speculation centered on the young Jordanian physician whom the recruits called Abu Leila, using the Arab practice of referring to men by the name of their oldest child and the word abu, or “father of.” But Leila’s father wasn’t nearly so certain. Before he left for Pakistan, Humam al-Balawi imagined himself a mujaheddin, a holy warrior, fighting and maybe even dying in a righteous struggle against the enemies of God. What he hadn’t pictured for himself was a suicide vest. The one in the tailor’s shop in Datta Khel was coming together, row after metal-studded row, but there was still time. In the coming days Balawi tried his best to make sure that the vest ended up belonging to someone else. Anyone but him. ***

The forces that would compel Balawi’s arrival at the CIA base at Khost, in eastern Afghanistan, had been gathering momentum for months. The crude outlines of Balawi’s course had been set 10 months earlier in Amman, Jordan, when he volunteered to work as a spy, and weeks later, when intelligence officers dispatched him to Pakistan despite his utter lack of experience. The path became clearer when a CIA missile killed Balawi’s Pakistani host, Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud, heightening the militants’ thirst for revenge. On the U.S. side, the pace quickened when Balawi sent the CIA photographic proof that he had cracked al-Qaeda’s inner circle. From its highest levels, the agency was determined to confront Balawi. The only question was where.

Only one location made sense for the meeting, wrote Sharif Ali bin Zeid, a Jordanian intelligence officer who was Balawi’s handler, in an e-mail to his agent. It was the American base at Khost, just across the Afghan border. Balawi could travel there quickly and return to Pakistan before anyone missed him. Khost offered complete security and protection from accidental discovery by Taliban spies. But Balawi seemed uninterested in coming to the CIA base. As he well knew, going to Khost would be akin to breaking into a prison. There would no chance for an ambush or kidnapping, and no al-Qaeda fighters waiting for the command to attack. Even if he could somehow smuggle a gun onto the base, he would almost certainly be disarmed or killed before he could squeeze off a single round. Not possible, he wrote back.

A visit to the CIA base did offer one way to strike a blow against Jordanian intelligence and possibly the Americans as well. But this option would be a solo mission and a one-way trip. To succeed, he would have to somehow make it past layer after layer of security, starting with multiple rings of Afghan and American guards, followed by pat-downs, bomb-sniffing dogs and metal detectors. His likeliest victims might well be the low-paid Pashtun wretches who stood sentry outside the base.

Balawi’s feelings about a possible suicide mission can be deduced from the urgency of his efforts to avoid Khost. Through early December 2009, and continuing for weeks after bin Zeid arrived at the American base, he begged the Jordanian intelligence officer to come to him instead, in the town of Miranshah on the Pakistani frontier. Next he offered Ghulam Khan, a checkpoint on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border on the highway that runs from Miranshah to Khost. The answer from bin Zeid was the same: Come to Khost. His options dwindling as December neared its end, Balawi sat down one evening to write, as though he could somehow exorcise his doubts by putting them on paper.

“I have often wished to know what is going on in the head of a martyr before the martyrdom-seeking operation,” he wrote. “It is now my turn today to fulfill the wishes of others.”

He began to list his private fears, pausing to admit deep misgivings about the value of suicide attacks. The problem, he acknowledged, is that one could “only do it once in your life,” and there was a real chance that he would fail and squander his life for nothing. A harder question was whether he could go through with it. How would he feel in those final seconds, with only a slight twitch of his finger separating him from annihilation?

“Do you not fear to be cowardly at the last moment,” he asked himself, “and be unable to press the button?” On Dec. 28, Balawi e-mailed a brief note to his countryman bin Zeid. You win, he wrote. I’ll meet your driver in Miranshah. Afterward Balawi and two al-Qaeda associates drove to a field to record some video footage of the Jordanian firing a few rounds from an AK-47, the gun jerking upward as bullets kicked up dust spouts in the distance. Then he went to his room to put on the suicide vest. He tightened straps that bore the weight of 30 pounds of explosive and metal. He put on his khameez shirt and gray patou, the shawl-like blanket that doubles as a cloak and mobile prayer mat, and walked back outside, where his friend with the video camera was waiting beside a white hatchback.

Balawi sat in the driver’s seat as the camera rolled. He had decided that his martyr’s message should be in English, to ensure the widest audience if the video made its way to the Internet, and he had chosen lines intended to project a kind of cinematic, bad-guy toughness, as though he were a Hollywood mobster delivering an ultimatum.

“We will get you, CIA team. Insha’Allah — God willing — we will bring you down,” he said. “Don’t think that just by pressing a button and killing mujaheddin, you are safe,” a reference to missile strikes from CIA drones. “Insha’Allah, we’ll come to you in an unexpected way.”

Balawi raised his left hand to reveal what appeared to be a wristwatch beneath his sleeve. “Look, this is for you: It’s not a watch, it’s a detonator,” he said. But the tough-guy routine was falling short. Balawi seemed agitated and bitter, and he turned his head from the camera whenever he finished a thought. His eyes were red as he spit out his last words.

“This is my goal: to kill you, and to kill your Jordanian partner, and Insha’Allah, I will go to al-Firdaws — paradise,” he said. “And you will be sent to hell.”
With the final phrase his voice cracked, as though he were straining to fight back tears. Balawi looked away, and the image went dark.
***

Balawi scanned the line of cars and taxis, holding the crutch he used in the aftermath of a leg injury, looking for his ride. It was mid-afternoon on Dec. 30 when he finally arrived at Ghulam Khan, the only border crossing between Pakistan’s North Waziristan province and Afghanistan. The checkpoint, a cluster of mud-brick buildings on the Pakistani side, was manned by a handful of guards with rifles and one antique machine gun with its barrel pointed toward Afghanistan.

Balawi found his contact, a tall, solidly built Afghan gesturing to him from the cluster of taxis. Greeting Balawi in Pashtun-accented English, the Afghan officer, called Arghawan, opened the door of a small sedan to let Balawi inside. The driver mumbled a few words into his cellphone, and the two men began an hour-long trek down the mountains and into a dry plateau on the Afghan side of the border.

Sometime after 4:30 p.m., a large airfield appeared in the distance.Khost. Balawi used the driver’s cellphone to dial a number, and in a moment a voice in familiar Arabic came on the line.

“Salam alekum,” said bin Zeid. Peace be with you.

Balawi apologized for the delay and repeated his concerns about being poked and prodded by Afghan guards who might well be spies. “You’ll treat me like a friend, right?” he asked. Bin Zeid was reassuring.

The car slowed at the approach to the main gate of the Khost base and passed through a canyon of high walls that narrowed at one end, channeling vehicles into the kill zone of a 50-caliber machine gun. Balawi sat low in his seat, the weight of the heavy vest pressing against his gut, but as bin Zeid had promised, there was no search. Arghawan turned left into the main entrance, and the car barely slowed as it zigzagged around a final series of barriers and into the open expanse of the Khost airfield.

The car turned left again to travel along the edge of the runway, past tanker trucks and dun-colored armored troop carriers. Balawi, in his writings, had imagined the djinn — devils — and their whispered doubts.

“Are you going to perform jihad and get yourself killed, and let your wife remarry and your children become orphans? “To whom are you leaving your pretty wife? Who will be dutiful to your frail mother? “How can you abandon your wonderful work?”

There was an opening in a wall, and Arghawan steered the car through a second open checkpoint and then turned left through a third. Balawi was now inside a fortified compound with walls of stacked barriers 10 feet high and topped with razor wire. On the side of the compound opposite the gate were five newly constructed buildings with metal roofs and a few smaller ones. The next-to-last building in the row had a wide awning. Balawi could see a large cluster of people scattered in front of it, a welcome party that included CIA officers and security contractors. ***

Arghawan stopped the vehicle in the middle of a gravel lot in front of the building, parallel to the awning but several car lengths away from it. From his spot in the back seat behind the driver, Balawi could see bin Zeid, wearing a camouflage hat and standing next to a larger man in jeans and a baseball cap.

Balawi was staring blankly at the group when the car door opened and he was suddenly face to face with a bear of a man with a close-cropped beard and piercing blue eyes. One gloved hand reached for Balawi, and the other clutched an assault rifle, its barrel pointed down. Balawi froze. Then, slowly, he began backing away, pushing himself along the seat’s edge away from the figure with the gun.

Balawi squeezed the door handle on the opposite side and climbed out of the car, swinging his injured leg onto the gravel lot, and then the good one. Painfully he pulled himself erect, leaning on his metal crutch for support. Bin Zeid called out to him, but Balawi would not look up.

He began walking in a slow-motion hobble as his right hand felt for the detonator.

Just at the brink, the djinn would pose the most awful questions, he had written. “Who will take care of your little child? And your elderly father?”

Men were shouting at him now, agitated, guns drawn. “It is said in the Hadith that he who says, ‘There is no God but God alone and praise be to Him,’ he is protected by God from Satan on that day,” Balawi had written. “On the day of the martyrdom-seeking operation, the enemy of God will not reach you.”

Now Balawi mouthed the words softly in Arabic. “La ilaha illa Allah!” There is no god but God. Men were shouting loudly, yelling about his hand, but still Balawi walked. He could hear his own voice growing more distinct.
“La ilaha illa Allah!”

Balawi’s path was now blocked. He looked up to see that he was surrounded on two sides by men with guns drawn. The bearded man who had opened the car door had circled around him and was shouting at him from his left, and two other heavily armed officers stood directly in front of Balawi, trapping him against the car with no way forward or back. One of the men, blond and younger than the others, was crouching as though preparing to lunge.

Balawi turned slightly, finger locked on the detonator, and looked across the top of the car. The smiles had vanished, and bin Zeid was starting to move toward him. As he did, the tall man beside him grabbed his shoulder to pull him back.

Balawi closed his eyes. His finger made the slightest twitch.

 

The triple agent’: The final days of the suicide bomber who attacked the CIA…!

Moeed Pirzada |

By Joby Warrick, Published The CIA believed he was a “golden source,” a top-secret informant who had penetrated al-Qaeda and brought the agency within striking distance of the terrorist group’s senior leadership. But Humam al-Balawi, a Jordanian pediatrician turned spy, was not what he seemed. In late 2009, several months before the CIA learned of Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani hideout, Balawi appeared to offer the agency the best chance in a decade to find and kill al-Qaeda’s then-No. 2 leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. But his stunning reports from inside the terrorists’ camp were part of an elaborate trap that culminated in the deaths of nine intelligence operatives, including seven Americans, at a CIA base in eastern Afghanistan. The strike was the deadliest blow against the agency in a quarter-century. In this excerpt from his forthcoming book, “The Triple Agent,” Washington Post reporter Joby Warrick traces Balawi’s treacherous final days as he first avoids, and then commits to, the sacrifice of his own life to kill his enemies. The Pashtun tribesman known as al-Qaeda’s tailor lived in a house near the village of Datta Khel in the Pakistani tribal region of North Waziristan, where he made a living making suicide vests. One morning in mid-December, he sat at his antique sewing machine to fill yet another order, this one very different from the vests he usually made.

The man was celebrated for his ingeniously simple designs that were both reliable and cheap. He started with a sturdy cotton vest, often surplus military gear from the local bazaar, and attached thick straps so it could be secured snugly against the torso. He added fabric pouches and stuffed them with packets of white acetone peroxide powder, an explosive that can be cooked up at home using common ingredients. Next came the shrapnel layer, which consisted of hundreds of nails or other bits of metal glued to sheets of thick, adhesive-backed paper or cloth. Finally, he inserted blasting caps in the powder and attached them to wires that ran to a small nine-volt battery and a cheap detonator switch. The latter item he sewed into a separate pouch that closed with a zipper. That, he explained, was to prevent excitable young martyrs-to-be from blowing themselves up too quickly. An extra second or two of fumbling with the zipper would remind the bomber to move in closer to his target to ensure the maximum possible carnage.

The problem, he acknowledged, is that one could “only do it once in your life,” and there was a real chance that he would fail and squander his life for nothing. A harder question was whether he could go through with it. How would he feel in those final seconds, with only a slight twitch of his finger separating him from annihilation?

On this day a group of young Pakistani recruits, some of them tapped as future suicide bombers, gathered to admire the vestmaker as he worked. One of them took photos with his cellphone as the man reached into his explosives chest and pulled out a surprise: not the usual bags of powder, but doughy sticks of a far more powerful military explosive called C4. He kneaded the sticks to flatten them and began to pack them into a row of 13 fabric pouches he had sewn onto the outside of the vest. Next he dipped a paintbrush into a bucket of industrial adhesive and slathered the white goo over a large square of sturdy cotton. The man then patiently studded the sheet with metal bits, piece by piece and row by row, alternating marble-size steel ball bearings with nails and scrap and, finally, some children’s jacks.

Among the spectators, there had been lively discussions about the man who was likely to wear the special vest. Most speculation centered on the young Jordanian physician whom the recruits called Abu Leila, using the Arab practice of referring to men by the name of their oldest child and the word abu, or “father of.” But Leila’s father wasn’t nearly so certain. Before he left for Pakistan, Humam al-Balawi imagined himself a mujaheddin, a holy warrior, fighting and maybe even dying in a righteous struggle against the enemies of God. What he hadn’t pictured for himself was a suicide vest. The one in the tailor’s shop in Datta Khel was coming together, row after metal-studded row, but there was still time. In the coming days Balawi tried his best to make sure that the vest ended up belonging to someone else. Anyone but him. ***

The forces that would compel Balawi’s arrival at the CIA base at Khost, in eastern Afghanistan, had been gathering momentum for months. The crude outlines of Balawi’s course had been set 10 months earlier in Amman, Jordan, when he volunteered to work as a spy, and weeks later, when intelligence officers dispatched him to Pakistan despite his utter lack of experience. The path became clearer when a CIA missile killed Balawi’s Pakistani host, Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud, heightening the militants’ thirst for revenge. On the U.S. side, the pace quickened when Balawi sent the CIA photographic proof that he had cracked al-Qaeda’s inner circle. From its highest levels, the agency was determined to confront Balawi. The only question was where.

Only one location made sense for the meeting, wrote Sharif Ali bin Zeid, a Jordanian intelligence officer who was Balawi’s handler, in an e-mail to his agent. It was the American base at Khost, just across the Afghan border. Balawi could travel there quickly and return to Pakistan before anyone missed him. Khost offered complete security and protection from accidental discovery by Taliban spies. But Balawi seemed uninterested in coming to the CIA base. As he well knew, going to Khost would be akin to breaking into a prison. There would no chance for an ambush or kidnapping, and no al-Qaeda fighters waiting for the command to attack. Even if he could somehow smuggle a gun onto the base, he would almost certainly be disarmed or killed before he could squeeze off a single round. Not possible, he wrote back.

A visit to the CIA base did offer one way to strike a blow against Jordanian intelligence and possibly the Americans as well. But this option would be a solo mission and a one-way trip. To succeed, he would have to somehow make it past layer after layer of security, starting with multiple rings of Afghan and American guards, followed by pat-downs, bomb-sniffing dogs and metal detectors. His likeliest victims might well be the low-paid Pashtun wretches who stood sentry outside the base.

Balawi’s feelings about a possible suicide mission can be deduced from the urgency of his efforts to avoid Khost. Through early December 2009, and continuing for weeks after bin Zeid arrived at the American base, he begged the Jordanian intelligence officer to come to him instead, in the town of Miranshah on the Pakistani frontier. Next he offered Ghulam Khan, a checkpoint on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border on the highway that runs from Miranshah to Khost. The answer from bin Zeid was the same: Come to Khost. His options dwindling as December neared its end, Balawi sat down one evening to write, as though he could somehow exorcise his doubts by putting them on paper.

“I have often wished to know what is going on in the head of a martyr before the martyrdom-seeking operation,” he wrote. “It is now my turn today to fulfill the wishes of others.”

He began to list his private fears, pausing to admit deep misgivings about the value of suicide attacks. The problem, he acknowledged, is that one could “only do it once in your life,” and there was a real chance that he would fail and squander his life for nothing. A harder question was whether he could go through with it. How would he feel in those final seconds, with only a slight twitch of his finger separating him from annihilation?

“Do you not fear to be cowardly at the last moment,” he asked himself, “and be unable to press the button?” On Dec. 28, Balawi e-mailed a brief note to his countryman bin Zeid. You win, he wrote. I’ll meet your driver in Miranshah. Afterward Balawi and two al-Qaeda associates drove to a field to record some video footage of the Jordanian firing a few rounds from an AK-47, the gun jerking upward as bullets kicked up dust spouts in the distance. Then he went to his room to put on the suicide vest. He tightened straps that bore the weight of 30 pounds of explosive and metal. He put on his khameez shirt and gray patou, the shawl-like blanket that doubles as a cloak and mobile prayer mat, and walked back outside, where his friend with the video camera was waiting beside a white hatchback.

Balawi sat in the driver’s seat as the camera rolled. He had decided that his martyr’s message should be in English, to ensure the widest audience if the video made its way to the Internet, and he had chosen lines intended to project a kind of cinematic, bad-guy toughness, as though he were a Hollywood mobster delivering an ultimatum.

“We will get you, CIA team. Insha’Allah — God willing — we will bring you down,” he said. “Don’t think that just by pressing a button and killing mujaheddin, you are safe,” a reference to missile strikes from CIA drones. “Insha’Allah, we’ll come to you in an unexpected way.”

Balawi raised his left hand to reveal what appeared to be a wristwatch beneath his sleeve. “Look, this is for you: It’s not a watch, it’s a detonator,” he said. But the tough-guy routine was falling short. Balawi seemed agitated and bitter, and he turned his head from the camera whenever he finished a thought. His eyes were red as he spit out his last words.

“This is my goal: to kill you, and to kill your Jordanian partner, and Insha’Allah, I will go to al-Firdaws — paradise,” he said. “And you will be sent to hell.”
With the final phrase his voice cracked, as though he were straining to fight back tears. Balawi looked away, and the image went dark.
***

Balawi scanned the line of cars and taxis, holding the crutch he used in the aftermath of a leg injury, looking for his ride. It was mid-afternoon on Dec. 30 when he finally arrived at Ghulam Khan, the only border crossing between Pakistan’s North Waziristan province and Afghanistan. The checkpoint, a cluster of mud-brick buildings on the Pakistani side, was manned by a handful of guards with rifles and one antique machine gun with its barrel pointed toward Afghanistan.

Balawi found his contact, a tall, solidly built Afghan gesturing to him from the cluster of taxis. Greeting Balawi in Pashtun-accented English, the Afghan officer, called Arghawan, opened the door of a small sedan to let Balawi inside. The driver mumbled a few words into his cellphone, and the two men began an hour-long trek down the mountains and into a dry plateau on the Afghan side of the border.

Sometime after 4:30 p.m., a large airfield appeared in the distance.Khost. Balawi used the driver’s cellphone to dial a number, and in a moment a voice in familiar Arabic came on the line.

“Salam alekum,” said bin Zeid. Peace be with you.

Balawi apologized for the delay and repeated his concerns about being poked and prodded by Afghan guards who might well be spies. “You’ll treat me like a friend, right?” he asked. Bin Zeid was reassuring.

The car slowed at the approach to the main gate of the Khost base and passed through a canyon of high walls that narrowed at one end, channeling vehicles into the kill zone of a 50-caliber machine gun. Balawi sat low in his seat, the weight of the heavy vest pressing against his gut, but as bin Zeid had promised, there was no search. Arghawan turned left into the main entrance, and the car barely slowed as it zigzagged around a final series of barriers and into the open expanse of the Khost airfield.

The car turned left again to travel along the edge of the runway, past tanker trucks and dun-colored armored troop carriers. Balawi, in his writings, had imagined the djinn — devils — and their whispered doubts.

“Are you going to perform jihad and get yourself killed, and let your wife remarry and your children become orphans? “To whom are you leaving your pretty wife? Who will be dutiful to your frail mother? “How can you abandon your wonderful work?”

Before he left for Pakistan, Humam al-Balawi imagined himself a mujaheddin, a holy warrior, fighting and maybe even dying in a righteous struggle against the enemies of God. What he hadn’t pictured for himself was a suicide vest. The one in the tailor’s shop in Datta Khel was coming together, row after metal-studded row, but there was still time. In the coming days Balawi tried his best to make sure that the vest ended up belonging to someone else. Anyone but him.

There was an opening in a wall, and Arghawan steered the car through a second open checkpoint and then turned left through a third. Balawi was now inside a fortified compound with walls of stacked barriers 10 feet high and topped with razor wire. On the side of the compound opposite the gate were five newly constructed buildings with metal roofs and a few smaller ones. The next-to-last building in the row had a wide awning. Balawi could see a large cluster of people scattered in front of it, a welcome party that included CIA officers and security contractors. ***

Arghawan stopped the vehicle in the middle of a gravel lot in front of the building, parallel to the awning but several car lengths away from it. From his spot in the back seat behind the driver, Balawi could see bin Zeid, wearing a camouflage hat and standing next to a larger man in jeans and a baseball cap.

Balawi was staring blankly at the group when the car door opened and he was suddenly face to face with a bear of a man with a close-cropped beard and piercing blue eyes. One gloved hand reached for Balawi, and the other clutched an assault rifle, its barrel pointed down. Balawi froze. Then, slowly, he began backing away, pushing himself along the seat’s edge away from the figure with the gun.

Balawi squeezed the door handle on the opposite side and climbed out of the car, swinging his injured leg onto the gravel lot, and then the good one. Painfully he pulled himself erect, leaning on his metal crutch for support. Bin Zeid called out to him, but Balawi would not look up.

He began walking in a slow-motion hobble as his right hand felt for the detonator.

Just at the brink, the djinn would pose an awful questions, he had written. “Who will take care of your little child? And your elderly father?”

Men were shouting at him now, agitated, guns were drawn. “It is said in the Hadith that he who says, ‘There is no God but God alone and praise be to Him,’ he is protected by God from Satan on that day,” Balawi had written. “On the day of the martyrdom-seeking operation, the enemy of God will not reach you.”

Now Balawi mouthed the words softly in Arabic. “La ilaha illa Allah!” There is no god but God. Men were shouting loudly, yelling about his hand, but still Balawi walked. He could hear his own voice growing more distinct.
“La ilaha illa Allah!”

Balawi’s path was now blocked. He looked up to see that he was surrounded on two sides by men with guns drawn. The bearded man who had opened the car door had circled around him and was shouting at him from his left, and two other heavily armed officers stood directly in front of Balawi, trapping him against the car with no way forward or back. One of the men, blond and younger than the others, was crouching as though preparing to lunge.

Balawi turned slightly, finger locked on the detonator, and looked across the top of the car. The smiles had vanished, and bin Zeid was starting to move toward him. As he did, the tall man beside him grabbed his shoulder to pull him back.

Balawi closed his eyes. His finger made the slightest twitch.

 

Moeed Pirzada is prominent TV Anchor & commentator; he studied international relations at Columbia Univ, New York and law at London School of Economics. Twitter: MoeedNj. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy. This piece was first published in Moeed Pirzada’s official page. It has been reproduced with permission.

 

CIA instigating mutiny in the Pakistani Army??_MK Bhadrakumar, Ex Indian Ambassador on New York Times story of 15th June…!

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Moeed Pirzada | FB Blog |

CIA instigating mutiny in the Pakistani army

By M K Bhadrakumar The unthinkable is happening. The United States is confronting the Pakistani military leadership of General Parvez Kayani. An extremely dangerous course to destabilise Pakistan is commencing. Can the outcome be any different than in Iran in 1979? But then, the Americans are like Bourbons; they never learn from their mistakes.

The NYT report today is unprecedented. The report quotes US officials not less than 7 times , which is extraordinary, including “an American military official involved with Pakistan for many years”; “a senior American official”, etc. The dispatch is cleverly drafted to convey the impression that a number of Pakistanis have been spoken to, but reading between the lines, conceivably, these could also probably have been indirect attribution by the American sources. A careful reading, in fact, suggests that the dispatch is almost entirely based on deep briefing by some top US intelligence official with great access to records relating to the most highly sensitive US interactions with the Pak army leadership and who was briefing on the basis of instructions from the highest level of the US intelligence apparatus. The report no doubt underscores that the US intelligence penetration of the Pak defence forces goes very deep. It is no joke to get a Pakistani officer taking part in an exclusive briefing by Kayani at the National Defence University to share his notes with the US interlocutors – unless he is their “mole”. This is like a morality play for we Indians, too, where the US intelligence penetration is ever broadening and deepening. Quite obviously, the birds are coming to roost. Pakistani military is paying the price for the big access it provided to the US to interact with its officer corps within the framework of their so-called “strategic partnership”. The Americans are now literally holding the Pakistani army by its jugular veins. This should serve as a big warning for all militaries of developing countries like India (which is also developing intensive “mil-to-mil” ties with the US). In our country at least, it is even terribly unfashionable to speak anymore of CIA activities. The NYT story flags in no uncertain terms that although Cold War is over, history has not ended.

What are the objectives behind the NYT story? In sum, any whichever way we look at it, they all are highly diabolic. One, US is rubbishing army chief Parvez Kayani and ISI head Shuja Pasha who at one time were its own blue-eyed boys and whose successful careers and post-retirement extensions in service the Americans carefully choreographed fostered with a pliant civilian leadership in Islamabad, but now when the crunch time comes, the folks are not “delivering”. In American culture, as they say, there is nothing like free lunch. The Americans are livid that their hefty “investment” has turned out to be a waste in every sense. And. it was a very painstakingly arranged investment, too. In short, the Americans finally realise that they might have made a miscalculation about Kayani when they promoted his career.

Two, US intelligence estimation is that things can only go from bad to worse in US-Pakistan relations from now onward. All that is possible to slavage the relationship has been attempted. John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, Mike Mullen – the so-called “friends of Pakistan” in the Barack Obama administration – have all come to Islamabad and turned on the charm offensive. But nothing worked. Then came CIA boss Leon Panetta with a deal that like Marlon Brando said in the movie Godfather, Americans thought the Pakistanis cannot afford to say ‘No’ to, but to their utter dismay , Kayani showed him the door. The Americans realise that Kayani is fighting for his own survival – and so is Pasha – and that makes him jettison his “pro-American” mindset and harmonise quickly with the overwhelming opinion within the army, which is that the Americans pose a danger to Pakistan’s national security and it is about time that the military leadership draws a red line. Put simply, Pakistan fears that the Americans are out to grab their nuclear stockpile. Pakistani people and the military expect Kayani to disengage from the US-led Afghan war and instead pursue an independent course in terms of the country’s perceived legitimate interests.

Three, there is a US attempt to exploit the growing indiscipline within the Pak army and, if possible, to trigger a mutiny, which will bog down the army leadership in a serious “domestic” crisis that leaves no time for them for the foreseeable future to play any forceful role in Afghanistan. In turn, it leaves the Americans a free hand to pursue their own agenda. Time is of the essence of the matter and the US desperately wants direct access to the Taliban leadership so as to strike a deal with them without the ISI or Hamid Karzai coming in between. The prime US objective is that Taliban should somehow come to a compromise with them on the single most crucial issue of permanent US military bases in Afghanistan. The negotiations over the strategic partnership agreement with Karzai’s government are at a critical point. The Taliban leadership of Mullah Omar robustly opposes the US proposal to set up American and NATO bases on their country. The Americans are willing to take the Taliban off the UN’s sanctions list and allow them to be part of mainstream Afghan political life, including in the top echelons of leadership, provided Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura agree to play ball.

The US tried its damnest to get Kayani to bring the Taliban to the reconciliation path. When these attempts failed, they tried to establish direct contact with the Taliban leadership. But ISI has been constantly frustrating the US intelligence activities in this direction and reminding the US to stick to earlier pledges that Pakistan would have a key role in the negotiations with the Taliban. The CIA and Pentagon have concluded that so long as the Pakistani military leadership remains stubborn, they cannot advance their agenda in Afghanistan.

Now, how do you get Kayani and the ISI to back off? The US knows the style of functioning of the Pakistani military. The army chief essentially works within a collegium of the 9 corps commanders. Thus, US has concluded that it also has to tackle the collegium . The only way is to set the army’s house on fire so that the generals get distracted by the fire-dousing and the massive repair work and housecleaning that they will be called upon to undertake as top priority for months if not years to come. To rebuild a national institution like the armed forces takes years and decades.

Four, the US won’t mind if Kayani is forced to step aside from his position and the Pakistani military leadership breaks up in disarray, as it opens up windows of opportunities to have Kayani and Pasha replaced by more “dependable” people – Uncle Sam’s own men. There is every possibility that the US has been grooming its favourites within the Pak army corps for all contingencies. Pakistan is too important as a “key non-NATO ally”. The CIA is greatly experienced in masterminding coup d-etat, including “in-house” coup d’etat. Almost all the best and the brightest Pak army officers have passed through the US military academies at one time or another. Given the sub-continent’s middle class mindset and post-modern cultural ethos, elites in civil or military life take it for granted that US backing is a useful asset for furthering career. The officers easily succumb to US intelligence entrapment. Many such “sleepers” should be existing there within the Pak army officer corps. The big question remains: has someone in Washington thought through the game plan to tame the Pakistani military? The heart of the matter is that there is virulent “anti-Americanism” within the Pak armed forces. Very often it overlaps with Islamist sympathies. Old-style left wing “anti-Americanism” is almost non-existent in the Pakistani armed forces – as in Ayaz Amir’s time. These tendencies in the military are almost completely in sync with the overwhelming public opinion in the country as well. Over the past 3 decades at least, Pakistani army officers have come to be recruited almost entirely from the lower middle class – as in our country – and not from the landed aristocracy as in the earlier decades up to the 1970s. These social strata are quintessentially right wing in their ideology, nationalistic, and steeped in religiosity that often becomes indistinguishable from militant religious faith.

Given the overall economic crisis in Pakistan and the utterly discredited Pakistani political class (as a whole) and countless other social inequities and tensions building up in an overall climate of cascading violence and great uncertainties about the future gnawing the mind of the average Pakistani today, a lurch toward extreme right wing Islamist path is quite possible. The ingredients in Pakistan are almost nearing those prevailing in Iran in the Shah’s era.

The major difference so far has been that Pakistan has an armed forces “rooted in the soil” as a national institution, which the public respected to the point of revering it, which on its part, sincerely or not, also claimed to be the Praetorian Guards of the Pakistani state. Now, in life, destroying comes very easy. Unless the Americans have some very bright ideas about how to go about nation-building in Pakistan, going by their track record in neighbouring Afghanistan, their present course to discredit the military and incite its disintegration or weakening at the present crisis point, is fraught with immense dangers.

The instability in the region may suit the US’ geo-strategy for consolidating its (and NATO’s) military presence in the region but it will be a highly self-centred, almost cynical, perspective to take on the problem, which has dangerous, almost explosive, potential for regional security. Also, who it is that is in charge of the Pakistan policy in Washington today, we do not know. To my mind, Obama administration doesn’t have a clue since Richard Holbrooke passed away as to how to handle Pakistan. The disturbing news in recent weeks has been that all the old “Pakistan hands” in the USG have left the Obama administration. It seems there has been a steady exodus of officials who knew and understood how Pakistan works, and the depletion is almost one hundred percent. That leaves an open field for the CIA to set the policies. The CIA boss Leon Panetta (who is tipped as defence secretary) is an experienced and ambitious politico who knows how to pull the wires in the Washington jungle – and, to boot it, he has an Italian name. He is unlikely to forgive and forget the humiliation he suffered in Rawalpindi last Friday. The NYT story suggests that it is not in his blood if he doesn’t settle scores with the Rawalpindi crowd. If Marlon Brando were around, he would agree. *Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

NOTE:THIS IS A CROSS POST FROM THE INDIAN PUNCHLINE

CIA instigating mutiny in the Pakistani Military? MK Bhadrakumar, Ex Indian Ambassador on New York Times story of 15th June…!

By M K Bhadrakumar: The unthinkable is happening. The United States is confronting the Pakistani military leadership of General Parvez Kayani. An extremely dangerous course to destabilise Pakistan is commencing. Can the outcome be any different than in Iran in 1979? But then, the Americans are like Bourbons; they never learn from their mistakes.

The NYT report today is unprecedented. The report quotes US officials not less than 7 times , which is extraordinary, including “an American military official involved with Pakistan for many years”; “a senior American official”, etc. The dispatch is cleverly drafted to convey the impression that a number of Pakistanis have been spoken to, but reading between the lines, conceivably, these could also probably have been indirect attribution by the American sources. A careful reading, in fact, suggests that the dispatch is almost entirely based on deep briefing by some top US intelligence official with great access to records relating to the most highly sensitive US interactions with the Pak army leadership and who was briefing on the basis of instructions from the highest level of the US intelligence apparatus.

Over the past 3 decades at least, Pakistani army officers have come to be recruited almost entirely from the lower middle class – as in our country – and not from the landed aristocracy as in the earlier decades up to the 1970s. These social strata are quintessentially right wing in their ideology, nationalistic, and steeped in religiosity that often becomes indistinguishable from militant religious faith.

The report no doubt underscores that the US intelligence penetration of the Pak defence forces goes very deep. It is no joke to get a Pakistani officer taking part in an exclusive briefing by Kayani at the National Defence University to share his notes with the US interlocutors – unless he is their “mole”. This is like a morality play for we Indians, too, where the US intelligence penetration is ever broadening and deepening. Quite obviously, the birds are coming to roost. The Pakistani military is paying the price for the big access it provided to the US to interact with its officer corps within the framework of their so-called “strategic partnership”. The Americans are now literally holding the Pakistani army by its jugular veins. This should serve as a big warning for all militaries of developing countries like India (which is also developing intensive “mil-to-mil” ties with the US). In our country at least, it is even terribly unfashionable to speak anymore of CIA activities. The NYT story flags in no uncertain terms that although Cold War is over, history has not ended.

What are the objectives behind the NYT story? In sum, any whichever way we look at it, they all are highly diabolic. One, US is rubbishing army chief Parvez Kayani and ISI head Shuja Pasha who at one time were its own blue-eyed boys and whose successful careers and post-retirement extensions in service the Americans carefully choreographed fostered with a pliant civilian leadership in Islamabad, but now when the crunch time comes, the folks are not “delivering”. In American culture, as they say, there is nothing like free lunch. The Americans are livid that their hefty “investment” has turned out to be a waste in every sense. And. it was a very painstakingly arranged investment, too. In short, the Americans finally realise that they might have made a miscalculation about Kayani when they promoted his career.

Two, US intelligence estimation is that things can only go from bad to worse in US-Pakistan relations from now onward. All that is possible to slavage the relationship has been attempted. John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, Mike Mullen – the so-called “friends of Pakistan” in the Barack Obama administration – have all come to Islamabad and turned on the charm offensive. But nothing worked. Then came CIA boss Leon Panetta with a deal that like Marlon Brando said in the movie Godfather, Americans thought the Pakistanis cannot afford to say ‘No’ to, but to their utter dismay , Kayani showed him the door. The Americans realise that Kayani is fighting for his own survival – and so is Pasha – and that makes him jettison his “pro-American” mindset and harmonise quickly with the overwhelming opinion within the army, which is that the Americans pose a danger to Pakistan’s national security and it is about time that the military leadership draws a red line. Put simply, Pakistan fears that the Americans are out to grab their nuclear stockpile. Pakistani people and the military expect Kayani to disengage from the US-led Afghan war and instead pursue an independent course in terms of the country’s perceived legitimate interests.

Three, there is a US attempt to exploit the growing indiscipline within the Pak army and, if possible, to trigger a mutiny, which will bog down the army leadership in a serious “domestic” crisis that leaves no time for them for the foreseeable future to play any forceful role in Afghanistan. In turn, it leaves the Americans a free hand to pursue their own agenda. Time is of the essence of the matter and the US desperately wants direct access to the Taliban leadership so as to strike a deal with them without the ISI or Hamid Karzai coming in between. The prime US objective is that Taliban should somehow come to a compromise with them on the single most crucial issue of permanent US military bases in Afghanistan. The negotiations over the strategic partnership agreement with Karzai’s government are at a critical point. The Taliban leadership of Mullah Omar robustly opposes the US proposal to set up American and NATO bases on their country. The Americans are willing to take the Taliban off the UN’s sanctions list and allow them to be part of mainstream Afghan political life, including in the top echelons of leadership, provided Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura agree to play ball.

The US tried its damnest to get Kayani to bring the Taliban to the reconciliation path. When these attempts failed, they tried to establish direct contact with the Taliban leadership. But ISI has been constantly frustrating the US intelligence activities in this direction and reminding the US to stick to earlier pledges that Pakistan would have a key role in the negotiations with the Taliban. The CIA and Pentagon have concluded that so long as the Pakistani military leadership remains stubborn, they cannot advance their agenda in Afghanistan.

Now, how do you get Kayani and the ISI to back off? The US knows the style of functioning of the Pakistani military. The army chief essentially works within a collegium of the 9 corps commanders. Thus, US has concluded that it also has to tackle the collegium . The only way is to set the army’s house on fire so that the generals get distracted by the fire-dousing and the massive repair work and housecleaning that they will be called upon to undertake as top priority for months if not years to come. To rebuild a national institution like the armed forces takes years and decades.

The Pakistani military is paying the price for the big access it provided to the US to interact with its officer corps within the framework of their so-called “strategic partnership”. The Americans are now literally holding the Pakistani army by its jugular veins.

Four, the US won’t mind if Kayani is forced to step aside from his position and the Pakistani military leadership breaks up in disarray, as it opens up windows of opportunities to have Kayani and Pasha replaced by more “dependable” people – Uncle Sam’s own men. There is every possibility that the US has been grooming its favourites within the Pak army corps for all contingencies. Pakistan is too important as a “key non-NATO ally”. The CIA is greatly experienced in masterminding coup d-etat, including “in-house” coup d’etat. Almost all the best and the brightest Pak army officers have passed through the US military academies at one time or another. Given the sub-continent’s middle class mindset and post-modern cultural ethos, elites in civil or military life take it for granted that US backing is a useful asset for furthering career.

The officers easily succumb to US intelligence entrapment. Many such “sleepers” should be existing there within the Pak army officer corps. The big question remains: has someone in Washington thought through the game plan to tame the Pakistani military? The heart of the matter is that there is virulent “anti-Americanism” within the Pak armed forces. Very often it overlaps with Islamist sympathies. Old-style left wing “anti-Americanism” is almost non-existent in the Pakistani armed forces – as in Ayaz Amir’s time. These tendencies in the military are almost completely in sync with the overwhelming public opinion in the country as well. Over the past 3 decades at least, Pakistani army officers have come to be recruited almost entirely from the lower middle class – as in our country – and not from the landed aristocracy as in the earlier decades up to the 1970s. These social strata are quintessentially right wing in their ideology, nationalistic, and steeped in religiosity that often becomes indistinguishable from militant religious faith.

Given the overall economic crisis in Pakistan and the utterly discredited Pakistani political class (as a whole) and countless other social inequities and tensions building up in an overall climate of cascading violence and great uncertainties about the future gnawing the mind of the average Pakistani today, a lurch toward extreme right wing Islamist path is quite possible. The ingredients in Pakistan are almost nearing those prevailing in Iran in the Shah’s era.

The major difference so far has been that Pakistan has an armed forces “rooted in the soil” as a national institution, which the public respected to the point of revering it, which on its part, sincerely or not, also claimed to be the Praetorian Guards of the Pakistani state. Now, in life, destroying comes very easy. Unless the Americans have some very bright ideas about how to go about nation-building in Pakistan, going by their track record in neighbouring Afghanistan, their present course to discredit the military and incite its disintegration or weakening at the present crisis point, is fraught with immense dangers.

The instability in the region may suit the US’ geo-strategy for consolidating its (and NATO’s) military presence in the region but it will be a highly self-centred, almost cynical, perspective to take on the problem, which has dangerous, almost explosive, potential for regional security. Also, who it is that is in charge of the Pakistan policy in Washington today, we do not know. To my mind, Obama administration doesn’t have a clue since Richard Holbrooke passed away as to how to handle Pakistan. The disturbing news in recent weeks has been that all the old “Pakistan hands” in the USG have left the Obama administration. It seems there has been a steady exodus of officials who knew and understood how Pakistan works, and the depletion is almost one hundred percent. That leaves an open field for the CIA to set the policies. The CIA boss Leon Panetta (who is tipped as defence secretary) is an experienced and ambitious politico who knows how to pull the wires in the Washington jungle – and, to boot it, he has an Italian name. He is unlikely to forgive and forget the humiliation he suffered in Rawalpindi last Friday. The NYT story suggests that it is not in his blood if he doesn’t settle scores with the Rawalpindi crowd. If Marlon Brando were around, he would agree. *Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

NOTE: THIS IS A CROSS POST FROM THE INDIAN PUNCHLINE

CIA instigating mutiny in the Pakistani Army??_MK Bhadrakumar, Ex Indian Ambassador on New York Times story of 15th June…!

Moeed Pirzada |

By M K Bhadrakumar The unthinkable is happening. The United States is confronting the Pakistani military leadership of General Parvez Kayani. An extremely dangerous course to destabilise Pakistan is commencing. Can the outcome be any different than in Iran in 1979? But then, the Americans are like Bourbons; they never learn from their mistakes.

The NYT report today is unprecedented. The report quotes US officials not less than 7 times , which is extraordinary, including “an American military official involved with Pakistan for many years”; “a senior American official”, etc. The dispatch is cleverly drafted to convey the impression that a number of Pakistanis have been spoken to, but reading between the lines, conceivably, these could also probably have been indirect attribution by the American sources. A careful reading, in fact, suggests that the dispatch is almost entirely based on deep briefing by some top US intelligence official with great access to records relating to the most highly sensitive US interactions with the Pak army leadership and who was briefing on the basis of instructions from the highest level of the US intelligence apparatus.

Over the past 3 decades at least, Pakistani army officers have come to be recruited almost entirely from the lower middle class – as in our country – and not from the landed aristocracy as in the earlier decades up to the 1970s. These social strata are quintessentially right wing in their ideology, nationalistic, and steeped in religiosity that often becomes indistinguishable from militant religious faith.

The report no doubt underscores that the US intelligence penetration of the Pak defence forces goes very deep. It is no joke to get a Pakistani officer taking part in an exclusive briefing by Kayani at the National Defence University to share his notes with the US interlocutors – unless he is their “mole”. This is like a morality play for we Indians, too, where the US intelligence penetration is ever broadening and deepening. Quite obviously, the birds are coming to roost. The Pakistani military is paying the price for the big access it provided to the US to interact with its officer corps within the framework of their so-called “strategic partnership”. The Americans are now literally holding the Pakistani army by its jugular veins. This should serve as a big warning for all militaries of developing countries like India (which is also developing intensive “mil-to-mil” ties with the US). In our country at least, it is even terribly unfashionable to speak anymore of CIA activities. The NYT story flags in no uncertain terms that although Cold War is over, history has not ended.

What are the objectives behind the NYT story? In sum, any whichever way we look at it, they all are highly diabolic. One, US is rubbishing army chief Parvez Kayani and ISI head Shuja Pasha who at one time were its own blue-eyed boys and whose successful careers and post-retirement extensions in service the Americans carefully choreographed fostered with a pliant civilian leadership in Islamabad, but now when the crunch time comes, the folks are not “delivering”. In American culture, as they say, there is nothing like free lunch. The Americans are livid that their hefty “investment” has turned out to be a waste in every sense. And. it was a very painstakingly arranged investment, too. In short, the Americans finally realise that they might have made a miscalculation about Kayani when they promoted his career.

Read more: The triple agent’: The final days of the suicide bomber who attacked the CIA…!

Two, US intelligence estimation is that things can only go from bad to worse in US-Pakistan relations from now onward. All that is possible to slavage the relationship has been attempted. John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, Mike Mullen – the so-called “friends of Pakistan” in the Barack Obama administration – have all come to Islamabad and turned on the charm offensive. But nothing worked. Then came CIA boss Leon Panetta with a deal that like Marlon Brando said in the movie Godfather, Americans thought the Pakistanis cannot afford to say ‘No’ to, but to their utter dismay , Kayani showed him the door. The Americans realise that Kayani is fighting for his own survival – and so is Pasha – and that makes him jettison his “pro-American” mindset and harmonise quickly with the overwhelming opinion within the army, which is that the Americans pose a danger to Pakistan’s national security and it is about time that the military leadership draws a red line. Put simply, Pakistan fears that the Americans are out to grab their nuclear stockpile. Pakistani people and the military expect Kayani to disengage from the US-led Afghan war and instead pursue an independent course in terms of the country’s perceived legitimate interests.

Three, there is a US attempt to exploit the growing indiscipline within the Pak army and, if possible, to trigger a mutiny, which will bog down the army leadership in a serious “domestic” crisis that leaves no time for them for the foreseeable future to play any forceful role in Afghanistan. In turn, it leaves the Americans a free hand to pursue their own agenda. Time is of the essence of the matter and the US desperately wants direct access to the Taliban leadership so as to strike a deal with them without the ISI or Hamid Karzai coming in between. The prime US objective is that Taliban should somehow come to a compromise with them on the single most crucial issue of permanent US military bases in Afghanistan. The negotiations over the strategic partnership agreement with Karzai’s government are at a critical point. The Taliban leadership of Mullah Omar robustly opposes the US proposal to set up American and NATO bases on their country. The Americans are willing to take the Taliban off the UN’s sanctions list and allow them to be part of mainstream Afghan political life, including in the top echelons of leadership, provided Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura agree to play ball.

The US tried its damnest to get Kayani to bring the Taliban to the reconciliation path. When these attempts failed, they tried to establish direct contact with the Taliban leadership. But ISI has been constantly frustrating the US intelligence activities in this direction and reminding the US to stick to earlier pledges that Pakistan would have a key role in the negotiations with the Taliban. The CIA and Pentagon have concluded that so long as the Pakistani military leadership remains stubborn, they cannot advance their agenda in Afghanistan.

Now, how do you get Kayani and the ISI to back off? The US knows the style of functioning of the Pakistani military. The army chief essentially works within a collegium of the 9 corps commanders. Thus, US has concluded that it also has to tackle the collegium . The only way is to set the army’s house on fire so that the generals get distracted by the fire-dousing and the massive repair work and housecleaning that they will be called upon to undertake as top priority for months if not years to come. To rebuild a national institution like the armed forces takes years and decades.

The Pakistani military is paying the price for the big access it provided to the US to interact with its officer corps within the framework of their so-called “strategic partnership”. The Americans are now literally holding the Pakistani army by its jugular veins.

Four, the US won’t mind if Kayani is forced to step aside from his position and the Pakistani military leadership breaks up in disarray, as it opens up windows of opportunities to have Kayani and Pasha replaced by more “dependable” people – Uncle Sam’s own men. There is every possibility that the US has been grooming its favourites within the Pak army corps for all contingencies. Pakistan is too important as a “key non-NATO ally”. The CIA is greatly experienced in masterminding coup d-etat, including “in-house” coup d’etat. Almost all the best and the brightest Pak army officers have passed through the US military academies at one time or another. Given the sub-continent’s middle class mindset and post-modern cultural ethos, elites in civil or military life take it for granted that US backing is a useful asset for furthering career.

The officers easily succumb to US intelligence entrapment. Many such “sleepers” should be existing there within the Pak army officer corps. The big question remains: has someone in Washington thought through the game plan to tame the Pakistani military? The heart of the matter is that there is virulent “anti-Americanism” within the Pak armed forces. Very often it overlaps with Islamist sympathies. Old-style left wing “anti-Americanism” is almost non-existent in the Pakistani armed forces – as in Ayaz Amir’s time. These tendencies in the military are almost completely in sync with the overwhelming public opinion in the country as well. Over the past 3 decades at least, Pakistani army officers have come to be recruited almost entirely from the lower middle class – as in our country – and not from the landed aristocracy as in the earlier decades up to the 1970s. These social strata are quintessentially right wing in their ideology, nationalistic, and steeped in religiosity that often becomes indistinguishable from militant religious faith.

Given the overall economic crisis in Pakistan and the utterly discredited Pakistani political class (as a whole) and countless other social inequities and tensions building up in an overall climate of cascading violence and great uncertainties about the future gnawing the mind of the average Pakistani today, a lurch toward extreme right wing Islamist path is quite possible. The ingredients in Pakistan are almost nearing those prevailing in Iran in the Shah’s era.

Read more: IFs & Buts of General Musharraf 15 years after 9/11?

The major difference so far has been that Pakistan has an armed forces “rooted in the soil” as a national institution, which the public respected to the point of revering it, which on its part, sincerely or not, also claimed to be the Praetorian Guards of the Pakistani state. Now, in life, destroying comes very easy. Unless the Americans have some very bright ideas about how to go about nation-building in Pakistan, going by their track record in neighbouring Afghanistan, their present course to discredit the military and incite its disintegration or weakening at the present crisis point, is fraught with immense dangers.

The instability in the region may suit the US’ geo-strategy for consolidating its (and NATO’s) military presence in the region but it will be a highly self-centred, almost cynical, perspective to take on the problem, which has dangerous, almost explosive, potential for regional security. Also, who it is that is in charge of the Pakistan policy in Washington today, we do not know. To my mind, Obama administration doesn’t have a clue since Richard Holbrooke passed away as to how to handle Pakistan. The disturbing news in recent weeks has been that all the old “Pakistan hands” in the USG have left the Obama administration. It seems there has been a steady exodus of officials who knew and understood how Pakistan works, and the depletion is almost one hundred percent. That leaves an open field for the CIA to set the policies. The CIA boss Leon Panetta (who is tipped as defence secretary) is an experienced and ambitious politico who knows how to pull the wires in the Washington jungle – and, to boot it, he has an Italian name. He is unlikely to forgive and forget the humiliation he suffered in Rawalpindi last Friday. The NYT story suggests that it is not in his blood if he doesn’t settle scores with the Rawalpindi crowd. If Marlon Brando were around, he would agree. *Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

NOTE: THIS IS A CROSS POST FROM THE INDIAN PUNCHLINE

 

Moeed Pirzada is prominent TV Anchor & commentator; he studied international relations at Columbia Univ, New York and law at London School of Economics. Twitter: MoeedNj. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy. This piece was first published in Moeed Pirzada’s official page. It has been reproduced with permission.

Pakistan’s Army Chief Fights to keep his Job??? New York Times, 15th June 2011…!

1

Moeed Pirzada | FB Blog |

Pakistan’s Chief of Army Fights to Keep His Job By JANE PERLEZ ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Pakistan’s army chief, the most powerful man in the country, is fighting to save his position in the face of seething anger from top generals and junior officers since the American raid that killed Osama bin Laden, according to Pakistani officials and people who have met the chief in recent weeks. Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who has led the army since 2007, faces such intense discontent over what is seen as his cozy relationship with the United States that a colonels’ coup, while unlikely, was not out of the question, said a well-informed Pakistani who has seen the general in recent weeks, as well as an American military official involved with Pakistan for many years. The Pakistani Army is essentially run by consensus among 11 top commanders, known as the Corps Commanders, and almost all of them, if not all, were demanding that General Kayani get much tougher with the Americans, even edging toward a break, Pakistanis who follow the army closely said. Washington, with its own hard line against Pakistan, had pushed General Kayani into a defensive crouch, along with his troops, and if the general was pushed out, the United States would face a more uncompromising anti-American army chief, the Pakistani said. To repair the reputation of the army, and to ensure his own survival, General Kayani made an extraordinary tour of more than a dozen garrisons, mess halls and other institutions in the six weeks since the May 2 raid that killed Bin Laden. His goal was to rally support among his rank-and-file troops, who are almost uniformly anti-American, according to participants and people briefed on the sessions.

During a long session in late May at the National Defense University, the premier academy in Islamabad, the capital, one officer got up after General Kayani’s address and challenged his policy of cooperation with the United States. The officer asked, “If they don’t trust us, how can we trust them?” according to Shaukaut Qadri, a retired army brigadier who was briefed on the session. General Kayani essentially responded, “We can’t,” Mr. Qadri said. In response to pressure from his troops, Pakistani and American officials said, General Kayani had already become a more obstinate partner, standing ever more firm with each high-level American delegation that has visited since the raid to try and rescue the shattered American-Pakistani relationship.

In a prominent example of the new Pakistani intransigence, The New York Times reported Tuesday that, according to American officials, Pakistan’s spy agency had arrested five Pakistani informants who helped the Central Intelligence Agency before the Bin Laden raid. The officials said one of them is a doctor who has served as a major in the Pakistani Army. In a statement on Wednesday, a Pakistani military spokesman called the story “false” and said no army officer had been detained. Over all, Pakistani and American officials said, the relationship was now more competitive and combative than cooperative. General Kayani told the director of the C.I.A., Leon E. Panetta, during a visit here last weekend that Pakistan would not accede to his request for independent operations by the agency, Pakistani and American officials said.

A long statement after the regular monthly meeting of the 11 corps commanders last week illuminated the mounting hostility toward the United States, even as it remains the army’s biggest patron, supplying at least $2 billion a year in aid. The statement, aimed at rebuilding support within the army and among the public, said that American training in Pakistan had only ever been minimal, and had now ended. “It needs to be clarified that the army had never accepted any training assistance from the United States except for training on the newly inducted weapons and some training assistance for the Frontier Corps only,” a reference to paramilitary troops in the northwest tribal areas, the statement said.

The statement said that the C.I.A.-run drone attacks against militants in the tribal areas “were not acceptable under any circumstances.” Allowing the drones to continue to operate from Pakistan was “politically unsustainable,” said the well-informed Pakistani who met with General Kayani recently. As part of his survival mechanism, General Kayani could well order the Americans to stop the drone program completely, the Pakistani said. The Pakistanis have already blocked the supply of food and water to the base used for the drones, a senior American official said, adding that they were gradually “strangling the alliance” by making things difficult for the Americans in Pakistan.

The turmoil within the Pakistani Army has engendered the lowest morale since it lost the war in 1971 against East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, army observers say. The anger and disillusionment stems from the fact that the Obama administration decided not to tell Pakistan in advance about the Bin Laden raid — and that Pakistan was then unable to detect or stop it. That Bin Laden was living comfortably in Pakistan for years has evinced little outrage here among a population that has consistently told pollsters it is more sympathetic to Al Qaeda than to the United States.

Even a well-known pro-American commander, Lt. Gen. Tariq Khan, who spent more than a year at Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Fla., after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks had fallen in line with the new ultranationalist sentiment against the Americans, a former army officer said. The anger at the Americans was now making it more difficult for General Kayani to motivate the army to fight against the Pakistani Taliban in what is increasingly seen as a fight on behalf of the United States, former Pakistani soldiers said. “The feeling that they are fighting America’s war against their own people has a negative impact on the fighting efficiency,” said Javed Hussain, a former Special Forces officer in the Pakistani military. Discipline has become a worry, as has an open rebellion in the middle ranks of officers, particularly as rumors circulate that some enlisted men have questioned whether General Kayani and his partner, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of the chief spy agency, the Directorate for the Inter-Services Intelligence, should remain in their jobs.

A special three-year extension General Kayani won in his position last year did not sit well among the rank and file who perceived it as having been pushed by the United States to keep its man in the top job. “Keeping discipline in the lower ranks is a challenge,” said Mr. Qadri, the retired army brigadier. General Kayani’s problems have been magnified by a groundswell of unprecedented criticism from the public, questioning both the army’s competence and the lavish rewards for its top brass, something that also increasingly rankles modestly paid enlisted men. “Adding to this frustration and public pique is the lifestyle that the top brass of all the services has maintained,” Talat Hussain, a prominent journalist who generally writes favorably about the military, wrote in Monday’s edition of the English-language newspaper Dawn. “This is not a gun versus butter argument, but a contrast between the reality of the life led by the military elite at state expense and the general situation for ordinary citizens.” Despite the resources the army soaks up — about 23 percent of Pakistan’s annual expenditures — it has appeared impotent since the May 2 raid. The infiltration three weeks later of the nation’s largest naval base by Qaeda commandos that left at least 10 security officers dead added to the sense of disarray.

According to the notes of a participant in the session at the National Defense University, General Kayani acknowledged that Pakistan had mortgaged itself to the United States. The participant declined to be identified because people at the session agreed that they would not divulge what was said.

In making the analogy to Pakistan as a mortgaged house, General Kayani said that if a person gave his house against a loan and was unable to pay back the loan, the mortgage holder would intervene, the participant said. “We are helpless,” General Kayani said, according to the person’s notes. “Can we fight America?”

 

Pakistan’s Army Chief Fights to keep his Job??? New York Times, 15th June 2011…!

Moeed Pirzada |

Pakistan’s Chief of Army Fights to Keep His Job By JANE PERLEZ ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Pakistan’s army chief, the most powerful man in the country, is fighting to save his position in the face of seething anger from top generals and junior officers since the American raid that killed Osama bin Laden, according to Pakistani officials and people who have met the chief in recent weeks. Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who has led the army since 2007, faces such intense discontent over what is seen as his cozy relationship with the United States that a colonels’ coup, while unlikely, was not out of the question, said a well-informed Pakistani who has seen the general in recent weeks, as well as an American military official involved with Pakistan for many years.

According to the notes of a participant in the session at the National Defense University, General Kayani acknowledged that Pakistan had mortgaged itself to the United States. The participant declined to be identified because people at the session agreed that they would not divulge what was said.

The Pakistani Army is essentially run by consensus among 11 top commanders, known as the Corps Commanders, and almost all of them, if not all, were demanding that General Kayani get much tougher with the Americans, even edging toward a break, Pakistanis who follow the army closely said. Washington, with its own hard line against Pakistan, had pushed General Kayani into a defensive crouch, along with his troops, and if the general was pushed out, the United States would face a more uncompromising anti-American army chief, the Pakistani said. To repair the reputation of the army, and to ensure his own survival, General Kayani made an extraordinary tour of more than a dozen garrisons, mess halls and other institutions in the six weeks since the May 2 raid that killed Bin Laden. His goal was to rally support among his rank-and-file troops, who are almost uniformly anti-American, according to participants and people briefed on the sessions.

During a long session in late May at the National Defense University, the premier academy in Islamabad, the capital, one officer got up after General Kayani’s address and challenged his policy of cooperation with the United States. The officer asked, “If they don’t trust us, how can we trust them?” according to Shaukaut Qadri, a retired army brigadier who was briefed on the session. General Kayani essentially responded, “We can’t,” Mr. Qadri said. In response to pressure from his troops, Pakistani and American officials said, General Kayani had already become a more obstinate partner, standing ever more firm with each high-level American delegation that has visited since the raid to try and rescue the shattered American-Pakistani relationship.

In a prominent example of the new Pakistani intransigence, The New York Times reported Tuesday that, according to American officials, Pakistan’s spy agency had arrested five Pakistani informants who helped the Central Intelligence Agency before the Bin Laden raid. The officials said one of them is a doctor who has served as a major in the Pakistani Army. In a statement on Wednesday, a Pakistani military spokesman called the story “false” and said no army officer had been detained. Over all, Pakistani and American officials said, the relationship was now more competitive and combative than cooperative. General Kayani told the director of the C.I.A., Leon E. Panetta, during a visit here last weekend that Pakistan would not accede to his request for independent operations by the agency, Pakistani and American officials said.

A long statement after the regular monthly meeting of the 11 corps commanders last week illuminated the mounting hostility toward the United States, even as it remains the army’s biggest patron, supplying at least $2 billion a year in aid. The statement, aimed at rebuilding support within the army and among the public, said that American training in Pakistan had only ever been minimal, and had now ended. “It needs to be clarified that the army had never accepted any training assistance from the United States except for training on the newly inducted weapons and some training assistance for the Frontier Corps only,” a reference to paramilitary troops in the northwest tribal areas, the statement said.

The statement said that the C.I.A.-run drone attacks against militants in the tribal areas “were not acceptable under any circumstances.”Allowing the drones to continue to operate from Pakistan was “politically unsustainable,” said the well-informed Pakistani who met with General Kayani recently. As part of his survival mechanism, General Kayani could well order the Americans to stop the drone program completely, the Pakistani said. The Pakistanis have already blocked the supply of food and water to the base used for the drones, a senior American official said, adding that they were gradually “strangling the alliance” by making things difficult for the Americans in Pakistan.

Read more: CIA instigating mutiny in the Pakistani Army??_MK Bhadrakumar, Ex-Indian Ambassador on New York Times story of 15th June…!

The turmoil within the Pakistani Army has engendered the lowest morale since it lost the war in 1971 against East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, army observers say. The anger and disillusionment stems from the fact that the Obama administration decided not to tell Pakistan in advance about the Bin Laden raid — and that Pakistan was then unable to detect or stop it. That Bin Laden was living comfortably in Pakistan for years has evinced little outrage here among a population that has consistently told pollsters it is more sympathetic to Al Qaeda than to the United States.

Even a well-known pro-American commander, Lt. Gen. Tariq Khan, who spent more than a year at Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Fla., after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks had fallen in line with the new ultranationalist sentiment against the Americans, a former army officer said. The anger at the Americans was now making it more difficult for General Kayani to motivate the army to fight against the Pakistani Taliban in what is increasingly seen as a fight on behalf of the United States, former Pakistani soldiers said. “The feeling that they are fighting America’s war against their own people has a negative impact on the fighting efficiency,” said Javed Hussain, a former Special Forces officer in the Pakistani military. Discipline has become a worry, as has an open rebellion in the middle ranks of officers, particularly as rumors circulate that some enlisted men have questioned whether General Kayani and his partner, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of the chief spy agency, the Directorate for the Inter-Services Intelligence, should remain in their jobs.

To repair the reputation of the army, and to ensure his own survival, General Kayani made an extraordinary tour of more than a dozen garrisons, mess halls and other institutions in the six weeks since the May 2 raid that killed Bin Laden. His goal was to rally support among his rank-and-file troops, who are almost uniformly anti-American, according to participants and people briefed on the sessions.

A special three-year extension General Kayani won in his position last year did not sit well among the rank and file who perceived it as having been pushed by the United States to keep its man in the top job. “Keeping discipline in the lower ranks is a challenge,” said Mr. Qadri, the retired army brigadier. General Kayani’s problems have been magnified by a groundswell of unprecedented criticism from the public, questioning both the army’s competence and the lavish rewards for its top brass, something that also increasingly rankles modestly paid enlisted men. “Adding to this frustration and public pique is the lifestyle that the top brass of all the services has maintained,” Talat Hussain, a prominent journalist who generally writes favorably about the military, wrote in Monday’s edition of the English-language newspaper Dawn. “This is not a gun versus butter argument, but a contrast between the reality of the life led by the military elite at state expense and the general situation for ordinary citizens.” Despite the resources the army soaks up — about 23 percent of Pakistan’s annual expenditures — it has appeared impotent since the May 2 raid. The infiltration three weeks later of the nation’s largest naval base by Qaeda commandos that left at least 10 security officers dead added to the sense of disarray.

According to the notes of a participant in the session at the National Defense University, General Kayani acknowledged that Pakistan had mortgaged itself to the United States. The participant declined to be identified because people at the session agreed that they would not divulge what was said.

In making the analogy to Pakistan as a mortgaged house, General Kayani said that if a person gave his house against a loan and was unable to pay back the loan, the mortgage holder would intervene, the participant said. “We are helpless,” General Kayani said, according to the person’s notes. “Can we fight America?”

 

Moeed Pirzada is prominent TV Anchor & commentator; he studied international relations at Columbia Univ, New York and law at London School of Economics. Twitter: MoeedNj. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy. This piece was first published in Moeed Pirzada’s official page. It has been reproduced with permission.

Perception Building-Media as a Force Multiplier for National Security

Dr Moeed Pirzada was invited at National Defence University on 27 May 2011 to deliver lecture on “Perception Building-Media as a Force Multiplier for National Security”.

Dr. Moeed Pirzada in that seminar discussed the role of media as an element of national Power, significance of media in formulation of public perception and effective media policy in pursuance of national security policy objectives.

Details of the close combat at PNS Mehran – Why similarly trained Taliban are not in Afghanistan?

Moeed Pirzada |

Read this news story “Details of the Close Combat at PNS Mehran” by “Mayed Ali” in today’s The News (25th May) and ask yourself question that what kind of commandos had trained these commandos? why similarly trained commandos equipped with the latest gadgets are not operating in the neighboring Afghanistan?

LAHORE: The Pakistan Navy stands partially blinded till December this year after the destruction of two Orions (P-3C) at the PNS Mehran base in Karachi on Sunday night, The News has learnt. Sources in the Pakistan Navy revealed the defenders of seas’ capability to counter any threat from the sea had virtually come down to around 20 percent for the time being with three old Orions stationed in the US for routine repairs, check-up and upgrade.The Navy now has one Orion, a Fokker (upgraded with the required gadget for surveillance) and a Gulfstream jet (upgraded for the purpose). These three stations are not enough to guard the maritime frontiers of the country. The first of the three Orions sent for maintenance is expected to return in December this year. The second and the third Orion are expected to resume service in June and December next year.

During the entire operation, the naval SSG exercised complete command, while the Rangers, who had rushed to the spot from the gate as well as the reinforcements, stayed behind the SSG’s outer cordon. The naval SSGs lost three men, who were shot at the front door by the gang leader. The Rapid Response Team of simple marines from the PNS Mehran lost four men, while one Rangers’ personnel was also martyred.

With its 120 nautical-mile (222.24 km) radar and diverse detect and destroy capability, this $36 million aircraft is considered the backbone of Pakistan Navy. Apart from diverse surveillance capability, this aircraft has a broader envelope with the prowess to search and destroy all sea targets in its combat radius (18 hours non-stop flight with an onboard radar, which can detect the target at 360 degrees up to 222.24 kms) with its payload of depth chargers, Harpoon Missiles and Mak-46 torpedoes. In addition to this, these aircraft also assist in indirect or alternate attacks from other sea and air platforms with the help of its sophisticated target detection capability, which helps in searching and locking multiple targets in the sea as well as in the air.

Initial investigations into the incident by the Pakistan Navy do not rule out the possibility of foreign involvement in the sabotage operation carried out by just four extremely well-trained intruders, who were armed with sophisticated modern-day assault weaponry. It is learnt the navy is amazed at the level of preparedness and pre-mission information, including intricate details about tower-positions, light movement frequency, patrolling, cameras and exact location and comprehensive knowledge of the target once in sight.

Sources revealed four guerrillas, dressed in black, entered the premises from the Korangi (Faisal Town) side, using bushes on the bank of the drain as camouflage. After reaching the boundary wall, they not only blew a hole with sophisticated explosive, having little spark and sound, they also cut the charged wires after climbing up, using ladders. Once in the compound, they used the blind spots left within the two towers 100 metres apart. It seemed they had worked on the movement of lights to minute details, figuring exactly when to sneak ahead by evading the moving lights. They also had complete information vis-i-vis placement of cameras (including their panning circumference and timing) in and around the hangars, housing the aircraft. The investigators believe the information on the periphery of the compound could have been gathered from intense surveillance atop the Karsaz bridge, which gives a panoramic view of the northern side of the base.

Read more: A tiny old fashioned “mutiny” by Indian sailors on a ship

However, it is believed, the exact info on the details of the complex, which is not visible otherwise, the hangar and the aircraft suggests the plan just cannot be a work of amateur terrorists. The way the entire mission was executed, the sources in Pakistan Navy believe, it seems some specialists must have worked on the plan quite extensively. Moreover, the ex-Navy officials were of the view it was an inside job, implying that someone from within had provided vital information to saboteurs for the mission. And, if the investigation zeroes in on the possibility of sabotage from outside, the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), Mossad (Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) or even the CIA (Central Investigation Agency) could be a suspect. Interestingly, in such a scenario, the US technicians, working on the new Orions, might have to be interrogated.

More interesting is the fact the attackers precisely knew about the maintenance-cycle of Orions, and possibly had prior information with regard to presence of seven US and 11 Chinese technicians working in the PNS Mehran for the certification. The Pakistan Navy officials have arrived to this notion after juxtaposing the modus operandi of the assailants and timing of the incident. These foreign experts were housed half a kilometer south of the hangar, where the gunbattle raged on Sunday. The foreigners were evacuated immediately from the other gate on the order of Admiral Abbas Raza as soon as the first plane exploded.

These attackers were equipped with four RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers), Russian made AK-47s, night vision goggles (NVGs), hand-grenades and a sniper rifle with silencer. They had extra rounds for all rifles. However, they didn’t have any extra round for the RPGs, which they threw away after firing the loaded rounds. Once reaching the tarmac, one of the attackers fired an RPG round on one of the Orions.

The naval officials believe this strike had a purpose, that is, they knew the explosion would entail a blackout. And, it happened exactly that way. After the blackout, as the PNS Mehran’s unit of Rapid Reaction Force, comprising around 12 personnel, including three firefighters and two paramedics, reached the spot. With lights gone off, these assailants engaged the coming force, using night vision goggles. During the crossfire, these terrorists took out Lt Yasir and three firefighters with gunshots and grenades.

The attackers could see them with the NVGs, while the coming reaction force personnel were not equipped with the same gadget thus becoming easy targets. After injuring a couple of more, and forcing the rest to retreat, the attackers fired another RPG round on the second Orion. They then proceeded further for attaching magnetic explosives near the wings of the burning aircrafts. These explosives are highly sophisticated, and are not available easily even in the black-market. It is important to note the attackers did not touch any other aircraft (Fokker) or helicopter (Chinese ZA-6) parked in the same vicinity.

Within 15 minutes of the first fire shot, the 16-member Quick (Immediate) Response Force (QRF) of the Naval SSGs (Special Services Group of the Pakistan Navy also called Navy Seals), arrived at the spot from PNS Iqbal and engaged the attackers. By this time, three terrorists had taken position on the roof of an adjacent two-storey building used by Pakistan Navy for pre and post flight briefings and debriefings. This building has a crew room, a lounge, a briefing room and a leisure room, besides small offices, etc. The gang-leader, however, stayed in front of the building, taking a position on the ground. As the QRF engaged, the leader also went inside the building. The sniper on the rooftop, meanwhile, kept firing rounds on the SSG personnel for taking out men with the help of the night vision capability. The two others kept engaging the closer targets as crossfire raged. After cordoning the building off, and giving the warning to the terrorists to surrender, three SSG personnel, a Hawaldar (leading man) and two sailors tried to enter the building from the same front door in a bid to engage the leader.

They received a volley of bullets from the leader, getting critically injured. However, one of them got the leg of the leader, who blew himself up immediately as he was wearing an explosive jacket over the bullet-proof vest. All of them had both jackets on. The QRF, after having secured the assets and necessary information about the compound, formed the inner cordon. Some SSG personnel from the QRF then entered the building in search of the rest of attackers. After another 25 minutes, the QRF was reinforced by the 60-member Deliberate Response Force (DRF). This contingent formed the outer cordon at around 150 meters of the building. The inner cordon, 50 meters of the building, then crossed fire with some men searching inside.

Sources in the Pakistan Navy revealed the defenders of seas’ capability to counter any threat from the sea had virtually come down to around 20 percent for the time being with three old Orions stationed in the US for routine repairs, check-up and upgrade.The Navy now has one Orion, a Fokker (upgraded with the required gadget for surveillance) and a Gulfstream jet (upgraded for the purpose). These three stations are not enough to guard the maritime frontiers of the country.

The SSG personnel inside got themselves locked in a room-to-room battle with two assailants equipped with AK-47s and hand-grenades. One of the attackers was shot in the head who fell on the ground instantly. Since the bullet entered the brain, the attacker couldn’t blow himself up. The other attacker also got hit, and he blew himself up. He had 17 bullet-hits. Meanwhile, the SSG personnel outside the building spotted the last terrorist, the sharpshooter, at the roof. He was spotted because of the spark of the gunshot. He was also taken out. The operation ended by dawn in less than seven hours. However, the naval SSG commandos took more hours for sweeping the entire runway and other places in the PNS Mehran.

During the entire operation, the naval SSG exercised complete command, while the Rangers, who had rushed to the spot from the gate as well as the reinforcements, stayed behind the SSG’s outer cordon. The naval SSGs lost three men, who were shot at the front door by the gang leader. The Rapid Response Team of simple marines from the PNS Mehran lost four men, while one Rangers’ personnel was also martyred.

No Army SSG or regular force personnel was engaged in the operation. As against the GHQ attack, where the Zarar Company of the SSG carried out the operation, 25 people, including two senior Army officials, got killed at the hands of eight terrorists in a gunbattle that continued for around 20 hours, the naval SSG personal managed the situation relatively easily.

Ironically, the Pakistan Navy is being criticised for the security lapse, very few are acknowledging the brave effort of the Pakistan Navy Seals and other personnel, who have sacrificed their lives for the motherland. In these troubled times, when the terrorism menace and external sabotage activities are getting out of control, the loss of precious lives amongst the armed forces deserves more respect.

 

Moeed Pirzada is prominent TV Anchor & commentator; he studied international relations at Columbia Univ, New York and law at London School of Economics. Twitter: MoeedNj. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy. This piece was first published in Moeed Pirzada’s official page. It has been reproduced with permission.

Details of the Close Combat at PNS Mehran – Why similarly trained Taliban are not in Afghanistan?

1

Moeed Pirzada | FB Blogs |

Read this news story “Details of the Close Combat at PNS Mehran” by “Mayed Ali” in today’s The News (25th May) and ask yourself question that what kind of commandos had trained these commandos? why similarly trained commandos equipped with the latest gadgets are not operating in the neighboring Afghanistan?

LAHORE: The Pakistan Navy stands partially blinded till December this year after the destruction of two Orions (P-3C) at the PNS Mehran base in Karachi on Sunday night, The News has learnt. Sources in the Pakistan Navy revealed the defenders of seas’ capability to counter any threat from the sea had virtually come down to around 20 percent for the time being with three old Orions stationed in the US for routine repairs, check-up and upgrade.The Navy now has one Orion, a Fokker (upgraded with the required gadget for surveillance) and a Gulfstream jet (upgraded for the purpose). These three stations are not enough to guard the maritime frontiers of the country. The first of the three Orions sent for maintenance is expected to return in December this year. The second and the third Orion are expected to resume service in June and December next year.

With its 120 nautical-mile (222.24 km) radar and diverse detect and destroy capability, this $36 million aircraft is considered the backbone of Pakistan Navy. Apart from diverse surveillance capability, this aircraft has a broader envelope with the prowess to search and destroy all sea targets in its combat radius (18 hours non-stop flight with an onboard radar, which can detect the target at 360 degrees up to 222.24 kms) with its payload of depth chargers, Harpoon Missiles and Mak-46 torpedoes. In addition to this, these aircraft also assist in indirect or alternate attacks from other sea and air platforms with the help of its sophisticated target detection capability, which helps in searching and locking multiple targets in the sea as well as in the air.

Initial investigations into the incident by the Pakistan Navy do not rule out the possibility of foreign involvement in the sabotage operation carried out by just four extremely well-trained intruders, who were armed with sophisticated modern-day assault weaponry. It is learnt the navy is amazed at the level of preparedness and pre-mission information, including intricate details about tower-positions, light movement frequency, patrolling, cameras and exact location and comprehensive knowledge of the target once in sight.

Sources revealed four guerrillas, dressed in black, entered the premises from the Korangi (Faisal Town) side, using bushes on the bank of the drain as camouflage. After reaching the boundary wall, they not only blew a hole with sophisticated explosive, having little spark and sound, they also cut the charged wires after climbing up, using ladders. Once in the compound, they used the blind spots left within the two towers 100 metres apart. It seemed they had worked on the movement of lights to minute details, figuring exactly when to sneak ahead by evading the moving lights. They also had complete information vis-i-vis placement of cameras (including their panning circumference and timing) in and around the hangars, housing the aircraft. The investigators believe the information on the periphery of the compound could have been gathered from intense surveillance atop the Karsaz bridge, which gives a panoramic view of the northern side of the base.

However, it is believed, the exact info on the details of the complex, which is not visible otherwise, the hangar and the aircraft suggests the plan just cannot be a work of amateur terrorists. The way the entire mission was executed, the sources in Pakistan Navy believe, it seems some specialists must have worked on the plan quite extensively. Moreover, the ex-Navy officials were of the view it was an inside job, implying that someone from within had provided vital information to saboteurs for the mission. And, if the investigation zeroes in on the possibility of sabotage from outside, the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), Mossad (Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) or even the CIA (Central Investigation Agency) could be a suspect. Interestingly, in such a scenario, the US technicians, working on the new Orions, might have to be interrogated.

More interesting is the fact the attackers precisely knew about the maintenance-cycle of Orions, and possibly had prior information with regard to presence of seven US and 11 Chinese technicians working in the PNS Mehran for the certification. The Pakistan Navy officials have arrived to this notion after juxtaposing the modus operandi of the assailants and timing of the incident. These foreign experts were housed half a kilometer south of the hangar, where the gunbattle raged on Sunday. The foreigners were evacuated immediately from the other gate on the order of Admiral Abbas Raza as soon as the first plane exploded.

These attackers were equipped with four RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers), Russian made AK-47s, night vision goggles (NVGs), hand-grenades and a sniper rifle with silencer. They had extra rounds for all rifles. However, they didn’t have any extra round for the RPGs, which they threw away after firing the loaded rounds. Once reaching the tarmac, one of the attackers fired an RPG round on one of the Orions.

The naval officials believe this strike had a purpose, that is, they knew the explosion would entail a blackout. And, it happened exactly that way. After the blackout, as the PNS Mehran’s unit of Rapid Reaction Force, comprising around 12 personnel, including three firefighters and two paramedics, reached the spot. With lights gone off, these assailants engaged the coming force, using night vision goggles. During the crossfire, these terrorists took out Lt Yasir and three firefighters with gunshots and grenades.

The attackers could see them with the NVGs, while the coming reaction force personnel were not equipped with the same gadget thus becoming easy targets. After injuring a couple of more, and forcing the rest to retreat, the attackers fired another RPG round on the second Orion. They then proceeded further for attaching magnetic explosives near the wings of the burning aircrafts. These explosives are highly sophisticated, and are not available easily even in the black-market. It is important to note the attackers did not touch any other aircraft (Fokker) or helicopter (Chinese ZA-6) parked in the same vicinity.

Within 15 minutes of the first fire shot, the 16-member Quick (Immediate) Response Force (QRF) of the Naval SSGs (Special Services Group of the Pakistan Navy also called Navy Seals), arrived at the spot from PNS Iqbal and engaged the attackers. By this time, three terrorists had taken position on the roof of an adjacent two-storey building used by Pakistan Navy for pre and post flight briefings and debriefings. This building has a crew room, a lounge, a briefing room and a leisure room, besides small offices, etc. The gang-leader, however, stayed in front of the building, taking a position on the ground. As the QRF engaged, the leader also went inside the building. The sniper on the rooftop, meanwhile, kept firing rounds on the SSG personnel for taking out men with the help of the night vision capability. The two others kept engaging the closer targets as crossfire raged. After cordoning the building off, and giving the warning to the terrorists to surrender, three SSG personnel, a Hawaldar (leading man) and two sailors tried to enter the building from the same front door in a bid to engage the leader.

They received a volley of bullets from the leader, getting critically injured. However, one of them got the leg of the leader, who blew himself up immediately as he was wearing an explosive jacket over the bullet-proof vest. All of them had both jackets on. The QRF, after having secured the assets and necessary information about the compound, formed the inner cordon. Some SSG personnel from the QRF then entered the building in search of the rest of attackers. After another 25 minutes, the QRF was reinforced by the 60-member Deliberate Response Force (DRF). This contingent formed the outer cordon at around 150 meters of the building. The inner cordon, 50 meters of the building, then crossed fire with some men searching inside.

The SSG personnel inside got themselves locked in a room-to-room battle with two assailants equipped with AK-47s and hand-grenades. One of the attackers was shot in the head who fell on the ground instantly. Since the bullet entered the brain, the attacker couldn’t blow himself up. The other attacker also got hit, and he blew himself up. He had 17 bullet-hits. Meanwhile, the SSG personnel outside the building spotted the last terrorist, the sharpshooter, at the roof. He was spotted because of the spark of the gunshot. He was also taken out. The operation ended by dawn in less than seven hours. However, the naval SSG commandos took more hours for sweeping the entire runway and other places in the PNS Mehran.

During the entire operation, the naval SSG exercised complete command, while the Rangers, who had rushed to the spot from the gate as well as the reinforcements, stayed behind the SSG’s outer cordon. The naval SSGs lost three men, who were shot at the front door by the gang leader. The Rapid Response Team of simple marines from the PNS Mehran lost four men, while one Rangers’ personnel was also martyred.

No Army SSG or regular force personnel was engaged in the operation. As against the GHQ attack, where the Zarar Company of the SSG carried out the operation, 25 people, including two senior Army officials, got killed at the hands of eight terrorists in a gunbattle that continued for around 20 hours, the naval SSG personal managed the situation relatively easily.

Ironically, the Pakistan Navy is being criticised for the security lapse, very few are acknowledging the brave effort of the Pakistan Navy Seals and other personnel, who have sacrificed their lives for the motherland. In these troubled times, when the terrorism menace and external sabotage activities are getting out of control, the loss of precious lives amongst the armed forces deserves more respect.

Why attack a Naval Base in Karachi? Who could do it?

Moeed Pirzada |

Why attack a Naval Base in Karachi? Who could do it?… because “someone” is trying to send the message to the whole world that Pakistani military’s claim that its garrisons and installations are safe is not true…if Orion and P3 Planes can be targeted then what is left? ….there is no logic in destroying these planes, this is a message, the attack will be easily blamed on “Al Qaeda” or Jihadis and those arrested will never be able to tell who controls them… but I think Pakistani military needs to revise its SOP’s to protect its assets and installations…this attack is part of “Strategic Mindset” that is working to encircle Pakistan… and again and again, our incompetency is letting them establish their case…that Pakistani military is not competent enough to safeguard its assets.. but please don’t waste your energies on Al Qaeda or TTP or Jihadis, some shit will accept responsibility but all these organizations have been penetrated by certain intelligence agencies and now these so-called “Jihadi” or Jihadi looking assets are being used by those intelligence agencies…we need to be clear as to who is doing it? as long as we keep on wasting our time and attention on Jihadis, or sectarian issues or militants we won’t be able to develop a response.

Read more: Details of the close combat at PNS Mehran – Why similarly trained Taliban are not in Afghanistan?

We politely need to send our “friends” back, and then deal with the local Pakistani assets they have created on the ground…they are doing it, and no one else is doing it, they will accuse us of denials and conspiracy theories but let’s be clear once and ever it is a “Strategic mindset” that is trying to establish a case… we have been nice and tolerant.

 

Moeed Pirzada is prominent TV Anchor & commentator; he studied international relations at Columbia Univ, New York and law at London School of Economics. Twitter: MoeedNj. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy. This piece was first published in Moeed Pirzada’s official page. It has been reproduced with permission.

Why attack a Navl Base in Karachi? Who could do it?

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Moeed Pirzada | FB Blog |

Why attack a Navl Base in Karachi? Who could do it?… because “someone” is trying to send the message to the whole world that Pakistani military’s claim that its garrisons and installations are safe is not true…if Orion and P3 Planes can be targeted then what is left? ….there is no logic in destroying these planes, this is a message, attack will be easily blamed on “Al Qaeda” or Jihadis and those arrested will never be able to tell who controls them… but I think Pakistani military needs to revise its SOP’s to protect its assets and installations…this attack is part of “Strategic Mindset” that is working to encircle Pakistan… and again and again our incompetency is letting them establish their case…that Pakistani military is not competent enough to safe guard its assets.. but please don’t waste your energies on Al Qaeda or TTP or Jihadis, some shit will accept responsibility but all these organizations have been penetrated by certain intelligence agencies and now these so called “Jihadi” or Jihadi looking assets are being used by those intelligence agencies…we need to be clear as to who is doing it?as long as we keep on wasting our time and attention on Jihadis, or sectarian issues or militants we won’t be able to develop a response. We politely need to send our “friends” back, and then deal with the local Pakistani assets they have created on the ground…they are doing it, and no one else is doing it, they will accuse us of denials and conspiracy theories but lets be clear once and ever it is a “Strategic mind set” that is trying to establish a case… we have been nice and tolerant

Advice from “Ajay Kumar” an Indian Member of this page – Lets discuss if it has merit??

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Moeed Pirzada | FB Blog |

On Monday I also met John Kerry along with a small group of journalists in Serena Hotel, in Islamabad. I will share what he said and what we discussed and what are my impressions, in the next few hours but lets first respond to Mr. Ajay Kumar’s comments, analytically and respectfully.

Mr. Ajay Kumar posted this long comment on my last Note, “We must welcome John Kerry…but we must not be afraid”, he thinks we are mostly debating palliative measures and not real solutions. I think we should examine his argument dispassionately and respond. His comment is produced below in full _ Moeed Pirzada.

Ajay Kumar @ Moeed Pirzada…..This is in reference to your panel discussion on News Night with Talat. All the solutions suggested by yourself and other participants on the present crisis are nothing but palliatives and not a cure. The entire poltica…l and defence establishment of Pakistan is indulging in nothing but tactical moves to come out of the present jam but do not show any change of heart. If this kind of obfuscation continues further Pakistan will very shortly reach point of no return with US.

Pakistan is on the cusp of history at this moment. If right conclusions are drawn, lessons learnt and necessary actions taken without any double crossing, then Perhaps you will be able to pull back from the precipice otherwise this slide into total destruction of Pakistan will not be very far.The following lessons need to be learnt both by Pakistan as a country and Pakistanis as a nation;

1. A conscious decision must be taken that all human beings are equal and there is no need to teach Jehad to your young generation. Your Madrasas are teaching hatred towards the whole world and are factories producing suicide bombers. In fact wrong education and rabid religious indoctrination is the root cause of extreme level of intolerance in your society. I find nobody in Pakistan is discussing the need for making the society a moderate one and most of the discussion is based on taking revenge with the whole world in one way or another. The society must be taught to be tolerant and peaceful towards others and not call them Kafirs. That is why there is urgent requirement to make Pakistan a secular country.

2. Pakistan must abjure terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Terrorism cannot be permitted at government level whatever be the cause. Even if you are fighting for Kashmir, let there be an open war once for all. But terrorism will ultimately make your country a pariah in the world and you will end up killing each other. Terrorism is the weapon of the weak and not a strong nation. Pakistan has not been able to harm India or its secular democracy and economic progress by pursuing terrorism. It has created a Frankenstein which is now eating up your own nation.

3. Pakistan must take a conscious decision to exterminate all Jehadis and terrorists on its soil whether they are fighting US or India or Afganistan. You can not differentiate between terrorists fighting India or terrorists fighting US. Terrorism as a policy has to abjured. Infact the terror activities started by Pakistan against India have now transformed into terror against the whole world. If Pakistan has to survive as a nation in the world it has to act as a responsible country and not as a loose cannon. On the one hand you are crying about American drone attacks but on the other you are not controlling the Talibanis or other terror outfits of Sirrajuddin Haqanni. US has to carry out drone attacks to deny safe havens to terrorists in your country if you are not willing to remove them. Incase Pakistan understands this basic thing and declares all out war on the terror outfits in Pakistan whole world will come to your support. All your present crisis with US will come to an end and there will be no drone strikes.

4. Pakistan should limit its geopolitical vision to its size and capability. Infact the reason for extreme dependance on the armed forces in Pakistan is due to its faulty geopolitical vision. Pakistan has grand designs about its geopolitical clout. Against whom you are collecting all these weapons and nuclear bombs. Pakistan is spending 40% of its budget on defence forces and 40% of the budget is going for servicing the debts. There is hardly any money left for the public good. Pakistan has no threat from India. All the wars between India and Pakistan were started by Pakistan .You can listen to Air Marshal Asgar Khan and even Najam Sethi on this issue. India will never attack Pakistan. Democratic countries do not wage wars only dictators do. Similarly Pakistan’s desire for securing strategic depth in Afganistan is another unnecessary geopolitical desire which is now causing maximum damage to Pakistan. So much so that Pakistan and US have almost become enemies. Afganistan must be allowed to exist in peace not be treated as a vassal state of Pakistan. And it should have the right to have good relations with any country it desires.

5. Pakistan must limit its spending on defence. Large defence forces or nuclear stockpiles do not provide security against internal unrest if the whole population is reduced to poverty. Look at Bangladesh. It has no defence forces worth the name yet it is secure from India, despite pursuing anti India policies for most of its independant history. Now the same country is making tremedous economic progress so much so it has left Pakistan far behind. This is all because of its focus on the economic progress and not having any unrealistic geopoltical designs.

6. Pakistan should open trade and commerce with India with which it shares such a long border and partake in the economic progress of India. Pakistan will save almost 40% of the cost of its imports in the shape of freight alone if it trades with India. In case Pakistan is able to establish rule of law and ensure peaceful environment, large scale investments will come from Indians and millions of jobs will be created. Dont forget if Pakistan opens its borders to Indian goods it will also get a market of 120 crore people. Your exports will zoom and you will regret for the lost decades wasted in fighting India.

7. Whatever your plans for war against India please do not forget that India can not be defeated by Pakistan. We are not living in medieval age and all wars cannot be won by sword. India has gone light years ahead of Pakistan in defence preparedness, economic progress. Today India is having a surplus of 300 billion dollars whereas Pakistan is begging IMF and even US for a couple of billion dollars to remain afloat. If any war is imposed by Pakistan on India it will be last one and Pakistan will cease to exist on the world map in this age of nuclear weapons. So war is not an option.

8. Last but not the least, Pakistan must make a conscious decision to break with its past policies of running with the hare and hunting with the hound. Otherwise you will have no crebility left in the world.

Sir the crisis staring Pakistan in face is not an ordinary crisis. The whole nation must look at the options avaiable and have an informed debate on the issue. Otherwise the matters will keep drifting and the drift to total destrucion will end very soon.

Advice from “Ajay Kumar”

Moeed Pirzada |

On Monday I also met John Kerry along with a small group of journalists in Serena Hotel, in Islamabad. I will share what he said and what we discussed and what are my impressions, in the next few hours but lets first respond to Mr. Ajay Kumar’s comments, analytically and respectfully.

Mr. Ajay Kumar posted this long comment on my last Note, “We must welcome John Kerry…but we must not be afraid”, he thinks we are mostly debating palliative measures and not real solutions. I think we should examine his argument dispassionately and respond. His comment is produced below in full _ Moeed Pirzada.

Ajay Kumar @ Moeed Pirzada…..This is in reference to your panel discussion on News Night with Talat. All the solutions suggested by yourself and other participants on the present crisis are nothing but palliatives and not a cure. The entire poltica…l and defence establishment of Pakistan is indulging in nothing but tactical moves to come out of the present jam but do not show any change of heart. If this kind of obfuscation continues further Pakistan will very shortly reach the point of no return with US.

Pakistan is on the cusp of history at this moment. If right conclusions are drawn, lessons learnt and necessary actions were taken without any double crossing, then Perhaps you will be able to pull back from the precipice otherwise, this slide into total destruction of Pakistan will not be very far.The following lessons need to be learnt both by Pakistan as a country and Pakistanis as a nation;

1. A conscious decision must be taken that all human beings are equal and there is no need to teach Jehad to your young generation. Your Madrasas are teaching hatred towards the whole world and are factories producing suicide bombers. In fact wrong education and rabid religious indoctrination is the root cause of extreme level of intolerance in your society. I find nobody in Pakistan is discussing the need for making the society a moderate one and most of the discussion is based on taking revenge with the whole world in one way or another. The society must be taught to be tolerant and peaceful towards others and not call them Kafirs. That is why there is urgent requirement to make Pakistan a secular country.

Read more: CIA instigating mutiny in the Pakistani Army??_MK Bhadrakumar, Ex Indian Ambassador on New York Times story of 15th June…!

2. Pakistan must abjure terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Terrorism cannot be permitted at government level whatever be the cause. Even if you are fighting for Kashmir, let there be an open war once for all. But terrorism will ultimately make your country a pariah in the world and you will end up killing each other. Terrorism is the weapon of the weak and not a strong nation. Pakistan has not been able to harm India or its secular democracy and economic progress by pursuing terrorism. It has created a Frankenstein which is now eating up your own nation.

3. Pakistan must take a conscious decision to exterminate all Jehadis and terrorists on its soil whether they are fighting US or India or Afganistan. You can not differentiate between terrorists fighting India or terrorists fighting US. Terrorism as a policy has to abjured. In fact the terror activities started by Pakistan against India have now transformed into terror against the whole world. If SFsirPakistan has to survive as a nation in the world it has to act as a responsible country and not as a loose cannon. On the one hand you are crying about American drone attacks but on the other, you are not controlling the Taliban or other terror outfits of Siraj Uddin Haqanni. The US has to carry out drone attacks to deny safe havens to terrorists in your country if you are not willing to remove them. In case Pakistan understands this basic thing and declares all out war on the terror outfits in Pakistan whole world will come to your support. All your present crisis with the US will come to an end and there will be no drone strikes.

4. Pakistan should limit its geopolitical vision to its size and capability. In fact, the reason for extreme dependence on the armed forces in Pakistan is due to its faulty geopolitical vision. Pakistan has grand designs about its geopolitical clout. Against whom you are collecting all these weapons and nuclear bombs. Pakistan is spending 40% of its budget on defense forces and 40% of the budget is going for servicing the debts. There is hardly any money left for the public good. Pakistan has no threat from India. All the wars between India and Pakistan were started by Pakistan.You can listen to Air Marshal Asghar Khan and even Najam Sethi on this issue. India will never attack Pakistan. Democratic countries do not wage wars only dictators do. Similarly, Pakistan’s desire for securing strategic depth in Afganistan is another unnecessary geopolitical desire which is now causing maximum damage to Pakistan. So much so that Pakistan and US have almost become enemies. Afganistan must be allowed to exist in peace not be treated as a vassal state of Pakistan. And it should have the right to have good relations with any country it desires.

Mr. Ajay Kumar posted this long comment on my last Note, “We must welcome John Kerry…but we must not be afraid”, he thinks we are mostly debating palliative measures and not real solutions. I think we should examine his argument dispassionately and respond

5. Pakistan must limit its spending on defense. Large defense forces or nuclear stockpiles do not provide security against internal unrest if the whole population is reduced to poverty. Look at Bangladesh. It has no defense forces worth the name yet it is secure from India, despite pursuing anti-India policies for most of its independent history. Now the same country is making tremendous economic progress so much so it has left Pakistan far behind. This is all because of its focus on the economic progress and not having any unrealistic geopolitical designs.

6. Pakistan should open trade and commerce with India with which it shares such a long border and partake in the economic progress of India. Pakistan will save almost 40% of the cost of its imports in the shape of freight alone if it trades with India. In case Pakistan is able to establish rule of law and ensure a peaceful environment, large scale investments will come from Indians and millions of jobs will be created. Don’t forget if Pakistan opens its borders to Indian goods it will also get a market of 120 crore people. Your exports will zoom and you will regret for the lost decades wasted in fighting India.

Read more: CIA instigating mutiny in the Pakistani Army??_MK Bhadrakumar, Ex Indian Ambassador on New York Times story of 15th June…!

7. Whatever your plans for war against India please do not forget that India can not be defeated by Pakistan. We are not living in a medieval age and all wars cannot be won by the sword. India has gone light years ahead of Pakistan in defense preparedness, economic progress. Today India is having a surplus of 300 billion dollars whereas Pakistan is begging IMF and the even US for a couple of billion dollars to remain afloat. If any war is imposed by Pakistan on India it will be the last one and Pakistan will cease to exist on the world map in this age of nuclear weapons. So war is not an option.

8. Last but not the least, Pakistan must make a conscious decision to break with its past policies of running with the hare and hunting with the hound. Otherwise, you will have no credibility left in the world.

Sir the crisis staring Pakistan in the face is not an ordinary crisis. The whole nation must look at the options available and have an informed debate on the issue. Otherwise, the matters will keep drifting and the drift to total destruction will end very soon.

 

Moeed Pirzada is prominent TV Anchor & commentator; he studied international relations at Columbia Univ, New York and law at London School of Economics. Twitter: MoeedNj. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy. This piece was first published in Moeed Pirzada’s official page. It has been reproduced with permission.

We must welcome and listen respectfully & understand John Kerry but we must not be afraid of sanctions or any other US action!

Moeed Pirzada |

Hi! as you all know Senator John Kerry is in Pakistan. He is a great visionary, a man of advanced consciousness, an able statesman, and a leader who thinks in terms of positive solutions for the world and for this region. I will say he is a friend of Pakistan. Had he won the elections in 2004 instead of George Bush history might have been somewhat different. However, we all know that he is coming here at a very difficult moment and through the New York Times story which I posted on this page we know that he is bringing certain tough demands and conditions.

Read more: CIA instigating mutiny in the Pakistani Army??_MK Bhadrakumar, Ex Indian Ambassador on New York Times story of 15th June…!

But we need not fear for a single moment. Whereas this Osama Bin Laden saga is deeply embarrassing, and we are under pressure from international media and community but lets be clear in our own minds first that we as a country or people had nothing to do with that ass hole or his stupid irrational Al-Qaeda. The American allegations against Pakistani military or ISI of being soft on Afghan Taliban may have substance and make sense given our Pakistani reservations on Afganistan and we do understand these conflicts, but given the whole history of the last 10-15 years we should have no doubt in our minds that “Bin Laden” was of no use to us, he was an enemy whose terror brigades in the form of Al Qaeda and TTP wreaked hell on Pakistan and Pakistanis. Al Qaeda killed 3000 innocent on American soil but it also leads to the deaths of almost 40, 000 Pakistanis many of whom were our friends, loved ones, and neighbors. If TTP mourned OBL’s death then we know that TTP is the number one enemy of Pakistani defense establishment and Pakistani state that even attacked our sacred places like Data ki Nagri.

This is mental chess. We lost it when we quiet unnecessarrilly accepted Kerry Lugar Bill in 2009 but now we should not let “Pakistani stooges” play their game again. If US wants to extract concessions on Afghanistan which we cannot give and they dangle the threat of “Aid cut off” then let them do it because if we did’nt deal wisely and carefully with the US pressure and demands then it will become even more difficult for us later.

Given this moment and the way it has played across the world and the doubts that have been genuinely created (and then purposefully exaggerated by vested interest and lobbies) John Kerry may – and more than him, certain black sheep in our own midst- will try to frighten us of international isolation, of US sanctions, end of KLB or military aid, end of IMF tranches and so on… we must listen respectfully and carefully, this is their moment and we are on defensive so we must respectfully listen but we not be afraid and we must not budge. Why?

I will tell you why? the way this OBL episode has played, it is getting abundantly clear that there was no Pakistani complicity in hiding OBL and deep down in their hearts the American policy makers know it and they know it for sure. They won’t say it, it is in their interest to pose that they might have evidence that may prove ISI complicity and that OBL was still operational. This is all nonsense; actions speak louder than words. We know for sure (thanks to Americans changing their story many times) that they only wanted to kill Osama Bin Laden (and this vital question that why they wanted to kill and not capture puts them on the defensive) and they never wanted to capture him alive.

Ask yourself why this is important to us? this is vitally important because if they really believed that ass hole, living with 3 wives and 13 children, was operationally active then they would not have killed him, they would have captured him alive for investigation. This story of several flash drives and computer hard drives looks good to unsuspecting eyes and for lay press but has no real merit. What is the significance of Flash Drives when you don’t care or not interested in capturing the mastermind of everything…???…Osama Bin Laden’s death was a big psychological achievement for Obama Administration but they know it and we know it that this was a symbolic and ceremonial victory, a trophy that helps complete the “Closure on 9/11” but that does not change much on ground…in this region…and using that to pressurize Pakistan is smart clever politics but then we also know that this is “clever smart politics”.

We must tell John Kerry honestly and sincerely that we are going to do a massive investigation through an “Independent National Commission” as approved by the parliament and will punish if some officials are found complicit and we will publish our findings to the whole world. And that we are determined to improve and reform our security and intelligence systems and will plug holes and will increase coordination between ISI, FIA, and Police. And that we will be hunting for Al Qaeda and Ayman Al Zawahri more than ever before but we also want to discuss our differences in open. And we are shocked the way the US has invaded an ally that has been fighting on its side for the last 10 years! …an ally that adopted America’s war against terrorism as its own war and paid with 40, 000 lives…Bin Laden was important but even then US has shown utter disregard of the political, regional and psychological impact of its actions. And that we do have national interests in the outcome of American end game in Afghanistan and whereas we like America want peace and stability in Afghanistan we are concerned that America has no clear road map for Afghanistan and shows no or little sensitivity to our national interests there…and that whereas our goals are same our approaches towards achieving those goals could be different.

We must not show those childish emotional reactions which are then quoted as Anti-Americanism; we must be respectful and polite and patient but we must know that despite all that has happened America, especially at this stage of the end game in Afghanistan and the coming US Elections needs us as much as we need them. If our economic problems necessitate their help and attention then they also need to disperse aid to manage our political system. Aid gives them influence and control inside Islamabad. This is a mutual game. This is mental chess. We lost it when we quiet unnecessarily accepted Kerry-Lugar Bill in 2009 but now we should not let “Pakistani stooges” play their game again. If US wants to extract concessions on Afghanistan which we cannot give and they dangle the threat of “Aid cut off” then let them do it because if we didn’t deal wisely and carefully with the US pressure and demands then it will become even more difficult for us later. In fact, we are in deep shit today and perceived to be on the wrong side of the international community, because in 1980’s we were often irresponsible in our efforts to please the US.

Had he won the elections in 2004 instead of George Bush history might have been somewhat different. However, we all know that he is coming here at a very difficult moment and through the New York Times story which I posted on this page we know that he is bringing certain tough demands and conditions.

If despite all what we have done or stood for, the US still cuts off our aid, then let them do it. It will only prove those right that always claimed that all US promises of a sustained relationship are fake and the US is unable to have anything more than a transactional relationship with Pakistan, a relationship contingent upon Pakistani military playing their game in the region. Consequences of their irresponsible actions will be as hard for them as for us. Also over the last 10 years the $20 billion which US media repeatedly quotes had about $9 Billion of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) which was a reimbursement of the cost incurred by Pakistani military and that was a contractual obligation between Pentagon and the military, and only $200 million has flowed from the Kerry-Lugar Bill…bottom line is that cutting off of aid can be painful but we can survive.

In the end, we all must be clear in our own minds that America is not our enemy, for the past 50 years of our history we have tried always to be on the American side; we have no ideological or territorial issues with America. We are not stupid or irrational to be conceiving a conflict with a Superpower like the US. Why should we be enemies of the US? or even perceived as such? We have always done more than any other country to help the US in this region but this does not mean that we will ignore our long-term interests and fears in Afghanistan or this region or should be so afraid or guilty that we cannot air them or take a logical position about them…this is the time to air our differences, sot that they can be debated and resolved…

Bottom line is that yes we are embarrassed on this OBL episode for our inability to capture him for he was also our public enemy one, but let’s act like mature people, this is not the end of the world and does not prove anything, and any attempts to arm-twist us by making us over-guilty by this OBL story looks very suspect… let’s look toward the stable future of this region in which the United States has to play a constructive role with responsibility and not through the narrow needs of an “Election year”…..

 

Moeed Pirzada is prominent TV Anchor & commentator; he studied international relations at Columbia Univ, New York and law at London School of Economics. Twitter: MoeedNj. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy. This piece was first published in Moeed Pirzada’s official page. It has been reproduced with permission.