This odyssey that takes us back into the British era starts at the beginning of the 20th century when two brothers – Syed Wazir Ali Zaidi and Syed Nazir Ali Zaidi – study portrait painting at the Mayo School of Industrial Arts – now called National College of Arts (NCA). Over the next hundred years, their lens captures the changing kaleidoscope of imperial Lahore in what is now Pakistan.
Some events barge into our consciousness and take us away from our frenzied pace of life, the recent Dastak Exhibition of Zaidi’s photographers curated by Irfan Sheikh and Tanzara gallery, Saidpur, was one such majestic interruption.
Shahid Zaidi’s amazing collection transports us back, in a time machine, to a different era to relive memories of a nation through its collection of photographs of people. Many of these men and women – in immaculate suits and with delicately managed buns and braids – have long gone, but their images preserved by Zaidi’s lens make us hurtle back into their times.
This exhibition was shown as part of Islamabad’s Art Festival activities that took place in the capital city between 18-30 November 2019. Zaidis Photographers on Lahore’s Mall Road is a romantic journey of Pakistan’s mind and soul.
This odyssey that takes us back into the British era starts at the beginning of the 20th century when two brothers – Syed Wazir Ali Zaidi and Syed Nazir Ali Zaidi – study portrait painting at the Mayo School of Industrial Arts – now called National College of Arts (NCA).
This art school, founded in 1875, was one of two art colleges created by the British Crown in India in reaction to the Arts & Crafts Movement. John Lockwood Kipling, the father of novelist Rudyard Kipling, was the school’s first principal.
Desire to produce impact took two Zaidi brothers to different parts of vast imperial India. Wazir Ali went to Banaras while Nazir Ali went to Allahabad to set up Portrait Painting and Photography studios in 1904.
Twenty-five years later, it was Nazir Ali’s son, Mohammad Ali Zaidi, who learned the skills from his father in Allahabad and travelled back to Kipling’s Lahore and ended up setting the historic Zaidi Photographers on Mall Road in 1930.
Much has changed in Lahore since then, but to this day, Zaidi Photographers continues as an unforgettable landmark in Punjab’s capital. Zaidi Photographer’s iconic studio located on Mall road has over 500,000 negatives of their subjects, creating a kaleidoscope of the socio-cultural evolution of people that have lived, managed, and ruled this land.
You turn over the pages of history, costume, and etiquette as you move from the 1930’s photos of Maharajas and Nawabs, Hindus, Sikhs Muslims, and English men and their wives, father of the nation, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, Nawab Liaqat Ali Khan, Jacqueline Kennedy with President Ayub Khan, Queen Elizabeth addressing a crowd in Pakistan, to a young impressionable 19-year-old Imran Khan.
A mere glance on the photos of grandfather Syed Nazir Ali and his son and grandson – Syed Ali Zaidi and Shahid Zaidi – shared by Dastak in its elegantly produced brochure let you see the evolution in expression, costume, and etiquette in this land from the last days of Queen Victoria to the present age of Imran Khan.
The photographs show a lost aristocratic past; they are significant for a host of reasons for different audiences. For costume designers, the range of high-quality dresses is a rich source of inspiration. The social and historian enthusiasts can study who’s who of the most volatile period of our history.
In an age of selfies, where every moment is captured in a second and lost from memory once the Instagram post has been uploaded. Shahid Zaidi still specializes in making memories last a generation. No wonder, Zaidi studios, a quintessential national institution, are considered a hallmark of vintage Pakistani photography.
As the science of photography has developed, so have the studios. Zaidis have gone from using large format cameras, roll films, and wet darkrooms to state-of-the-art digital photography supported by computer lab.
But while technology has moved on, the artist in Shahid Zaidi remains intact as he plays with his subjects commanding them to tilt their heads, produce smiles, and a twinkle in their eyes as he adjusts the shadows through downlights and up lights.
Islamabad’s “Dastak” Exhibition could happen because of excellent collaboration between Noshi Qadir of Tanzara Gallery and an unusual connoisseur of arts, Irfan Sheikh.
Irfan, is a senior executive in Cement Industry and one expects him to be specializing in limestone, marble and chalk but his spirit is in lenses and lights.
With cameras and photography his real passion, he is devoted to the legacy of Zaidis and has worked hard with Tanzara Gallery to make this exhibition possible. But Zaidis bring forward a bigger cause to the capital city. Their collection since the 1930’s consists of more than half a million meticulously maintained negatives with customer details.
Most of these men and women have moved on since then – but their images offer a kaleidoscope into their times and our history. Few years ago, Zaidis embarked on the mission to digitise their archives. Goal is to build a database and put it online for public. It’s a humungous task but much needed for posterity.
We hope either the government or an institution will step forward to help and share this burden of history. We have selected a few images that take us back through Zaidi’s time machine – Editors.
GVS welcomes Dr. Christian TurnerCMG, the new British High Commissioner to Islamabad. He was announced as the replacement to outgoing High Commissioner, Thomas Drew, in August, but he is now joining in December. Dr. Turner will be Britain’s 20th High Commissioner to Pakistan since the country’s independence from Britain in 1947.
He brings a very diverse background to this position. He has previously served as High Commissioner to Kenya, in Nairobi (2012-2016). His last assignment in London has been as International Affairs Adviser to British Prime Minister and as Deputy National Security Adviser.
Before this, in 2016-17, he had served at the important position of Director General (MENA), the Middle East and North Africa. This was an assignment to which he brings in-depth exposure as he had earlier served as Director MENA with Cabinet Office (2007-8) and then as Deputy Director and Director, FCO for MENA between 2008 and 2012.
Dr. Turner also served as Private Secretary to PM at 10 Downing Street in 2007. In the initial years of his career, he served in Washington as a first secretary and as a team leader in Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit. British residence in Islamabad looms large in the capital city’s diplomatic life.
It is known for its diplomatic and cultural gatherings and considered one of the most important meeting points for Pakistani politicians, intelligentsia, and corporate leadership. British Ambassadors and High Commissioners have often been very popular in Pakistani media, and at times it is believed that they may have played an important role in Pakistani politics.
Some of the more famous envoys have been: Sir. Nicholas Barrington, Sir. Hilary Synnott, Sir. Mark Lyall Grant, Robert Brinkley, and Sir. Adam Thomson. Perhaps the most well known is Sir. Nicholas Barrington, who served for seven years between 1987 to 1994 – a period that saw many political transitions in Pakistan from Gen. Zia’s martial law to Benazir Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif and again Benazir Bhutto. Dr. Turner is married to Ms. Claire Turner; they have two children.
British High Commissioners to Pakistan
1947–1951: Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith
1951–1954: Sir Gilbert Laithwaite
1954–1961: Sir Alexander Symon
1961–1965: Sir Morrice James
1966–1971: Sir Cyril Pickard
British Ambassadors to Pakistan
1972–1976: Sir Laurence Pumphrey
1976–1979: John Bushell
1979–1984: Sir Oliver Forster
1984–1987: Richard Fyjis-Walker
1987–1989:Nicholas Barrington
British High Commissioners to Pakistan
1989–1994: Sir Nicholas Barrington
1994–1997: Sir Christopher MacRae
1997–2000: Sir David Dain
2000–2003: Sir Hilary Synnott
2003–2006: Sir Mark Lyall Grant
2006–2010: Robert Brinkley
2010–2013: Sir Adam Thomson
2014–2016: Philip Barton
2016–2019: Thomas Drew
British envoys to Pakistan are called High Commissioners since Pakistan is one of the 54 members of the British Commonwealth. Between 1972 to 1989, Pakistan was not a member of the British Commonwealth as Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had decided to withdraw Pakistan after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war when it was perceived that Britain did not play the kind of role it needed to play. However, it later re-joined in 1989 realizing the multiple benefits of being part of the Commonwealth.
On 28th September, a day after, PM Imran Khan’s speech at UNGA, I was at a dinner in Islamabad’s posh F-6/3 sector. The host was a corporate leader, and most guests were CEOs and CFOs of major companies or heads of private business entities. The subject inevitably was PM Khan’s speech of 27th, and the mood was depressing.
“Does he want a war with India or what? He has tried doing nuclear blackmail and the west will react. Are we going to sacrifice Pakistan for Kashmir? Modi has settled Kashmir for all of us, why don’t we realize, and so on. It sounded like the “End of the world”. There was one lone voice of a top hotelier who reminded other participants that Khan may have been speaking to several audiences at the same time – including the followers of Maulana Fazal ur Rehman, who was then threatening a million march on Islamabad and who keeps on repeating “Namoos-e-Risalat” in his medley of words.
Years in the media have trained me to understand that opinions vary across different segments of society depending upon social strata, income bracket, nature of work, access to information, world view, and so on. And top corporate executives, especially in Pakistan, may have never reflected the national sentiment.
The mood in my television program and countless others across 32 news channels on 27th September, immediately after the speech was altogether different. A potpourri combination of diplomats, journalists, and politicians was unanimous in thinking that Khan’s speech was excellent – and was exactly what was needed at this point. Most in the workplace around me felt the same.
I made several phone calls to TV executives, columnists, lawyers, normal businessmen, and retired pensioners and being a journalist, I did not stop there; I asked everyone on the street, and that included beggars I paid, shopkeepers I bought from, customers who were purchasing wares, men who were with me in bank teller’s queue and so on – and there was a universal excitement around Khan’s UNGA speech.
Imran Khan conducted 27 or 28 interactions that consisted of one on one meetings, institutional talks, press conferences, and so on. This was a sharp contrast to previous lackluster visits by Pakistani leaders over the past ten years.
Unfortunately, such was the exaggerated interest in Imran Khan’s UNGA speech that somehow the dynamics of his whole trip were overshadowed by it. Many opposition leaders and political commentators asked on TV channels, “so what came out of this speech?” with such vehemence that it suggested as if the speech itself marked Fukuyama’s end of history; as if it would have settled things forever.
These sentiments would make one believe that the UNGA speech was a do or die debating competition – a kind of scene from Suzanne Collins’s Hunger Games – after which the Security Council would have declared war against one or the other side. Khan’s personal statements, “I will keep Kashmir’s case in front of the world,” helped create a hype around a speech that in the ordinary course of events should have been of 20 or 25 minutes.
In reality, Khan’s 50 or so minutes long – and at times unwieldy – speech was directed towards several audiences. He may have been standing in the halls of the United Nations General Assembly, but his primary audience was watching on TV screens in Punjab, KP, Karachi, Azad Kashmir, and Gilgit Baltistan.
He had to reassure the Kashmiris in Indian occupied state that Pakistan stands with them, he was sending a message to Muslims across the world, to the Arab street and their monarchs; he was informing the UN, global leadership and International media that there is grave danger in Kashmir, and he was talking to Narendra Modi to ward him off from any further adventurism in Kashmir.
But, as I said above, this fiery political speech overshadowed the real dynamics of PM Imran Khan’s feverish activity at the UN. In his five days in New York, Pakistan’s prime minister was busy every moment; he met US President Donald Trump, British PM Boris Johnson, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, Malaysian PM Mahatir Mohammad, New Zealand PM Jacinda Ardern, Italian PM Guiseppe Conte, Norwegian PM Erna Solberg, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Founder of Microsoft Bill Gates, Kashmiri delegation with founder of Kashmir Study Group, Farooq Kathwari, influential senators like Lindsay Graham and host of investors.
Imran Khan spoke at the Council of Foreign Relations, at Asia Society, met with the New York Times Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal Editorial Board, held a joint press conferences with Erdogan and Mahatir, announced the idea of an English TV channel to be jointly launched by Pakistan, Turkey and Malaysia and was part of deliberations of Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). Altogether, in his five days in New York, Imran Khan conducted 27 or 28 interactions that consisted of one on one meetings, institutional talks, press conferences, and so on.
This was a sharp contrast to previous lackluster visits by Pakistani leaders over the past ten years. Zardari and Nawaz, in their trips to New York, were often seen taking a select group of accompanying Pakistani journalists in small hotel rooms filled with their own ministers, advisers, and embassy officials.
In 2016, Nawaz Sharif barely had 4 or 5 meetings and mostly stayed in his hotel room. So what has Khan achieved? PPP and PML-N, two political parties that can be credited for creating the most dysfunctional era in Pakistan’s foreign policy (2008-2018) with direct implications for the country’s position on Kashmir, argue that India’s million-strong army is still in Kashmir.
One can only be amused by this abject hypocrisy. Reality is more close to what a European diplomat commented off the record, “Imran Khan made the best use of the United Nations given the limitations involved.”
Another added that Khan has, for the first time, after many years given a voice to Pakistan on the International arena, has reached out to International media, academia, and human rights organizations, has put India’s powerful establishment on defensive and has rattled Modi.
No doubt, India controls ground reality in the occupied Jammu and Kashmir, where it has placed the world’s largest possible concentration of troops upon a civilian population, that has ever been witnessed in mankind’s history. With reinforcements of regular troops and paramilitaries, almost a million-plus trained, armed soldiers, create the highest ever ratio of combatants assembled to control an unarmed civilian population that at best numbers around 8 million including children, women, aged, infirm, sick and dying.
There is incontrovertible evidence flowing out from diplomatic circles that Modi is stressed because of Khan’s unremitting rhetoric directed towards him.
If one remembers the thousands of mass graves, that started to come to light after the 2005 earthquake, and that too in only three districts of the valley (Kupwara, Baramulla, and Bandipora) dug up till 2012, it had thrown up more than 3,000 bodies, then one can estimate the empire of fear Modi has imposed upon Kashmir.
Human Right workers till 2012, working through two more districts, Rajouri and Poonch, mapped another 3,844 unmarked single and mass graves, taking the total number to more than 6,000. There were still another 16 districts to be surveyed – leaving human right workers to wonder how many violent deaths and surreptitious burials have been concealed across Kashmir – and then nothing more was heard.
Indian governments have enjoyed the international clout to suppress and distort information at all levels. Could another government lock up 8 million people in this day and age? What will be the reaction of the international community if 6000 mass graves are discovered in only three districts of Balochistan or FATA?
Under the circumstances, Modi’s physical hold on Kashmir is apparently un-shakeable; Kashmiris are suppressed and terrified, global leadership cares little for Muslim suffering, and Modi, for the time being, is secure in his actions. Yet, there is incontrovertible evidence flowing out from diplomatic circles that Modi is stressed because of Khan’s unremitting rhetoric directed towards him.
The world had mostly forgotten about Modi’s past; the impressive title of the Prime Minister of the world’s largest democracy is powerful enough, seductive enough, to let you forget that the man who occupies this office has an unusually dark past.
Over the past few years, at least since 2014, few had remembered that Modi is the same man who was instrumental during Sangh Parivar‘s marches (1989-91) to demolish Babri Mosque – a grotesque event that led to the death of thousands of Indians in riots, mostly from the subjugated Muslim minority. And that he was seriously accused of orchestrating or letting the massacres of Muslims in Gujarat (for letting the Muslims know their place) when more than 2000 died in pogroms.
And that he was a life long member of RSS, the organization that assassinated Mahatma Gandhi. To Modi’s great misfortune, Imran Khan has started to remind the world about Modi’s past. Along with Modi, this stresses the Indian establishment that has worked assiduously to create a brand around Modi, but now Modi is fast becoming a liability for the Indian brand managers.
For Imran Khan facing a seriously troubled economy, divided political house, weak national institutions Kashmir is a challenge he did not need. But given that Modi’s irresponsible actions – rooted not in pragmatism but his ideological commitments to a Hindutva political base – have thrust this upon him, he has accepted this as a long haul struggle.
His goal is to deny Modi the ease of turning Kashmir into ether “terrorism” or “India-Pakistan war.” Instead, Imran is focused on letting the world understand the fascist nature of the Hindutva regime in India.
Modi would have expected that given his hold on the ground and tacit support of many key international players, it would be over soon, and Pakistan, too, will accept the inevitable. He didn’t understand that Imran Khan sitting across the borders in a Pakistan – for which Indians only express contempt – may prove to be his political nemesis. The battle has just begun.
Somewhere in October 1947, my mother, Najma, who was then four, was part of a refugee caravan in between Jammu and Sialkot. She was in the lap of her grandmother, Ameena, when the Akalis and RSS gangs attacked them.
Years later, my grandmother, Zubedia, would always turn ashen white whenever she remembered the horror of those dark moments “Sky was red, mist of blood flying in thick air turned into clouds, shouts had turned into shrieks, no one could hear anything, they kept attacking with their swords, machetes, axes and kirpans, we kept falling, we kept running, for how long we did not know, at some point there were some uniformed men that appeared and started firing, it was then that the Akalis turned back”.
And it was only then that Zubedia realized that she had lost Ismat, her eldest daughter, and Najma who was in her mother’s lap. Someone insisted that they had seen Ameena being attacked and falling to ground with little Najma.
Later, sitting in a refugee camp, in the outskirts of Sialkot, Zubedia realized that almost everyone in the family – her mother, father, uncles, aunts, cousins everyone had perished except her two brothers and one daughter – and her husband, who was in Srinagar. Most who reached Sialkot in that season of killing had similar stories to tell.
There was the genocide of Muslims in and around Jammu city. Dogra troops of Maharaja Hari Singh lead the charge. Fearsome Aakalis and RSS goons had joined them. The state officials provided arms and ammunition to the rioters. Maharaja’s administration had demobilized a large number of Muslim soldiers in the state army and had disarmed Muslim police officers.
Mountbatten and Edwina had developed a relationship of mutual liking with Pundit Nehru long before former’s arrival in India as its last British Viceroy.
Maharaja who in the fiction of history was supposed to be the custodian of his population was instead killing them. His imperial majesty was reacting to the rebellion of “Sudhans” in Poonch. So in imperial rage he had a “final solution” for the Muslims of Jammu: Ethnic Cleansing.
Mountbatten, Nehru & Tragedy of Kashmir
This purification of Jammu was taking place in the second week of October 1947; few days before the now-infamous tribal lashkar crossed over from near Abbottabad into the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Hari Singh, ruthless ruler of Kashmir and butcher of Jammu, now presented himself as a victim of aggression.
He who had signed a “Stand Still Agreement” with Pakistan now signed an instrument of accession with India. What exactly happened in those 48 hours remains murky to this day. History will perhaps remember last English Viceroy, Mountbatten, for his scheming wicked mind and corrupt soul.
Maharaja’s administration had demobilized a large number of Muslim soldiers in the state army and had disarmed Muslim police officers.
Mountbatten and Edwina had developed a relationship of mutual liking with Pundit Nehru long before former’s arrival in India as its last British Viceroy. Was his appointment by Labor Prime Minister, Atlee, influenced by Congress supporters in London is not clear.
However, irrespective of his initial liking for Nehru, by October of 1947, Mountbatten was seething in rage against the new state of Pakistan – and its founder. His egoistical desire to be the combined Governor-General of both new dominions – India & Pakistan – was turned down by Jinnah.
Denying Kashmir to Pakistan; which Jinnah thought was in “his pocket” was thus now Mountbatten’s mission. Mountbatten may have his reasons; perhaps Jinnah should have treated him more carefully. But Jinnah died in 1948, with his unique place in history as founder of a nation.
It is the poor Kashmiris whose generations have paid the price and will continue to suffer this British Viceroy’s demons of ego. Today all across the world, governments, media and academia discuss Kashmir as a border issue, a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan.
Most Pakistani protesters shout, “Kashmir banega ka Pakistan” and Indians, very innocently and perhaps truly, believe that Kashmir was always India. Can we blame them when this is what they have been taught? Height of information is reflected when western diplomats, UN officials and columnists say it was “a princely state, and Maharaja wanted to stay independent”.
Kashmir: Was it ever in India?
But you have to be a Kashmiri to know that Kashmir never had a physical relationship with areas that now constitute India. This statement may sound confusing, because on map, Kashmir appears a territory between India and Pakistan. But maps are two dimensional, with lines on paper.
Kashmir’s ancient history, its civilization, its unique Sufi culture were all shaped by its mountainous geography. For all practical purposes people, over the past two thousand years, could only enter or leave Kashmir from the areas that now constitute Pakistani Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Denying Kashmir to Pakistan; which Jinnah thought was in “his pocket” was thus now Mountbatten’s mission. Mountbatten may have his reasons; perhaps Jinnah should have treated him more carefully.
Sufi preachers, Mughal armies, Pathan invaders, Sikh conquerors, British officers, and Pundit Nehru all either used the Rawalpindi-Srinagar Highway or used the Wazirabad-Sialkot corridor for access into Kashmir. After the 1947 conquest, India invested heavily to create complex tunnels, like Banihal and others, to develop land access.
All historic human relationship of Kashmir – good, bad or ugly – its cultural and civilizational links thus only existed with the areas and populations that constitute Punjab.
It was the treaty of Lahore in 1846, that ceded control of Hazara, Jalandhar Doab and Kashmir to British and it was the treaty of Amritsar through which a bankrupt East Indian Company sold Kashmir to Jammu’s Dogra ruler, Ghulab Singh. True, that pre-Islamic Kashmir, before 13th century had a distinct Hindu history, but that is true for Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and all of Pakistan.
If Kashmir was a princely state in the geography of British India, it was because Punjab was considered to be in India – though was there an India or distinct Indian identity or an Indian nation before the British rule remains a subject of rich debate.
Irrespective of that debate, Kashmir for all practical purposes was a unique place with its own isolated culture and human existence with little or no geographic and human relationship with areas that now constitute India after 1947. Indian claims on Kashmir, around the partition, thus operated in a historical vacuum that was defined through an ideological definition of India.
India: an ideological definition?
Even today we hear this ahistorical, ideological religiously derived definition of India. According to this definition: one country or nation of India existed between Khyber Pass and Kanyakumari that was tragically divided in the partition of 1947 – in reality, no Indian state or nation could exist before the arrival of British East India Company.
The advent of railways, telegraph, radio, district administrations, Indian army garrisons and a common judicature all played a role in creating a nascent sense of a country – but it was a loosely arranged imperial order. With all its trappings of power, British India ruled over limited geography – with more than 580 independent princely states between Khyber and KanyaKumari.
Indian claims on Kashmir, around partition, thus operated in a historical vacuum that was defined through an ideological definition of India.
And these states were told to opt for the new dominions of India and Pakistan keeping in view their geography and population. Media worldwide continues to regurgitate this definition of “India” and its partition without understanding its malevolent meaning.
This cruel definition of India was cleverly used by the leaders of Congress and Mountbatten for the disastrous division of two largest states of Punjab and Bengal that lead to migrations and genocide. The pathetic argument was if India can be divided then Punjab and Bengal should be divided.
But India was an entity that existed for only 90 years between 1858 and 1947 –and Punjab and Bengal were centuries old. This bizarre propaganda-driven definition of India has been used to dehumanize Kashmiris who have become a colony of people they had no real relationship over past two thousand years.
Actions of a Hindutva driven fascist regime in August of 2019 have now set the stage for genocide and ethnic cleansing of a whole population – while a world that derives its insensitivity from its ignorance continues to watch listlessly as a tragedy unfolds.
Killing fields of Jammu
How many Muslims were killed in Jammu in those few days of October 1947? Historians continue to disagree. Figures from 100,000 to 500,000 have been estimated as killed, several hundred thousand were driven of their homes and landed in Pakistan as refugees – my mother’s family was one of them.
Hari Singh, ruthless ruler of Kashmir and butcher of Jammu, now presented himself as a victim of aggression.
Indian historians and teams created, perhaps by the deep state, to influence Wikipedia history continue to downplay this massacre or try painting it as part of larger Hindu-Muslim killings in Punjab and elsewhere. But what happened in Jammu had all elements of a preconceived state-sponsored genocide and ethnic cleansing – its goal was to purify Jammu of Muslims.
Before partition Muslims had a slim majority in and around Jammu, immediately after October-November 1947, Muslims became a distinct minority. Returning back to my mother who was presumed dead on a killing field between Jammu and Sialkot. Human spirit prevails in the worst of times.
A Hindu shopkeeper who arrived on the scene of death as a scavenger, looking to kill the survivors and loot precious leftovers of gold and silver found an injured girl child with extremely fair complexion and dark hair. He had no child; he fell in love with that daughter of a Kashmiri civil servant and Jammu’s high bred Muslim woman.
Najma my mother, was nursed, treated and raised affectionately by this Hindu shopkeeper for next few months, till his wife compelled him that he must return and unite this crying child to her mother.
He came to Sialkot and dropped her in the refugee camp providing all details – this is how my mother who was hit with a sword and left for being dead on a killing field lived on for several decades with a long scar on her abdomen. But if a Hindu shopkeeper who came to loot the dead corpses saved her from a killing field, she – several decades later – was murdered by a Muslim servant for her gold jewelry. Life is strange and cruel.
Kashmir: An Identity of Eternal Pain
While, in October of 1947, most India burnt with sectarian fires, Muslim majority Kashmir (93% Muslim) was one distinctive area in that sea of mayhem that remained calm. British Indian troops started to arrive in Srinagar from 26th October – as if Mountbatten was only waiting for the instrument of accession. My father, a college student, helplessly watched Kashmiri people’s mental lethargy and slumber.
Tribals were fighting around Srinagar, every day one or two arrested Pathans would be paraded and dragged on the streets of Srinagar as trophies of Indian victory. Sheikh Abdullah’s goons will always be there to beat them and tell public that they are looters and came for gold.
Former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir Sheikh Abdullah.
Sheikh Abdullah, an eloquent speaker, a Hafiz Quran, an intelligent manipulator of human minds, had emerged as a key Kashmiri leader from 1930’s onwards. Nehru relied upon his loyalty and with Pundit’s support he was the real force on streets of Srinagar.
It was Abdullah who provided Nehru with the narrative and injected morphine into the Kashmiri minds painting a picture of a wonderful future. My father, as a young Kashmiri man, identified Sheikh as the real devil who had sold Kashmiris for his personal interests. Few months later, he managed to cross the mountains and found his “azadi” in Rawalpindi.
Tribals were fighting around Srinagar, every day one or two arrested Pathans would be paraded and dragged on the streets of Srinagar as trophies of Indian victory.
His contempt for Sheikh continued till last breath. He never visited Srinagar till his death; he did not let his children – of Kashmiri descent from both mother and father – learn Kashmiri language. He once told me “I didn’t want to give you an identity of eternal pain”. He always said, “Kashmiris will forever regret their love of Abdullah, one day will come their children will all hate him”.
My maternal grandfather, the forest officer in Srinagar, and an admirer of both Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru also migrated to Pakistan and became a civil servant. All their lives these two men kept clashing with their rival worldviews and at times it was ugly. I grew up learning from both.
In September of 1988, my grandfather took me to Srinagar. It was immediately after Gen. Zia’s death. I was surprised to find that many Kashmiris died in protests that broke out over Zia’s death. Most Pakistanis were rather happy or relieved. There was definitely something strange about Kashmir that was difficult to fathom.
We went to Sheikh Abdullah’s grave; many policemen were guarding it. My grandfather asked the reason for such security around a grave; policemen told us: “All young men come here to urinate; stink had become intolerable so the government has maintained security to keep them off”.
My grandfather had visited Srinagar many times before but this trip opened up his eyes; as he listened to his nephews and nieces explaining that why Kashmiris have no real place and future inside India, his world view from 1940’s started to collapse. When we were returning he told me that maybe he was wrong all along.
Few years later, Hindutva fanatics demolished Babri mosque. My grandfather wept, apologized to his wife and my father for believing in a delusional world that had perhaps never existed.
Nehru relied upon his loyalty and with Pundit’s support he was the real force on streets of Srinagar.
Fast forward: August 2019. An extremist Hindutva regime, led by Narendra Modi, has consolidated the colonial status of Kashmir. The legal chicanery of autonomous status, Art.370, internal issue, union territory and so on is all pure gibberish. The real thing was Article 35-A that stopped outsiders from buying property in Kashmir and was the only thing left that prevented Hindutva’s plans of “Anschluss” for Kashmir.
In reality, what is happening is far crueller than Nazi unification with Austria. While the constitutionally Nazi plan was a violation of treaties and an abject power grab but most Austrians were ethnic Germans, had much to share with Germany and welcomed Anschluss.
Situation in Kashmir is far more sinister- the constitutional mumbo jumbo of “integration” into one country artfully hides the real plan, the “final solution”, of crushing Kashmiri identity, of diluting the Kashmiri Muslims through influx from India in a way that colonized Kashmiris will now become an ineffective minority without a voice like the Jammu Muslims.
This diabolical plan means that as and when Kashmiris resist this rape of their identity, they will be muzzled with the power of Indian army. Modi’s “Anschluss” is not against the state identity (that was gone long time ago); it’s essentially against the people and who they are.
Genocide in Jammu, in October of 1947, was Maharaja’s “final solution” for Jammu Muslims; Modi, in 2019, is now implementing his “final solution” for Kashmiri Muslims. Who is Narendra Modi? Since he is now the prime minister of a country, which once produced the likes of Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru and Ambedkar, so the world is compelled to show some deference to his title.
But he is the man who played a significant role in organizing the mobs of hate that demolished Babri mosque. He later presided over the pogroms of Muslims in Gujarat. There is massive evidence to believe that he was responsible for orchestrating that tragedy.
The real thing was Article 35-A that stopped outsiders from buying property in Kashmir and was the only thing left that prevented Hindutva’s plans of “Anschluss” for Kashmir.
It was not without a reason that several countries including UK and the US had banned him for Visa. This international pariah became acceptable to the world, in 2013, when it became obvious that he will lead extremist Hindutva party of BJP into power.
On a personal level, there is much similar between Modi and Adolf Hitler. Both have remained single, without marriage, family and effective human relationship. Modi sells his insensitivity towards his mother and relatives as part of his honesty and defines his life through ideas of Hindutva.
Adolf Hitler was for German racial supremacy; Modi is for Hindu supremacy – an India for Hindus as full citizens – through the vehicle of BJP politics. But rise of Hindutva politics represents continuous regression of Indian social order, a closing of Indian mind and psyche.
From 1980’s onwards, Hindutva brigades – be it BJP, or RSS or Jan Sanghis of all sorts – have used religious iconography and invented grisly events on ground to expand their hold on politics.
Ram Rath Yatra, demolition of Babri mosque, riots in Bombay and across India, nuclear explosions of 1998, military standoffs with Pakistan, incidents like Uri, Pulwama, Surgical Strikes, and videotapes of mob lynchings have all been used to whip up a new identity of India based on Hindu Rashtra. Arguably germs of this demon were always there, once Gandhi started using religious iconography to advance his politics from 1920 onwards.
Schism inside Congress leading to departure of Jinnah and rise of Muslim league was in reaction to that narrow religious definition of India – but now the genie is out of bottle and dancing naked in front of the whole world. What all this means for Kashmiri Muslims does not need much imagination to foresee. My father refused giving me his language to stop me from becoming part of “eternal pain”. I think he failed in the end – Such is life!
Comments of Narendra Modi, Indian Prime Minister, on Kashmir, during his meeting with US President, Donald Trump, at Biarritz, France, describing it as a “bilateral issue” have exposed the confusion that prevails in New Delhi on its stand on Kashmir.
Narendra Modi met US President Donald Trump, on Monday 26 Aug, during the G7 summit in Biarritz, France. Though India is not a member of G-7, but Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had worked hard to extract an invitation for Modi so that he can be seen rubbing shoulders with global elite. In view of the negative media attention on abrogation of Art. 370 and 35-A, it was a useful opportunity to show to Indian media and public that all is well on international stage.
As expected by Pakistani and international media, and political commentators, like Michael Kugelman of Wilson Center, Kashmir was one of the key topics of discussion.
Kashmir: A bilateral issue between India & Pakistan?
Challenge for the Indian team, during the meeting with Trump, was to reject any offers of mediation from the US president. But the way Indian Prime Minister managed it exposed the chaos and confusion in Indian ranks and raised more questions. Its getting obvious that right-wing BJP government had not fully thought through the complexity of Kashmir issue before abrogating Art. 370 and 35-A.
A visibly stressed Modi, with his shoulders slouching forward, flanked by his team including National Security Advisor Ajit Doval said that, “all issues between India and Pakistan were bilateral” He was responding to a question on Kashmir. He went on explaining his earlier telephonic talks with Pakistani Prime Minister, Imran Khan in which he had told him that both countries need to talk as they face similar problems of poverty and hunger.
Modi, who while setting a stage for genocide in Kashmir, on Aug 5, had called it “India’s internal matter” was now saying in the context of Kashmir that its a bilateral matter between Pakistan and India and he did not want to pain any external party, a third country, with the inconvenience of becoming involved in finding a solution. He did not stop there but went on to say that “Pakistan and India were a single country before 1947, so we can settle issues between ourselves”.
Aided by a translator, US president Trump glanced at Modi with mild interest, looking amused, as he said all this. He later added that “PM Modi says that he has the situation in Kashmir under control.”
Modi was immediately described by Indian media as achieving a huge victory. Such was the level of fear on the issue of Trump offering mediation on Kashmir that even Trump’s cynical joke on Modi, “he speaks English very well” and a brief laughter between the two leaders was described as “body chemistry”. In reality, Trump was commenting on Modi’s fluctuating use of languages during the press talk – and Modi was struggling to hide his stress.
When first question was asked on Kashmir, Modi answered a parroted response in English, however when someone asked a second question, on Kashmir and possible mediation, a visibly nervous Modi switched to Urdu/Hindi. It was then that he again reaffirmed in the context of Kashmir, that “all issues between India and Pakistan are bilateral”
Kashmir: India’s Internal Issue?
However, when the Modi led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government ended Kashmir’s special status by abrogated Article 370 and 35-A of the Indian constitution on August 5, the government insisted that it was India’s internal matter. The same claim was repeated in Modi’s radio speech broadcast two days later. The position was also maintained by all major news outlets. Even the Indian opposition seems to think the same way. In fact, this is some sort of “patriotism test” because anyone in India that say’s that Kashmir is disputed territory can find himself in danger.
India’s fascist Hindutva government’s position has been brilliantly summed up an American microblogger, Richard Harris. According to Harris, India is telling the western world that Kashmir is a bilateral issue, to Pakistan it asserts that Kashmir is an internal issue and to Kashmiris who want to know their fate; its say’s; “Fuck You”
Notwithstanding Indian state machinery’s insistence that it is an internal matter, the fact is that there are more than a dozen United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kashmir that effectively make it an international dispute with Pakistan and India as key parties. This was comprehensively explained in an article, “India’s New lawfare on Kashmir and Pakistan’s strategic options” for Global Village Space magazine’s August 2019 issue by Hassan Aslam Shad, an international law expert.
As explained by Hassan Aslam Shad, the resolutions from 1947-8 onwards make it clear that no party could unilaterally change the status of Kashmir as a disputed territory.
After Pakistan’s defeat in 1971 war in what was formerly East Pakistan and is now Bangladesh, India has exclusively relied on Simla Agreement of 1972 to call Kashmir a bilateral matter instead of an international one. The agreement was signed at a time when India had taken more than 90,000 Pakistani soldiers and civilians serving in former East Pakistan as prisoners of war. The agreement was signed with India in a much stronger position with a weaker defeated Pakistan that needed to get its prisoners released.
However, even the Simla agreement, of 1972, says that all bilateral matters must be settled in accordance with the UN Charter and UNSC resolutions.
The Simla Agreement says:
“In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:-
– That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two
countries;”
After the 5th August decision by Modi’s right wing fanatical Hindu supremacist government, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres took a clear position that his office continues to look at the J&K dispute through the lens of the UN Charter.
Since the Indian government’s unilateral action on occupied Kashmir, the US State Department has also said that their position on Jammu and Kashmir has not changed and the conflict must be resolved bilaterally. After the special meeting of the UN Security Council on Kashmir on 9th August, both Russia and China have maintained a similar position. The leaders of France and UAE have impressed upon PM Modi when they met that the issue must be resolved bilaterally.
Modi’s logic: Brute Power
Its getting obvious that Modi’s RSS controlled government had not thought through the complexity of issues. To them ending special status of Kashmir was an ideological commitment that had to be delivered. BJP is a progeny of Bharatiya Jana Sangh founded by Syama Prasad Mukherjee in 1951. And ending Kashmir’s special status was part of its founding manifesto. It was a religious and ideological commitment, a long standing election promise. There were no real functional or utilitarian reasons for this latest act of aggression against Kashmiris.
Since 2011, the insurgency had gone down. Pakistan under pressure of the US and western countries had gradually reined in pro-Kashmiri groups. Zardari and Nawaz governments, from 2008 till 2018, were afraid of raising the issue of Kashmir, lest it will anger New Delhi and earn them wrath of Washington. With a robust dialogue New Delhi could have pacified the situation in Kashmir. Most in Pakistan believed that Delhi will do so, however Modi government after coming to power in 2014 refused offering any political dialogue. It went on destabilising the Jammu & Kashmir government. It was a not without a forward-thinking that elections were not held in Jammu & Kashmir in 2019. When Modi took the unthinkable step of abrogating Art. 370 and 35-A, there was no government in Kashmir. Center sought approval of its actions altering the status of the disputed state from its own subordinate Governor.
Modi regime’s actions of ending Kashmir’s special status and turning it into a union territory means that New Delhi will have to rule Kashmir with an iron hand. Abolition of Article 35-A has set a stage for brining in migrants from India to change Kashmir’s Muslim demography. There are already reports – not fully confirmed at this stage – that RSS gangs have been made active in outlying districts of Kashmir. Their task is to frighten the locals to leave their homes, and to create a wave of mass refugees towards the Line of Control with Pakistan (LOC). This is clearly the kind of ethnic cleansing, from a primitive mind set that reminds world of Hitler’s Nazis or Milosevic in Serbia in 1990s.
Kashmir: Internal or Bilateral?
So Modi government’s actions leave no doubt that it considers Kashmir a matter on which it can act with impunity. Modi’s parroted statements at G-7, describing Kashmir as a “bilateral issue” siting next to Trump, were only to give a public excuse to Trump to back off. Indian media’s jubilant reaction on these double standards (obvious lies) demonstrates that there is a universal death of consciousness across India – country of 1.3 billion humans has been conquered by fundamentalists. World however refuses to open its eyes – Appeasement of Indian Nazis continues.
The reality is that United Nations maintains United Nations Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) in India and Pakistan. The organisation has offices in Srinagar and has often been the site of Kashmiri protests. It also has offices in Rawalpindi and Azad Kashmir. However, unlike Pakistan, India does not let the group anywhere near the Line of Control (Loc). But UNMOGIP’s presence itself is proof that the Kashmir issue is an international one.
Therefore, the Modi government, the Indian opposition and media have no rational basis to claim that Kashmir is an internal matter. The only rationale they have is that they have a strong and brutal military presence in Kashmir and they are now bent upon changing the demographics through fear and mass exodus – something against every cannon of international law.
While the world continues to appease a fascist regime in New Delhi, videos circulating on social media and even international media have shown how the population of 8 million is under siege. Soldiers are seen pumping live ammunition and pellet guns into crowds. Young men are picked up from their houses and beaten on roads. Rape fantasies disguised as “marriages with fair-skinned dark hair Kashmiri girls” are being expressed publicly and turned into popular songs. Kashmir’s beautiful valley, often referred to as ‘Paradise on Earth” has now turned into a maximum-security prison. With curfew running into 24th day, Modi’s India continues to operate behind the secular face of Gandhi and Nehru. Ironically, it was RSS that killed Gandhi. Today RSS controls Modi’s BJP. History has turned full circle.
August has many important transition points in Pakistan’s history. The country was carved out of the British Indian Empire on 14th August 1947. Gen. Zia’s crash on 17th August 1988 ended a kind of dark age in the nation’s turbulent history.
Imran Khan initiated his famous “dharna” (sit-in) on Constitution Avenue, Islamabad in August 2014, and four years later he took over as Prime Minister of Pakistan on 18th August 2019. PTI’s initial 21-member cabinet took its oath on 19th August and so on.
Pakistan’s Middle Class has arrived
History cannot be understood or defined without reference to key events that shape consciousness. The global order cannot be discussed without reference towards the Second World War, Bretton Woods, Vietnam, and 9/11. Russians cannot make sense of themselves without invoking the terms Bolshevik revolution, Great War, and Gorbachev.
One cannot understand Modern Europe, without making sense of the French revolution. History in Pakistan is often understood in terms of the partition, 1965 war, Students movement against Ayub Khan, Fall of Dacca, Bhutto’s nationalization, Zia’s martial law, Nuclear Explosions, Kargil, and so on. In a similar vein, Urdu word “Dharna” has now assumed a peculiar significance in Pakistan’s political psyche.
Its meanings may fluctuate with all shades of opinion – good, bad, or evil – depends upon who you are talking with. But no historian will be able to deny that a ‘Naya Pakistan‘ (new Pakistan) emerged from the fossils of the old as a larva emerges from a dying caterpillar. Pakistan’s urban middle class had finally arrived with “Dharna” in August of 2014.
In August of 2014, Nawaz Sharif was sitting in Prime Minister House, and Imran Khan sat on top a container for 126 days of Dharna. In August of 2019, Nawaz is in jail and Imran Khan is Prime Minister
I say “final” because Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s agitation against Field Marshal Ayub Khan, in the late sixties was also a middle-class moment. It was inspired and led by the ideas of intellectuals like JA Rahim, Hanif Ramay and many others on the left and right of Bhutto – supported by the industrial workers of Punjab.
But as soon as Bhutto came to power the feudal nature of his mind overtook, intellectuals were brushed aside, workers suppressed, and the feudals of Sindh and Punjab soon dominated the party. But this time it is different.
Imran Khan is a quintessential representative of Pakistan’s middle class. At times because of his former celebrity status, his first marriage with Jemima Goldsmith and his house on the hilltop in Banigala, he is perceived as part of the “super-rich.” US-based analysts are often misled on this issue; few months before the 2018 elections, a respected US-based analyst compared him with Trump and thought that they both share one thing: they are rich.
But nothing is far from the truth. In 2005, I worked as a TV anchor in London with “PTV Prime” (now called Prime TV UK); we came to Pakistan to interview the then Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, and we also thought of interviewing the cricketer turned politician who was becoming known for his radical positions.
We traveled on a dusty road to his newly built residence on top of the hills in Banigala. On the way, we crossed, with difficulty, a somewhat unruly, inhospitable water stream. After the interview, Khan showed me around; from his lawns, we could barely see a few houses on the hills around. “Why do you prefer to live in this wilderness,” I asked.
Khan was candid; he told me that a single Kanal in E-7 sector of Islamabad, his other choice, was for three crores (Rs. 30 million). But he and Jemima had preferred to live in a large open space. “And people will gradually come, they will follow me here, this is how areas develop” he added.
The now-famous, and controversial, Banigala residence spreads over almost 300 Kanals of land, but it cost him little more than Rs. 1 lac per Kanal when he bought it. It’s a different matter that a single Kanal in E-7 has only multiplied 3-4 times in price, but Banigala land may have increased in value ten or more times.
Fast forward 14 years: Pakistan’s first quintessential representative of its middle classes has managed to become its prime minister and through a long drawn political struggle. Ayub, Zia, and Musharraf were also middle class, but they represented their institution and were nothing without it – fish without water.
Imran’s opposition also blames him for being an “Establishment stooge” – but they have chosen to believe in their own propaganda. Pakistan’s history has reached a point where the establishment needed a genuinely popular leader to deal with the world and to save the realm from total collapse.
The majestic outpouring of 25,000 plus Pakistani Americans, from all over the East coast of the United States, to catch a glimpse of Khan, at Capital One Arena, Washington in the third week of July was an expression of this popular support. Their enthusiasm cannot be understood without grasping Pakistan’s middle-class moment.
In many ways, this is similar to the political change in India; Modi, despite his narrow Hindutva politics, has risen because of new middle classes who despise corruption of dynastic politics and see Modi as a harbinger of change.
Whether Imran Khan succeeds or he fails, PTI progresses as a political force, or it perishes, the fact is: wheel of history has moved on. This is a new Pakistan – and challengers of Imran and PTI will not emerge from the folds of Sharif and Zardari clans. These challengers may creep out from the disgruntled forces inside PTI or its myriad allies.
Pakistan: Experiencing Durkheim’s “Anomie”
French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, had coined the term “Anomie” to describe a state of agitation in the lives of individuals and societies. Durkheim believed that when a social system is in a state of anomie, shared values and common meanings are no longer understood or accepted, and yet new values and meanings have not developed.
In August of 2019, Nawaz is in jail more or less since July of 2018; his sons, his closest confidante, and accountant – Ishaq Dar – and many others are in self-exile.
Pakistan, today in many ways, can be described as experiencing its moments of anomie. The political order that was thrown up by the martial law of Gen. Zia, after 1977 – and that had comfortably reenacted itself after the end of Musharraf’s benign rule – is finally coming to an end.
With it all those polite values of political compromise, built around adjustments and bargaining – often referred to as “mukh mukka” – are vanishing. Old political elite led by the Sharif and Zardari dynasties and many in the administrative and judicial hierarchies took a while in absorbing this new reality, but now it’s becoming evident to them. The stage is being set for a fight unto “political death” or oblivion.
In August of 2014, Nawaz Sharif was sitting in Prime Minister House, and Imran Khan sat on top a container for 126 days of Dharna. In August of 2019, Nawaz is in jail more or less since July of 2018; his sons, his closest confidante, and accountant – Ishaq Dar – and many others are in self-exile.
Most key leadership of PML-N – including ex-premier, Shahid Khaqan Abbassi and strongmen, Khawaja Saad Rafique and Rana Sanaullah – are in jail and many others may also land there. Nawaz’s daughter, Maryam that looked like creating waves a few weeks ago, looks isolated and rudderless.
PPP leadership is yearning to strike some old fashioned bargain not realized so far. Failure of Nawaz Sharif’s last political move when his nominee – Senator Hasil Bizenjo – failed to dislodge Chairman Senate, Sadiq Sanjarani on 1st August, despite overwhelming numbers in the Senate, reflects the ground realities of this new Pakistan.
Failure in the Senate contest sends a strong “realpolitik signal” that now Nawaz and Zardari, and many others facing corruption cases will not get any reprieve from the system. The system is now being driven by an angry middle class and its amorphous, inchoate values. Many believe that progress has been denied to Pakistan only and only because of the corruption of its elite.
Imran Khan has successfully engaged Pakistan’s stakeholders – Saudi Arabia, UAE, China, Turkey and Malaysia – and built trust in Washington
Most proponents of these ideas are under thirty years of age, are unemployed or have worked at best for few years; their incomes often fall below the tax nets, and they believe things will change through strict action against the rich especially those not paying their taxes. While there are serious elements of truth in this narrative, it is not the whole story.
The country suffers from underperformance in several areas including school and college education, industrial and managerial skill sets, and so on. Concept of wealth generation through intelligent ideas, creativity, skilled workforce, and pro-business government policies is not understood.
Most sections of the government bureaucracy are used to 9 am to 5 pm jobs, they have never produced a winning product and few winning policies, yet the government is hugely involved in industry and services- almost all loss-making. If you watch Pakistani TV news and political talk shows, it appears that country has lots of wealth hidden around or abroad in Switzerland, and the government merely has to take decisive honest steps to dig it out or discover.
Even sober people, in Pakistan, believe that if the government manages to accomplish its declared task of collecting Rs. 5.5 trillion of taxes before the end of the fiscal year, it will achieve nirvana and rest will take care of itself. In reality, even if the government achieves its tax targets, it will only be fixing its own balance of payment problem; its expenses will still be almost Rs. 2 trillion more than its declared ability to collect.
Very little, if any debate is taking place around the questions: How will the near collapsed state of trade and commerce turn around? How will Pakistani exporters make competitive products; how the government will reduce its huge expenses, its unproductive footprint into the economy? How will the country get rid of loss-making enterprises?
How can Pakistani youth be imparted meaningful skills? How will we renegotiate the bad contracts of “capacity payments” with Independent Power Producers? How do we overcome the recurring scourge of “circular debt”? At times PTI supporters get angry when someone pointedly asks these questions.
Such are now the pressures for conformity that this is perceived as lack of patriotism or loss of faith. It reminds me of American writer, Walter Lippman’s now immortalized words: “Where all think alike, no one thinks very much”
So, while the political success so far – and it has not been a mean achievement – has depended upon the spirit of ambitious, over-optimistic, angry young middle class, this now also carries the seed of disappointment, political instability, chaos, and failure –and if not managed well, then growing fascism.
Opposition: its strength and its weakness
Imran Khan’s opposition – mainly PML-N & PPP – could not have been in worse shape. Their key leaders are either under arrest, facing serious investigations of graft or have gone underground keeping a low profile. Yet, this fragmented opposition derives its strength from the economic crisis Pakistan now faces.
Concept of wealth generation through intelligent ideas, creativity, skilled workforce, and pro-business government policies is not understood.
In May of this year, PML-N leadership brought out a kind of white paper titled “PML-N vs. PTI.” They compared PML-N’s last year in power (till May 2018) with PTI’s 9 months of rule on facts of tax revenue growth, current expenditure, public sector development programs (PSDP), rupee devaluation, prices of major consumer products, monthly inflation, gross public debt, foreign debt, GDP growth rate and policy rate.
PML-N leaders used data from the State Bank of Pakistan, Federal Board of Revenue and Ministry of Finance to blame Khan’s government for creating an absolute mess; multiplying country’s debt as a result of devaluation, reducing its GDP from around $330 billion to approximately $250 billion, destroying its industrial productivity, trade cycle, and market confidence.
The argument is that Imran as a chief executive and PTI as a party are incompetent and inexperienced; they should have rushed to the IMF in August of 2018, should have continued with import driven growth model supported through external financing and internal borrowing – and could have managed with a minimum controlled devaluation of Pakistani rupee.
“The United States, China and India are all heavily leveraged, there is nothing wrong in raising public debt, as long as the economy continues to grow” they argue. Some economists, many businesspeople, and diplomats of key countries also support this contention. In July issue of this magazine, Mohammad Zubair, ex-Governor Sindh and former privatization minister in the PML-N government wrote a scathing analysis of PTI government building on the same theme.
But PTI supporters, most independent economists and international institutions working inside Pakistan blame PML-N and PPP’s fiscal mismanagement, and overall bad governance, for the economic crisis Pakistan now faces. Economics is far from being an exact science. Economists and bankers seldom agree with each other.
The government faces multiple challenges on several fronts, but it continues to open new fronts creating new enemies.
It is said that if there are two economists in a room, then there are at least three strong opinions. Most economists of Pakistan have a near consensus that import and debt-driven economic growth model of PML-N (growth rates of 5-6% cited by PML-N) was not possible in the circumstances which existed in August of 2018 – when PTI took over from the interim government.
While PML-N’s critique may not be sound, and PTI government may have inherited a mess created by the 10-year mismanagement of PPP and PMLN, yet the economic crisis Pakistani citizens and businesses now face is humungous. And its effects upon general population so painful that it will continue to present opportunities to a fragmented opposition to find new leaders and stage a come-back.
Britain tried to introduce a similar ID card through an Act of Parliament in 2006, but under growing public opposition from human rights activists, lawyers, academics, security experts and politicians it was scrapped in 2010
Khan’s government’s handling of its opponents, media and public policy issues at times is also patently unwise. The government faces multiple challenges on several fronts, but it continues to open new fronts creating new enemies. For instance, the way it is dealing with traders on the issues of sales tax and national identity card is amusing.
While documenting B2B transactions between manufacturers, suppliers, and the traders makes perfect sense; Pakistan has now become the first country on the planet where any natural citizen making a purchase of more than Rs. 50,000 ($312) will have to deposit his National Identity Card (CNIC) as proof of purchase.
While government and its middle-class supporters continue to offer myriad economic explanations (streamlining taxes, increasing documentation) for this bizarre decision, the Orwellian nature of control it offers a state upon its citizens is patently obvious.
In Pakistan’s peculiar political atmosphere – driven by fears of terrorism, slogans of anti-corruption and taxes – few realize that overuse of the National Identity Card, as an absolute tool of control upon citizens, is becoming ridiculous.
Britain tried to introduce a similar ID card through an Act of Parliament in 2006, but under growing public opposition from human rights activists, lawyers, academics, security experts and politicians it was scrapped in 2010, and all data was destroyed.
But then perhaps Britain – a big perhaps –as a political and social order – has never experienced the kind of existential fears, Pakistanis continue to suffer.
Imran Khan’s challenge
PTI supporters argue that in less than 12 months, Khan government has reduced current account deficit by around 30 percent, trade deficit by 14 percent, has initiated a crackdown on money laundering, electricity, and gas theft and has pushed hard on accountability drive, has retrieved state land worth hundreds of billions and has pushed back against sectarian organizations like TLP creating an atmosphere where long-pending cases like Asiya Bibi can be amicably resolved.
They point out that Imran’s government is implementing an Rs. 100 billion development package for tribal areas (erstwhile FATA), has held peaceful elections there and launched pro-poor schemes like “Ehsas program” to provide a safety net and “Panahgah” to provide shelters for the homeless and expanded the Health Card to around 80 million Pakistanis.
And why forget he has successfully engaged Pakistan’s stakeholders – Saudi Arabia, UAE, China, Turkey and Malaysia – and built trust in Washington, earning rare plaudits from a US President and Senate. He boldly defended Pakistan against Indian aggression and then delivered peace to South Asia and the world when he gracefully returned the captured Indian pilot, Abhinandan.
Khan’s critics repeatedly argue that the prime minister has little experience and he is learning on the job. But the kind of challenges, Pakistan’s 22nd prime minister faces are unique, and there was no way he or anyone could have been trained to handle all this. As a young officer in 1797, Napoleon had no idea how to conquer Europe – he learned on the job.
Imran Khan has to fight the Sharif and Zardari clans and their supporters inside the system – including powerful media barons – because his vision of a clean “Naya Pakistan”, which he has sold to his supporters, cannot be achieved if those who savagely abused the public office are allowed back into politics –through a process of legal sanitization.
He has to fight big business, corporations, traders, and tax machinery because he has to resolve his balance of payments and has to meet his recurring commitments with the IMF. He has to deliver on Afghanistan to keep Washington in good humor to ease tensions built around FATF, IMF, and India. He has to tame Pakistan’s Jihadi spirit at a time when Modi government is deliberately creating tensions in Kashmir.
He has to court Washington while keeping Beijing close to his heart. And he has to find ways – no one knows how – to stimulate the economy, build business confidence, increase transactions, restrain FBR harassment of businessmen, collect taxes, and generate jobs. Perhaps most importantly, he has to continue telling his desperate supporters and his ruthless critics with a poker face that “good times are around the corner.”
But he has to do more to earn his place in history. At a time when minorities are being mob lynched across India, he has shown the strength to stand for Pakistan’s Hindu, Christian and Sikh minorities – his wholehearted support to Kartarpur initiative has already eased tensions across Punjab. Liberals have been miserly in not sufficiently praising him, but he has put the genie of TLP (Tehrik-e-Labaik Pakistan) into a bottle – though admittedly there is much more to be done.
He has initiated schemes for the promotion of tourism, and for “Clean and Green Pakistan” but he has to do more to secure the environment in this region. He has inaugurated Mohmand Dam, but he has to speed up work on dams and preservation of aqueous resources to save millions from a water-deprived future.
And finally, he has to find intelligent, out of the box, ways to engage Modi and Yogi Adityanath’s India driven mad by reactionary forces of Hindutva. Trump – for reasons not fully understood – has already created an impetus in this direction. If Imran Khan delivers on half of these challenges, we should demand universities in Pakistan, UK, and the US to recommend him for the Nobel Peace Prize.
Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, was in Pakistan for a brief one-day visit in the third week of June 2019. Emir, and his delegation, arrived in the evening of Friday 22, he was personally received, at Noor Khan airbase, (known to residents of Islamabad as the old airport) by Imran Khan, Pakistan’s premier, who personally drove him to Prime Minister’s house in Islamabad where a one on one meeting took place between the Emir and the Prime Minister of Pakistan.
During the visit, Qatar announced keeping $3 billion in State Bank of Pakistan to support country’s balance of payments. Three memoranda of understanding (MoU) were signed on Saturday, between Qatar and Pakistan, in trade and investment, tourism and business events, and exchange of financial intelligence and then Emir left in the early afternoon of June 23.
On the face, it was pretty routine affair – albeit much shorter than most routines – with the usual pomp and show; a guard of honor by three service personnel and salute by JF-17 strike fighters and a ceremony in which President of Pakistan conferred country’s highest civilian award upon the Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hammad Al Thani.
But this visit, Emir’s first since 2015, was long in making and carries the potential of a broad-based relationship – provided both sides can appreciate each other’s geo-strategic limitations and work gradually to build confidence and space. Both Pakistan and Qatar had been working step by step to forge a closer relationship of trust ever since Imran Khan government took power in August 2018. Before the July elections, PTI leadership had often criticized the LNG deals Nawaz and later Shahid Khaqan Abbassi governments struck with Qatar.
A careful, step by step, process of engagement was thus necessary between Islamabad and Doha. But the process was made trickier because the new Pakistani government was also busy engaging its traditional allies in the gulf – Saudi Arabia and UAE – and unfortunately since June 2017 GCC countries had developed serious fault lines amongst themselves leading to a blockade of tiny Doha by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt.
Pakistanis that believed in poet Iqbal’s vision of “Aik hoon Muslim Haram ki Pasbani kay liye, Neel kay Sahil say lay kar Tabakhak e Kashgar” (There is only one Muslim to lead the Ummah from the shores of Nile to the dusts of Kashgar) could not have been more disturbed by the ever-deepening faultiness across the Muslim Middle East.
UAE and Bahrain have cut off diplomatic relations with Doha and have imposed an economic blockade upon tiny Qatar since June 2017, but Qatar continues to supply gas to UAE and Bahrain from its North field through Dolphin pipeline
However, notwithstanding the romanticism of Islamic bonds, importance of tiny Doha was never lost to decision-makers in Islamabad and Pindi. Qatar in recent years has emerged as the largest gas exporter of the world (along with Australia) and Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) founded in 2005 now maintains one of the biggest and most active sovereign wealth fund that is estimated to be around $350 billion.
In January 2019, Qatar has withdrawn from OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) on the grounds that it is more of a gas exporter than that of petroleum. While the decision was also seen as Doha seeking more independence from the influence of erstwhile big brother – Saudi Arabia – but the economic rationale cited had serious elements of truth.
Qatar, in the last few years, has grown its major LNG trading partners from 7 to 21. Japan, China, South Korea, India, Pakistan and European nations are all Qatar’s buyers. Qatar exported more than $40 billion of gas in 2018, this is increasing and if current contracts are considered then Pakistan will be importing gas worth $4 billion each year from Qatar.
Doha also maintains a carefully balanced foreign policy of “hedging” – something that is watched world over with deep interest and Pakistan’s foreign office is no exception. Qatar maintains largest US bases in the region, at Al Udeid near Doha, but has good relations of trust with Iran with whom it shares the undersea gas fields of North Field/South Pars in Persian Gulf.
In recent ongoing US-Iran tensions Doha offered mediation between Washington and Tehran and for the past several years Afghan Taliban had been maintaining their official presence in Doha which has finally supported the US-Taliban dialogue of which Pakistan is an active supporter. Qatar finances Palestinian groups like Hamas and has influence over Hezbollah but maintains excellent communication with Israel.
UAE and Bahrain have cut off diplomatic relations with Doha and have imposed an economic blockade upon tiny Qatar since June 2017, but Qatar continues to supply gas to UAE and Bahrain from its North field through Dolphin pipeline. Al Jazeera Arabic and English tinker with the sensitivities of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt but now give Qatar a global identity which only testifies to the long term vision of decision-makers in Doha.
Pakistan Army Chief in Doha & Qatari Foreign Minister in Islamabad
So it was not merely a coincidence that in the third week of October 2018, Pakistan’s Army Chief, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, was in Doha meeting Emir Tamim bin Hammad and his prime minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa Al-Thani and almost at the same time Sheikh Mohammad Bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs of the State of Qatar was in Islamabad with a business delegation meeting Pakistan’s prime minister, Imran Khan.
Pakistan’s Army Chief, Gen. Bajwa, was apparently there to thank Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hammad, for his continued support to the Afghan peace process – but it was perhaps more than that. He arrived in Doha literally one day after the United States diplomats and Afghan Taliban representatives had met in the United Arab Emirates for the first round of talks facilitated by Pakistan on finding a negotiated settlement of the war in Afghanistan.
The meeting in Abu Dhabi was also attended by officials from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It was the third meeting between the Taliban and US officials since the appointment of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad as US special envoy for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan – but it was the first that took place outside Doha that hosts Taliban’s political office.
Diplomatic sources familiar with the situation believed that the meeting was convened outside Qatar to underscore Pakistan’s role in arranging it, and at the same time allowing participation of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, both of whom had last year cut diplomatic ties with Doha.
Gen. Bajwa was in Doha perhaps explaining Pakistan’s delicate balancing act and seeking Qatar’s continued understanding and support for a process in which both Qatar and Pakistan are deeply invested.
Almost at the same time, Imran Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, was meeting Sheikh Mohammad Bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs of the State of Qatar, who had called on him in Islamabad to convey felicitations and best wishes on behalf of the Emir of Qatar on Khan’s successful election and assumption of office.
Prime Minister Khan utilized the opportunity to invite Qatari investment in all sectors of Pakistan’s economy, especially in agriculture, livestock, and energy. Earlier Sheikh Al Thani had met his counterpart, Pakistan’s foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi who was quick in reminding him about his commitment to create 100,000 jobs for skilled Pakistani workers.
This commitment was apparently made when both foreign ministers met one month earlier during the United Nations General Assembly’s 73rd Session (UNGA) in New York. Most of these jobs will be created due to the investments in construction, hoteling, tourism and service industry Qatar is making to facilitate FIFA World Cup 2022 to be played in Doha in December 2022. This is the first time FIFA world cup is being played in an Arab country and a predominantly Muslim country.
Qureshi, according to statements issued by Pakistan Foreign Office, highlighted the huge potential for bilateral cooperation in energy, petroleum and petrochemical, agriculture and livestock sectors and also offered the professional services of the Pakistani workforce for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar.
June visit of Emir Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hammad had a wider context and build-up which is both strategic and investment-oriented
Doha had won the prestigious award of FIFA World Cup in 2010 and has since beaten back all attempts by its recalcitrant neighbors to shift matches to venues outside Qatar. December 2022 is going to witness a huge global event in Doha and much physical infrastructure and service industry will be shaped around this mega event. Al Thani invited Qureshi to visit Doha which Qureshi gladly accepted.
PM Imran Khan in Doha, Jan 2019
Soon, in January, Imran Khan, Pakistan’s Prime Minister was in Qatar on a two-day visit at the invitation of the country’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani. Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Finance Minister Asad Umar, Petroleum Minister Ghulam Sarwar Khan, Adviser to PM Abdul Razak Dawood, Syed Zulfiqar Abbas Bukhari, and Board of Investment Chairman Haroon Sharif and Foreign Secretary Tehmina Janjua accompanied him.
Upon their arrival, the delegation was received by Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Soltan bin Saad al-Muraikhi at the airport. Khan met the Qatari Prime Minister but he also met Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hammad and amongst other issues export of skilled labour to Qatar was discussed which shows the priority Islamabad attached to the issue – and which makes it so important to understand the economic impact of FIFA World Cup 2022 on the region.
In December 2018, Qatar had already opened a visa facilitation center in Islamabad for swift processing of visas of members of the Pakistan workforce wishing to work in Qatar.
Doha has also promised 100,000 jobs for Pakistani workers, and the government is in talks with the Qatari government to adjust skilled members of the labor force returning from Saudi Arabia. Observers and policy experts on Gulf economies (like Author, Mehran Kamrava, ‘Qatar: Small State, Big Politics’) believe that workers from India and Pakistan suit employers and contractors because they are not part of the political currents of the region – unlike the workers from Egypt, Yemen or Morocco.
Qatar Investment Authority lands in Islamabad – April 2019
In the first week of April 2019, Sheikh Faisal bin Thani Al-Thani, Deputy Chief Investment Officer of the Qatar Foundation was in Islamabad heading a delegation of Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) that included representatives from various organizations in housing, tourism, real estate and energy sectors. This delegation was being facilitated by the then Chairman Board of Investment (BOI) Haroon Sharif who organized meetings of Sheikh Faisal and his delegation with all key ministers of Khan government including the then finance minister, Asad Umar.
This two-day dialogue was a follow-up to Pakistan-Qatar Investment Forum held in Doha in March. The delegation also met with Prime Minister Imran Khan who welcomed the Qatari interest in various sectors of the economy and highlighted various business opportunities in tourism, housing and other sectors.
Apart from finance minister Asad Umar – who briefed the delegation about the steps being taken by the government for ease of doing business and facilitating foreign investors – this delegation also met with Adviser to PM on Commerce Abdul Razak Dawood and Minister for Power Omar Ayub Khan and his team who explained government`s energy policy and highlighted the potential in power sector.
Later, this delegation also met with Minister for Housing and Works Tariq Bashir Cheema to explore opportunities in the government`s `Naya Pakistan Housing Scheme` and with Zulfi Bokhari on possible interests in projects related to overseas Pakistanis. Faisal Al Thani, a former banker, is not only the Deputy Chief Investment Officer with Qatar Foundation but he is also related to the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hammad, and thus enjoys a powerful seat on the decision-making table in Doha.
Sheikh Faisal took a keen interest in almost all aspects of Pakistani economy and was repeatedly heard by his discussants that Qatar seeks a long term relationship with Pakistan. Board of Investment had organized his discussions with several key individuals from the government and industry and Sheikh’s questions were precise and probing. He and his delegation also discussed investment potential in areas such as tourism, energy and infrastructure with Minister for Planning, Development and Reform Makhdoom Khusro Bakhtiar.
Bakhtiar highlighted investment potential in Gwadar Industrial Zone and build the case that the port city of Baluchistan will emerge as regional trade hub. He asked the delegation to invest in various road infrastructure projects across Pakistan adding that some projects under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will be encouraged on a build-operate-transfer basis. Minister for Maritime Affairs Ali Zaidi also discussed investment potential in Gwadar Port and in the maritime sector with the delegation.
Way Forward: Pakistan’s Balancing Act
Background helps explain that the June visit of Emir Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hammad had a wider context and build-up which is both strategic and investment-oriented – and is long term. Middle East dynamics have been changing since 9/11. Center of gravity has shifted from traditional centers like Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo towards the Persian Gulf where Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar have emerged as powerhouses.
Qatar, as one of the world’s topmost energy exporter, manager of one of the biggest sovereign funds and a sophisticated foreign policy player (master of the art of hedging) is impressed by the role nuclear Pakistan plays in the region and it will be interested in Pakistani power sector, airports, hotels roads and infrastructure and can be persuaded to take interest in other areas like tourism.
But decision makers in Islamabad have to view Doha as more than a LNG exporter; tiny Qatar has assumed a strategic dimension that defies the old traditional thinking of size and population. (Qatar: 2.2 million with only 230,000 citizens). Doha will definitely be interested to sustain its role in conflict resolution in Afghanistan in which it has heavily invested and its support was crucial in achieving the current breakthrough between Washington and Taliban which is of utmost importance to Pakistan.
But unfortunately, erstwhile allies of GCC have developed serious fault lines as is obvious from the break up of diplomatic relations and continuing economic blockade of Qatar by the four GCC members – including Saudi Arabia and UAE. Qatar, to develop a deeper interest, will like Pakistan to improve its balancing act in the region and its internal economic commitments.
Cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy should be to show autonomy to maintain its relationship with all brotherly GCC countries in such a way that it can offer mediation and conflict resolution between them. With the meeting of Pakistan’s Prime Minister, with US President Donald Trump scheduled for the third week of July 2019, this becomes all the more important. Islamabad and the world has to learn the “art of hedging” from tiny Doha.
Many political changes, upheavals of one or the other kind, throughout the twentieth century have often been referred to as: “revolutions”. The term has been used loosely enough to refer to a pro-western change in Georgia, in 2003, as Rose Revolution and fall of Kyrgyz president in 2005 as Tulip revolution and recently the political upheavals in Tunisia, Libya and Syria have also been defined as revolutions. Apparently, the word revolution has been used so frequently and so lightly that it has lost much of its sense, romance, respect or terror that was once associated with the term: French revolution.
But most historians will agree that the political upheaval – that rocked Iran in 1979, sent shock waves across the region and the world and set into motion a process of evolution that in many ways continues to this day, was a quintessential revolution. It rightly reminded many of the French revolution of 1789. In the context of 20th century, it was a phenomenon that warrants study along with the Soviet Revolution of 1917 and the Communist revolution in China of 1948.
Imam Khomeini: One Man Revolution?
Revolutions have layers of leadership and intelligentsia and scores of characters identified with them. French revolution brings to mind names like Rousseau, Mirabeau, Marquis de Lafayette, Robespierre, Jean Paul Marat, Danton and so on. But in case of Iranian revolution, one man stands out. Thirty years after his death; Muslim world remembers him merely as “Imam Khomeini”
Arab monarchs did not or could not collect armies in the same way but its no secret that Saddam Hussain’s invasion of Iran in 1980 and the subsequent eight-year war was supported and funded by several Arab states – and the goal was to strangulate the Islamic revolution of 1979.
Sayyid Ruhollah Mūsavi Khomeini (4 Sept 1902 – 3 June 1989), known to the world as Ayatollah Khomeini, was the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution that overthrew the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was supported by the United States. This brought a symbolic end to 2,500 years of Persian Sassanid monarchy and turned Iran into an Islamist republic sending tremors across a region ruled by dynastic monarchies.
Where others feared, he was calm. Where they were hesitant, he was firm. The secret to Imam Khomeini’s amazing influence among Muslim nations was: selflessness, not acting for his own interests, witnessing God & purely doing jihad for His sake. June 4, 2007 pic.twitter.com/s4AWlfAoEj
What followed was a continuing conflict of ideas, ambitions and above all of fears and insecurities that have led to wars, massive killings and human right tragedies. It also created new political orders, stakeholders and communities across the region as far away as Lebanon in the west and Pakistan in the east. But the question arises: has the revolution of 1979 been finally accepted by the world around?
After the French revolution, kings and queens of Europe gathered armies to defeat dangerous ideas emanating from Paris. After the Bolshevik upheaval of 1917, Allied nations – including Japan, United Kingdom, United States – supported the anti-communist White Army to suppress a Marxist evil in the bud. Arab monarchs did not or could not collect armies in the same way but its no secret that Saddam Hussain’s invasion of Iran in 1980 and the subsequent eight-year war was supported and funded by several Arab states – and the goal was to strangulate the Islamic revolution of 1979.
French revolutionary wars (1792-1802) left France in control of most of western Europe and though Napoleon was finally defeated and monarchy returned to France, it can be said with a great degree of confidence that ideas emanating from Paris destroyed the institution of monarchy and transformed Europe forever. Today intelligentsia in all those countries – England, Austria, Prussia, Russia, etc. – that had fought to defeat the revolution remember the upheaval Paris generated in 1789 with admiration and respect. Can the same be said about the Iranian revolution?
Prime Minister Mosaddegh was overthrown in a CIA and MI6 managed political theater in 1953 and its brazen admission in declassified documents
It was inevitable that anti-monarchy ideas will travel outwards from Tehran in shock waves. Iranian revolution was immediately perceived as a challenge to the established political order across the middle east. While elite resented it, there is evidence to believe that Iranian revolution won popularity on the Arab street before other currents overtook it. Iraq’s attack on Iran – at the behest of Arab monarchies and western powers can only be understood as a counter-revolution. French revolutionary wars against England, Austria, Prussia and Russia are a handy reference from history. It was almost textbook.
But Iran’s revolution had additional complexities; it could be easily described or condemned as “Shia” in a Sunni dominated region, and it took a position against Israel to seek popularity at the Arab street – directly pitching it against the powerful Israeli lobby in Washington. Perhaps this can explain why Iranian revolution did not produce the impact its French cousin had – two hundred years earlier.
Much has changed since 1979. The power that was once Baghdad has been decimated, Syria lies in ruins, Libyan strongman Qaddafi was killed like a rat next to a sewer pipe, Egypt has lost its historic importance, Arab Israeli conflict has morphed into an Iran-Israel conflict and Palestinians are mostly forgotten by the Arab nations – and even by the Arab street – who perceive Tehran as their enemy No. One. United States has become a permanent part of Persian Gulf’s security architecture and no one knows what may happen in the region between Washington and its allies and Iran before the next US elections.
Ironically Khomeini’s origins and initial life were much different than what the world remembers him for. He was a “marja” – meaning source of emulation – according to traditions of Twelver Shia Islam. He was thus a “Mujtahid” or faqi, an expert in Islamic Sharia, and author of more than 40 books on issues of religion and ethics but he is principally known to the world as inspiration for the 1979 revolution.
In his writings, he preached and expanded the theory of “Welayat-el Faqih” the “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist”. This principle became part of the new Iranian constitution after being put to a referendum. Though Khomeini returned to Iran from exile in Paris and was Time magazine’s Man of the Year in 1979 for his international influence, but initial western appreciation could not materialize into any stable relations with the west. Imam became identified for his support of the hostage takers during the US Embassy hostage crisis, his fatwa calling for the murder of British Indian novelist Salman Rushdie and for referring to the United States as the “Great Satan”.
Iranian Revolution’s By-Products
Today, after 30 years of Khomeini’s death, to many Arab and western scholars, the emergence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the moral boost provided to Shia forces in Iraq, the regional cold war against Saudi Arabia and Israel, lending an Islamic flavor to the anti-imperialist, anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, and inadvertently widening the Sunni-Shia cleavage, are the most important by-products of the Iranian revolution.
This limited lens often ignores the background of the revolution, decades of abuse felt by the Iranian intelligentsia at the hands of the US and other western powers especially the way Prime Minister Mosaddegh was overthrown in a CIA and MI6 managed political theater in 1953 and its brazen admission in declassified documents. And it fails to do justice to the good revolution did to countless millions in terms of providing better education, health and political consciousness. Most importantly this narrow reflection ignores what the revolution could have done if several powers had not colluded in creating the Iran-Iraq war of 1980s and had not fought so hard and so relentlessly to defeat the Islamic revolution of Iran.
The power that was once Baghdad has been decimated, Syria lies in ruins, Libyan strongman Qaddafi was killed like a rat next to a sewer pipe, Egypt has lost its historic importance, Arab Israeli conflict has morphed into an Iran-Israel conflict and Palestinians are mostly forgotten by the Arab nations – and even by the Arab street – who perceive Tehran as their enemy No. One.
To what extent was it fear and insecurity of Arab monarchs, Israel and the United States and to what extent Tehran’s attempts to export its revolution, were responsible for the mess we see; this is difficult to judge. Debate continues endlessly on this question; one thing is sure that the region has changed and changed forever.
Some argued, like American author, and New York Times foreign correspondent, Stephen Kinzer, that the “The American political class has never recovered from the shock and humiliation of the hostage crisis. It cast Iranian regime as the face of evil in many American hearts. This anger is the main reason why the US has been so unrelentingly hostile to Iran over three decades”. Kinzer has been author of many books on the region – including the brilliant “Overthrow” that documents US interventions to overthrow foreign governments – but this kind of analysis too was a narrow interpretation – and has outlived its utility.
While Iranian Islamist rule cannot be described as a western styled democracy, but the revolution produced a system of politics in which governments came through reasonably fair elections, and if there is a stable system closer to democracy in the whole Middle East then it is Iran. This was something that was gradually accepted by many in US politics, media and intelligentsia, and the thrust behind the Obama administration’s desire for JCPOA (US-Iran Nuclear Deal), was a deep-seated realization that pragmatic Iran offers that zone of stability in the Middle East that must be engaged for the spread of genuine modernity and democratic values in the region.
Pragmatic Iran had earned that confidence after its quiet coordination with the US after 9/11, in Afghanistan and during the 2003 US invasion of Saddam’s Iraq. Many US diplomats in Islamabad had quietly told this scribe that “engaging Iran is the most logical thing we have to do” Obama administration’s JCPOA had more than eight years of multilateral negotiations and confidence-building measures behind it. Trump administration’s unilateral pulling out of Iran-US nuclear deal, in 2018, can thus only be understood in the complex dynamics of Israeli and Arab insecurities – and is a testament to the power of special interest groups and lobbies in the US political system.
Received wisdom since the toppling of Afghan Taliban and Saddam Hussain regime has been that United States invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan has eliminated Iran’s two biggest rivals in the region – i.e. the Taliban and Saddam Hussein – and left Iran as the most important player. This narrative has perhaps received much resonance due to the writings of Dr. Vali Nasr, Dean of the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, who robustly argued such notions in his book, “The Dispensable Nation”. In recent years this has given rise to the argument that it is that “powerful Iran” that is scaring Arabs.
Imam became identified for his support of the hostage takers during the US Embassy hostage crisis, his fatwa calling for the murder of British Indian novelist Salman Rushdie and for referring to the United States as the “Great Satan”.
Middle East: Rise of GCC as centers of power
Reality today may once again be different. Years of US sanctions have enfeebled Iranian economy, restricted its ability to maintain a regional influence commensurate with its size, history and political institutions, and has seriously demoralized its intelligentsia. Centre of gravity in the Middle East has decisively shifted in the favor of peninsular states of GCC. Traditional centers of authority and influence – Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus – have lost their capacities and roles for one or the other reason; Tehran – notwithstanding its assets in Hezbollah and Hamas – has been curtailed and the world increasingly looks towards the GCC states being lead by Saudi Arabia – as brilliantly argued by Mehran Kamrava, a professor at the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University, in his book, “Qatar: Small State, Big Power”
But there are rifts within the GCC as demonstrated by the blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. And there are other issues: states like Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain are either too poor or politically fragmented, and the real players are three: Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar. Tiny Qatar housing the largest US airbase at Al Udeid, owner of Al Jazeera, world’s largest exporter of LNG and running one of the biggest sovereign funds is an upcoming powerhouse in this changed scenario. In this changed Middle East, size of population is dwarfed by the importance of economic linkages. Doha that maintains a balancing act between the US, Iran, Israel and Palestinians is an interesting emerging center to watch.
Summing up, we can argue that Islamic Revolution of Iran is still continuing after almost 40 years of its upheaval, and after 30 years of Khomeini’s departure from the scene. It has transformed the region in ways altogether different than what its founding fathers might have imagined. And just like the French revolution of 1789, that kept the European pot on fire for next 40 years – till at least Waterloo – it has created fault lines that are not healing.
Power dynamics of the region have changed, US has become a permanent part of its security architecture and the political balance of the region is far from settled. Obama administration’s quest supported by Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China that led to signing of JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) – or the US Iran Nuclear Deal – was the best effort by a conscientious global elite to move beyond the schisms of a tortuous history but it ultimately failed and the future is now more uncertain than before.
Moeed Pirzada is Editor Global Village Space; he is also a prominent TV Anchor and a known columnist. He previously served with the Central Superior Services in Pakistan. Pirzada studied international relations at Columbia University, New York and Law at London School of Economics, UK as a Britannia Chevening Scholar. He has lectured and given talks at universities and think tanks including Harvard, Georgetown, Urbana Champaign, National Defense University, FCCU, LUMS, USIP, Middle East Institute and many others. Twitter: MoeedNj The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Global Village Space.
Tired, sick, guilty and beset by rebellion, King Henry IV is feeling the weight of his crown… Henry IV, Part 2, Act 3, Scene 1, 26-31
William Shakespeare, 1597
Supporters of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan were perturbed on seeing an uneasy, almost broken body language of their leader. It was the third week of April; he was emerging on television screens, from Iran speaking in a joint press conference after his meeting with the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani. Imran Khan, usually very articulate, was struggling with his words, at times even fumbling, he sounded under pressure and looked confused. An international observer could have easily concluded that Iran’s visit was stressful, given Pakistan’s delicate balancing act between its GCC partners, the United States and a Tehran battling under sanctions. However, Khan’s admirers back home knew instantly it was not because of tensions with or around Iran it was all related to the politics back home, that is getting more and more uncertain after merely eight months of PTI forming government in the center, Punjab and KP.
Prime Ministers do change their cabinets. There is nothing extraordinary about a reshuffle; however large it may be. Had Asad not refused accepting any other portfolio then it probably would not have created the kind of political jolt which it did.
In the last week of April, Dawn, Pakistan’s most influential paper, carried a front-page story claiming that removal of finance minister, Asad Umar, was on political grounds and not economic. The influential paper cited sources inside the ministry of finance and the ruling party that argued that PM had often referred to his finance minister as his Deputy Prime minister and had congratulated him for latter’s successful talks with IMF during the semi-annual retreat of monetary institutions (World Bank and IMF) in the first week of April. PM had credited Asad for obtaining much softer conditions from IMF for a bailout package.
Talks between IMF and Pakistan had broken down in November 2018 for what Asad Umar, and those close to him, had described as harsh conditions that among other implications would have also depreciated Pakistani Rupee to 182 against US dollar. To this day no one fully understands why Imran Khan suddenly sacked Asad Umar. There is no dearth of PTI leaders, opposition politicians, bankers, businessmen and media pundits who supported Asad’s sacking and argued that Khan’s opening batsman had mismanaged economy – yet the final impression that prevails is that PM was forced to take that decision under pressure from power centres outside his control. His replacement with Dr. Hafeez Sheikh – considered close to Washington only served to consolidate that impression that PM was forced to change course. Dawn’s story in the last week of April had thus a glaring weakness: it claimed as a scoop what most already knew or believed in Islamabad.
New Economic Strategy or Political Course Correction?
Prime Ministers do change their cabinets. There is nothing extraordinary about a reshuffle; however large it may be. Had Asad not refused to accept any other portfolio then it probably would not have created the kind of political jolt which it did. But, other ministers, who were changed, were being judged against a simpler yardstick of performance; did they work hard to deliver? In the case of Asad Umar, it was a matter of political philosophy. Though his critics were merciless; they blamed him for not being an economist, called him a failed corporate leader, a mere marketing executive and even described him as arrogant and someone who could not understand the complexity of Pakistani economy and politics.
However, most of the time this criticism zoomed into a narrow area: he did not cut a deal with IMF early on in October or November. Some have also blamed him for not continuing the import and consumption-driven growth model of Ishaq Dar. However, to any objective observer, it was apparent that Asad Umar was never alone in that process of decision making. Many in Pakistan’s foreign office, institutional setup, and strategic community were worried that IMF conditions would impinge upon country’s national security, CPEC and its relations with China. Imran Khan had repeatedly taken a position against IMF loans; he kept on attacking Nawaz and Zardari for accepting IMF loans and conditions, he repeated all these pledges in his first detailed speech to the nation in August as Prime Minister it sounded nationalist, and his followers were pleased.
Imran Khan, usually very articulate, was struggling with his words, at times even fumbling, he sounded under pressure and looked confused.
Khan had imagined that his sincere appeals to the diasporas would stream in billions of dollars, he thought that public’s belief in his personal honesty would double or treble the tax receipts, he was expecting greater help from China and the Muslim world. But, before what is now called “Khashoggi Affair” Saudis were telling PM Khan to approach IMF, and in the GCC’s peculiar power matrix UAE only follows Saudi thinking. So much had been said and written in Pakistan on CPEC as a “game changer” that most in public believed it to be a panacea for all problems.
Many in Islamabad thought that the “Iron brother” across the Himalayas would create an IMF style package to bail out its most trusted ally that has opened up its land to connect Chinese economy to the Indian ocean. However, by January of 2019, it was getting obvious that most of these expectations were not being met. Chinese did deposit $3 billion into Pakistani state bank ($2 billion even before the PTI government was formed) and Saudis and UAE did open up their purse – after the Khashoggi Affair but none of that was enough, in the end, to provide Pakistan with what it needed to stabilize its economy and balance of payments. And then came the Indian adventurism in February of 2019.
What really happened in Pulwama, on Feb 14, remains to this day shrouded in mystery; but it was not difficult to see that it immensely benefitted PM Modi’s troubled politics before the national elections and Indian air strike in Balakot was an unprecedented act of brinksmanship in South Asia. Yet the unambiguous support to India of three UN security council members – US, UK, and France – was a clear sign of where the major powers (Pakistan’s former allies) now stood in the complex Indo-Pakistani calculus.
Asad Umar’s departure in April was thus not the simple exit of an incompetent finance minister not able to deliver on the spreadsheet; it marked the change of “political course” a major shift in the belief system and world view by PM Imran Khan and the centers of power that supported him. And if this analysis is true then this “course correction” to please outside centers of power or international system will not stop at Asad Umar; more heads inside Pakistan’s financial architecture may roll. It is believed, by many circles in Islamabad, that Dr. Hafeez Sheikh will be able to buy more space from IMF and international monetary system to help PM Khan with a relatively popular economic agenda. How Sheikh will deliver on these expectations remains to be seen. It will also be interesting to see what kind of team he assembles around him within the next few weeks.
Does Imran Khan want a Presidential System?
Cabinet reshuffle led to other kinds of challenges for PM Imran Khan, on 30th April, Liaqat Khattak took oath as KP provincial minister, he is the brother of Pervaiz Khattak, the defense minister. Islamabad political circles believe that PM had to acquiesce to demands from an embittered Pervaiz Khattak, who was still expecting a portfolio of interior ministry maintained by PM himself.
Many in Pakistan’s foreign office, institutional setup, and strategic community were worried that IMF conditions would impinge upon country’s national security, CPEC and its relations with China.
However, in the cabinet reshuffle, it went to Brig (retd) Ejaz Shah – who suddenly emerged as a new player on the power scene. Liaqat Khattak’s induction (against a previously declared policy) into KP cabinet has now encouraged expectations that brothers, cousins, and uncles of other key ministers will have to be accommodated into different political offices. Before Khattak’s induction, Imran Khan had held a dam against political nepotism by establishing a policy principle that family members of ministers will not be eligible for government positions.
This shift comes at a time when it was widely believed that PM was so upset by continuous demands – from party members and allies for the award of ministries that he wanted a presidential system instead of parliamentary. Whether PM had ever seriously wanted that, is not clear but “presidential system” remained under discussion on Pakistani media throughout March and April.
Then prominent TV anchors, followed by WhatsApp chat groups started spreading rumours that PM has made up his mind to dissolve assemblies and soon the country will be getting an interim government of technocrats supported by Supreme Court and the Army ostensibly to fix the troubled economy. While most of this was political gossip or overactive imagination of sections of the media, but the intensity of the debate and how widely it was discussed underscores the challenges and different pressures being faced by the PTI government.
Imran Khan is generous in lavishing praises and acknowledging achievements of all sorts. He has praised sportsmen, academics, politicians and executives. But those who know him agree that in his entire life he has never supported any person with greater vigour and frequency as he has done in case of Usman Buzdar Punjab’s lacklustre CM. Why and on whose recommendation, Khan had selected Buzdar to head Pakistan’s largest province remains a mystery. Punjab’s population is between 110-120 million, this is not only 55% of Pakistan but presents the major challenges of governance and delivery for PTI.
Islamabad political circles believe that PM had to acquiesce to demands from an embittered Pervaiz Khattak, who was still expecting a portfolio of interior ministry maintained by PM himself.
Civil servants and functionaries of the state who are ultimately responsible for all this have never been inspired by Buzdar’s personality; he is inarticulate, lacks leadership and has become a source of ridicule for PTI government over the past 8 months. Rumours of his change have gripped media many times, several key politicians from the existing cabinet – and even outside – have been named as his successors. These included the brilliant sounding Makhdoom Hashim Jawan Bakht, finance minister, Raja Yasir Humayun minister for higher education and tourism noted for his ideas and mature sounding Mian Aslam Iqbal minister for industries, commerce and investments.
But to this day Khan continues to spend political capital to defend his choice or to say more bluntly his “original mistake”. Buzdar, under pressure because of these repeated rumors and apparently demands for performance from the PM, has increased his media presence; he is now daily on tv screens exhibiting one or the other kind of initiative. But almost everyone is convinced that sooner or the later Khan will have to admit his mistake and force a change in Punjab. Will this take another 6 weeks or 3 months remains to be seen.
However, this government’s unprecedented challenges match its extraordinary ambitions. In May 2018, two months before the general elections, PTI came up with a “100 Day Agenda” which it promised to unleash within the first 100 days if it formed the government. Generally, such political promises, in Pakistan, are to be made and not kept. However, in the last week of November, Imran Khan’s cabinet was issuing its “performance report card.” This 100-day agenda consisted of six main themes (transforming governance, strengthening the federation, economic growth, agriculture and water, social services and national security) and under each theme were 4-6 sub-themes making a total of 34 deliverables.
Report card admitted that the government was able to initiate work on only 18 out of these 34 ticket items. To imagine how ambitious this government’s agenda is one only needs to look at the sub-themes under the major titles. For instance, under “Economic Growth and Vitalization” one finds a list of goals like: job creation, revival of manufacturing, policy framework for five million homes, boosting tourism, tax reform, ease of doing business, fixing energy challenges, enhancing access to finance and ensuring that CPEC turns into a game changer.
Thirty-four sub-themes thus define Pakistan’s entire spectrum of problems and create formidable challenges in terms of implementation, maintaining progress and explaining what has been achieved and what has not been achieved and why not. As if all this was not ambitious enough, in March and April, the government added another big challenge to its plate when it first launched and then established a policy framework for its poverty alleviation program, “Ehsas” (meaning: to feel for others in English).
Rumours of his change have gripped media many times, several key politicians from the existing cabinet – and even outside – have been named as his successors.
Dr. Sania Nishtar, head of Poverty Alleviation Coordination Council nationally respected figure in health policy for her previous work and innovative ideas has developed this program after consultation with all stakeholders in private and public sectors. The program aims to transform the lives of disadvantaged sections of society within the next four years – by laying the foundations of the welfare state. Imran Khan’s ideas of “welfare state” repeatedly refer to state of Madina (harkening back to the period of first 4 Muslim caliphs; the only non-controversial or uniting part of Muslim history) but in terms of practical reality this vision borrows from the modern welfare state across western Europe seen since the end of second world war.
Khan’s government has decided to add another Rs. 80 billion to the cause of poverty alleviation for this program. All sounds good till one realizes that government now wants to take Article 38(d) of the constitution from section of “policy principles” into the section of “fundamental rights.” This change will make the provision of food, clothing, housing, education and medical relief a state responsibility for citizens who cannot earn a livelihood due to sickness, infirmity or unemployment. No doubt this looks immensely desirable, essentially human in terms of ambition, but in terms of implementation, it can be a policy nightmare.
Pakistan is a poor country struggling with difficult economic choices and political debate around welfare states in super rich European countries and aspirations of democratic politics in the United States needs careful analysis to understand the quantum of challenges Imran Khan’s government has added to its already strained deck. Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) maintains a very active website; apart from other details it also lists all press releases. In March PMO issued 50 press releases and in April the number was 56. These mostly relate to actual events and thus provide an excellent overview of the feverish activity that is taking place in the PMO on a range of issues from the economy to foreign policy.
Nawaz Sharif Prime minister from 2013 till 2017 used to take off for Lahore for long weekends, at times he was in Raiwind for several days. Now PMO in Islamabad presents a different picture with PM engaged in endless meetings on energy, tax reforms, IMF, FATF, tourism, poverty alleviation, health policy, housing, CPEC, tribal areas, national security, labor issues, water and dams, and provincial matters. Imagine a subject, and you can find a press release from the records of the past eight months. This is clearly a man who is determined to deliver – but this is also a man and a government under severe pressure.
No one will get NRO?
Speaking on PTI’s 23rd Foundation Day, Imran Khan reminded his supporters that “success is never a straight journey” and admitted that many leave on the way. He reminded them that nations face difficult times, but things will improve as our reforms work. As a sign of new realism, he toned down a bit and claimed that his government would be successful if it brings down Pakistan’s cumulative debt from Rs. 30,000 billion to Rs. 20,000 billion. However, reinforcing his stand against political corruption, he reiterated that there will be “No NRO” a euphemistic term meaning that no deal will be struck to those accused of mega corruption.
Thirty-four sub-themes thus define Pakistan’s entire spectrum of problems and create formidable challenges in terms of implementation, maintaining progress and explaining what has been achieved and what has not been achieved and why not.
While he keeps repeating this stand, which is important to his support base, it is getting obvious that Pakistan’s criminal justice system has no ability to convict politically connected mega rich – and there may be powerful forces desiring a pardon for the politically corrupt. Most, therefore, expect that sooner or later Nawaz Sharif – convicted but availing an unprecedented bail, first of its kind in Pakistan’s history, on health grounds will find a way out of his problems and leave for London. And that courts will never be able to convict former president, Asif Ali Zardari.
Perhaps realizing these challenges, the PTI government, in end April, brought in a tough officer, Hussain Asghar, as Deputy Chairman National Accountability Bureau (NAB). Asghar, a senior most police officer (BPS-22) has previously worked with Anti-Corruption and enjoys an excellent reputation for talent and delivery. Will he be able to make a difference? It remains to be seen.
PTI Government’s Night of the Long Knives – Saw new faces in the Cabinet
Asad Umar is Central Senior Vice President and perhaps, PTI’s most popular leader, after Imran Khan. Asad served as Pakistan’s finance minister from 20 August 2018 to 18 April 2019. Member National Assembly twice from Islamabad. Before entering politics, he was a known face of the corporate world; served as the president and CEO of Engro Corporation before he resigned and joined PTI in 2012. In cabinet reshuffle, he was offered ministry of petroleum but he opted to resign which was a shocker for the whole political system.
There are a number of theories around his sacking as Pakistan’s financial czar: IMF did not want to work with him; UAE complained of his dismissive manner and perhaps the entrenched business classes were upset over his tax amnesty scheme. Others argue that the real power centres were not happy with his policies that led to a precipitous economic decline. However, given his popularity, his proximity to the PM everyone expects him to be back in the cabinet soon as a senior member with a different ministry or combination of portfolios.
Fawad Hussain Chaudhry is a politician and lawyer by profession. Currently, He is Federal Minister for Science and Technology. Previously, he was the Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting from 20 August 2018 to 18 April 2019. He has been a member of National Assembly of Pakistan since August 2018. Earlier he has served in the federal cabinet under the PPP government of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani and Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf as Special Assistant for information and political affairs, between April 2012 and March 2013.
Speculations abound that Fawad Chaudhry’s ouster was due to his flamboyant manner of criticizing the opposition and using language with which the circumspect middle-class PTI power holders and supporters were uncomfortable. Another conjecture has it that he took on the PM’s choice of MD PTV and got into verbal argument with his chief of Staff. However, there is no doubt when he was denouncing stories about Asad Umar’s removal on 15 April he had no clue he was also about to go.
Dr. Firdous Ashiq Awan is a politician who is serving as Special Assistant to the Prime Minister Imran Khan (SAP) for Information and Broadcasting – as de-facto Information minister after Fawad Chaudhry’s departure. This is her second stint as Information Minister; she held that portfolio in PPP government under PM Gillani. She holds MBBS degree from Fatima Jinnah Medical College. She was elected as member of National Assembly first time on the reserve seats for women in 2002 under PML-Q ticket.
In 2008, she was elected to the National Assembly from NA-111-Sialkot-II, having joined the PPP. She joined Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf in 2017. Media speculations on the cabinet reshuffle are that Babar Awan was the first choice for the Federal Minister of Information and Broadcasting but a lingering question mark over the Nandipur power project case helped Dr. Firdous to be named as the Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Information and Broadcasting.
Abdul Hafeez Sheikh is an economist and is the current advisor to the Prime Minister Imran Khan on Finance, Revenue & Economic Affairs. He served as Federal Minister in previous governments and was Finance Minister of Pakistan between 2010 and 2013 and Provincial Minister for Finance & Planning in Government of Sindh between 2000 and 2002. He also had been a member of the Senate of Pakistan from 2003 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2012 and then again from 2012 and 2018.
He has worked with a number of prime ministers including Yousaf Raza Gillani, Shaukat Aziz, and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain He has worked at Harvard University and World Bank and holds Masters and Doctorate degree in Economics from the Boston University. While PTI has garnered a great deal of criticism for appointing PPP’s Finance Minister, it is important to note that Shaikh’s 30 years of experience as a world-renowned economist and economic policymaker make him a credible choice to steer Pakistan out of the financial turmoil and build a strong case in front of international bodies, including the IMF and FATF.
Ijaz Ahmed Shah is a politician, former military officer of Pakistan Army. He is currently serving as the federal Minister for Interior since April 2019. The portfolio was earlier held by the premier while Shehryar Afridi was made the minister of state for interior. Previously, Shah was the State Minister for Parliamentary Affairs from March 2019 to April 2019. He is a member of Pakistan’s National Assembly. He has also served as Director General of Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan from 2004 to 2008.
Shah’s appointment as the Interior Minister has stirred a debate on local and international media platforms given that he is a former spymaster of the military, and one of the four individuals that Benazir Bhutto had named as suspects to be investigated in the event of her death in a letter written to former President Musharraf. Even though Shah’s name never formally emerged with regards to legal proceedings and he has long disassociated himself in the military and entered the electoral process as a civilian, the rumour mill is ripe with the gossip of military interference.
Dr. Sania Nishtar is currently Chairperson Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) and also head of the Poverty Alleviation Coordination Council that has developed the framework for the government’s “Ehsas” program. She started her career as a cardiologist but later turned towards public health policy. She is the author of the famous book, “Choked Pipes” a rare analysis of Pakistan’s dysfunctional health system. And she created Islamabad based health policy think tank, Heartfile.
Previously she served in the interim federal cabinet in 2013 overseeing public health, education and science. She was also shortlisted for Director General World Health Organization (WHO). She studied medicine at Khyber Medical College, Peshawar and later did her doctorate in medicine from King’s College London. Her husband, Ghalib Nishtar, descends from the family of Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar – one of the key leaders of Pakistan movement. He currently heads Khushhali Microfinance Bank.
Moeed Pirzada is Editor Global Village Space; he is also a prominent TV Anchor and a known columnist. He previously served with the Central Superior Services in Pakistan. Pirzada studied international relations at Columbia University, New York and Law at London School of Economics, UK as a Britannia Chevening Scholar. He has been a participant in Chaophraya Dialogue, and at Salzburg Forum and has lectured and given talks at universities and think tanks including Harvard, Georgetown, Urbana Champaign, National Defense University, FCCU, LUMS, USIP, Middle East Institute and many others. Twitter: MoeedNj The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Global Village Space.
Director General Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Asif Ghafoor made it clear on Monday that the “time is up” for Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM). General Ghafoor talked at length about the PTM, its demands and links with anti-Pakistan forces in India and Afghanistan. He advised PTM to remain within their constitutionally determined limits and not challenge the writ of the state. “RAW and NDS are funding the PTM. Is it not true?” asked DG ISPR.
Moreover, the DG ISPR also maintained that the problem is in tribal areas and all the stakeholders in the country; including the incumbent government, parliament and the army are willing to address them, so then why is PTM targeting the state of Pakistan internationally? He was referring to recent talks and speeches of PTM leadership in London and America.
PTM has organized many rallies and protests across the country since its emergence. PTM alleges that its protests are not reported on the country’s electronic media because of their alleged anti-army posture. Many experts and political commentators allege that the PTM is a group of ‘traitors’ working on enemy agenda.
Recently, a committee of the senate met with PTM leaders and assured it of full cooperation. The meeting was widely criticized due to the PTM’s anti-army narrative. Jan Achakzai, prominent analyst, is critical of the meeting between the members of the Senate and the PTM leadership.
Lar-aw-Bar-one #Afghanistan under the portrait of Quaid Azam. Thanks 2 these Senators, it will be a mainstream slogan instead of fringe as #PML-N discreetly & #PPP openly patronising #PTM to avenge Establishment 4 not backing them 2 power in 2018 & standing against corruption
Lar-aw-Bar-one #Afghanistan under the portrait of Quaid Azam.
Thanks 2 these Senators, it will be a mainstream slogan instead of fringe as #PML-N discreetly & #PPP openly patronising #PTM to avenge Establishment 4 not backing them 2 power in 2018 & standing against corruption pic.twitter.com/7vrwONs0hK
Mr. Jan also slammed the PTM for its extreme language, saying “….generation of Waziristan’s former warring tribesmen spreading from erstwhile #FATA 2 Karachi; 7) #PTM inspired use of extreme language is pitching impressionable Pashtun youth against the state— way beyond the pale of freedom of speech: like #TLP which invited the ire…”
6. ….generation of Waziristan’s former warring tribesmen spreading from erstwhile #FATA 2 Karachi;
7) #PTM inspired use of extreme language is pitching impressionable Pashtun youth against the state— way beyond the pale of freedom of speech: like #TLP which invited the ire…
According to well-placed sources, FIRs will soon be lodged against the leadership of the PTM and sufficient amount of evidence will also be presented before the court of law. The sources claim that the intelligence agencies have actionable evidence against the senior leaders of the PTM who have allegedly received money from the RAW and NDS.
Army has decided after carefully looking into the available evidence to go after these elements, sources added. There are some experts who suggest the state not to use force against these elements since it shall get extensive coverage in international media which shall raise some serious question for the foreign office and interior ministry.
Dr, Moeed Pirzada, prominent political commentator, recently noted that “we know that “Spring Revolutions” originate and evolve less on ground and more on media and cyberspace and sudden interest of publications from New York Times, Washington Post, Foreign Policy to Asia Times Online and many many others points towards systematic efforts to create a “narrative”.
BBC Pashto, VOA –Deeva and France 24 all have been overactive – and all are state-funded broadcasters. This is being reinforced by the plethora of newer western web sites that are all using different words but more or less the same substance, a consistent message moving from different directions to create and reinforce a mental reality. This is further reinforced by teams of activists connected with NGO’s and international media inside Pakistan.”
However, it is also advised that the state must not compromise on maintaining its writ. No individual or group within the state should have any right to stand up against the state itself and threaten to break it into the piece if his demands are not fulfilled.
Salman Safdar, legal counsel for former president Pervez Musharraf, announced that his client is likely to return to Pakistan on May, 1. Mr Safdar reportedly told media personnel that despite his deteriorating medical condition, the former military ruler is determined to appear before the court that has summoned him for the hearing scheduled for May 2.
It is pertinent to mention here that last month a special court had ordered Musharraf to appear before it on May 2. His counsel had subsequently put forth Musharraf’s request to appear in court on May 13 instead. “If he can come to court on May 13, Musharraf can also appear before the court on May 2. If he doesn’t, the court will pass an appropriate order regarding recording his statement,” Justice Tahira had said, warning that he would otherwise lose the right of defence.
Plan Cancelled?
But late in the evening on Saturday, Ali Nawab Chitrali, member of Musharraf’s party, All Pakistan Muslim League, told media that the former president was unlikely to come back to Pakistan due to deteriorating health. “Gen Musharraf is eager to come to Pakistan and wants to appear before the court.
He has been suffering from severe backbone pain and the medical board has advised him not to travel. Moreover, he has been facing pressure from his family that he should not travel at the cost of his health. However, as everyone knows that Gen Musharraf is a man of his words so still there are 50 per cent chances of his return,” he said.
Musharraf is being trialled for imposing emergency in 2007 and detaining the judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. A case was registered against him in 2013 and his name was placed in the Exit Control List (ECL) by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) on the directives of the Sindh High Court (SHC).
Later on, the Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed Musharraf to go abroad for his medical check-up and his name was removed from the ECL. Moreover, the special court has declared Mr. Musharraf an absconder, issued perpetual warrants of his arrest and commenced proceedings under Section 87, 88 CrPC for attachment of his properties on July 19, 2016. On April 29, 2018 an application was filed by the federal government to give verdict on high treason case against Musharraf as early as possible.
The application titled “Federal Government of Pakistan versus retired General Pervez Musharraf” read as “The turn of events have unfolded and he [Musharraf] has categorically made statement to the media abroad that he left the country with the help of his institution thereby casting aspersions on our armed forces and its then chief retired Gen Raheel Sharif.”
It further mentioned that “it is a matter of common knowledge that shortly after leaving Pakistan he was seen on videos shared on social media sites where he is swaying to the beats of the music in wedding festivities and during his three months preferred stay in Armed Forces Institute of Cardiology (AFIC) he did not receive a single tablet of aspirin or underwent any angiogram test as according to him at that time the angiogram posed a potential threat to his life”. The former CJP made many attempts to bring back the former military dictator to Pakistan but all in vein.
Analysts’ Opinion
Analysts believe that the former President shall prefer not to come back and avoid serious problems for himself. It is believed that the health condition of Musharraf is not satisfactory which clearly gives him a reason to avoid court proceedings or serve any term in the prison if convicted.
Last time when the former CJP designed a trap for Musharraf and invited him to come back on his on conditions e.g. pre-arrest bail and dignified treatment, analysts suggested Musharraf not to throw himself in troubled waters. Dr. Moeed Pirzada, the prominent Pakistani journalist, said that “Will Gen. Musharraf be “naive” enough to fall in this trap? Hope he has brains enough not to create problems for all sides…and he won’t win from any seats…enjoy retired life..”
Will Gen. Musharraf be "naive" enough to fall in this trap? Hope he has brains enough not to create problems for all sides…and he won't win from any seats…enjoy retired life.. https://t.co/zmm7bpsun8
GVS contacted G-M Pitafi, academic and Political commentator, for his comment on the development. “I have always maintained that the former dictator shall not come back. He left the country not to return and face the courts. Musharraf knows his position is very weak and the courts are comparatively independent now, therefore, he would never commit a mistake of surrendering before the present government,” he said.
When asked what will happen if Musharraf does not come back, Mr. Pitafi said “nothing is going to happen. The world shall remain the same. The court may give a verdict against Musharraf which shall always remain controversial since the former dictator’s followers would have some excuses to politically challenge and disregard the decision given in the absence of their leader”.
Two stories have captivated the media in Pakistan more than any others in the last few days – news regarding a reshuffle in the federal cabinet and the Prime Minister Imran Khan allegedly having “developed differences” with the first lady.
The electronic media watchdog swung into action by issuing show-cause notices to several media houses for allegedly airing “fake news” items after the ex-information minister had rebutted the claim about cabinet reshuffle. However, the news turned out to be true and the minister himself lost his portfolio in exchange for another one.
Interestingly, the second news item wherein the complainant is the PM himself, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Pemra) has ordered to Channel-24 to air an apology within seven days through its show Najam Sethi Ke Saath as penance for what the regulator described as propagation of false news about the prime minister, the media reported.
Meanwhile, with one news turning out to be true and while the other’s fate still hangs in balance in Pakistan, it was widely reported that Prince William reportedly cheated on Kate Middleton. The media speculated that rumor has it that Prince William has allegedly been unfaithful and has cheated on Kate Middleton. He supposedly had an affair with Rose Hanbury, who happens to be a friend of his wife.
Though there’s no public proof that the rumors are true, and nobody but the public figures (well, there family members as well) can actually reveal what went on. But before PM Khan, his wife, the royals and anyone else affiliated with the developments say something, the news items have once again triggered the debate on how much privacy can, and should, politicians and celebrities – who make their living in the public eye – expect?
Public Figures’ Role in Shaping Views
On one hand, it has been debated that the public figures play an increasing role in shaping our views and mindset of the world, hence, making it essential that they are held accountable for their actions in public and private. They believe the press is within its rights to focus on the private lives of public representatives.
On the other hand, it has been argued that one should overlook what is being done in private if the person is performing well in office. However, objection on the latter argument is that it doesn’t define much about the influence the politicians, celebrities, and Royals have over society because of their personal lives.
Some have argued when performance at work does not exempt anyone from the laws of the land then why private lives of the public figures shouldn’t be discussed or accounted for. Panama papers scandal is one example of the public figures’ office and private affairs leading to high-profile corruption cases.
Primarily, the corruption cases against the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family members were about their properties and factories but the outcome of the cases have favored the notion that it was not just limited to their personal lives and they should have been accounted for such actions.
Some say public figures give up or ignore their right to privacy when they feel like informing public about a certain issue but complain when media uses them. Others believe that rights have constantly been invaded in today’s digital age.
Surprisingly, at one point, they both give example of PM Khan’s life and political views that have changed with his marriage with Jemima Goldsmith, Reham Khan, and Bushra Bibi since 1995.
Free, Responsible Media?
In the debate, some believe that the press must be free but they must be responsible. While others say when public figures use the media, they can’t complain too much when the media uses them.
For years, the western media says, the tabloid press has made its reputation on the stories involving private lives of public figures and celebrities. Nonetheless, they have simultaneously questioned the extent to which their personal affairs can be discussed.
Commenting on the situation, Jeremy King, the editor of industry paper Media Week, had once told BBC that “unfortunately once you push the toothpaste out of the tube it’s hard to get it back in.”
In today’s digital age, it is important for public figures to realize that it can still be possible for them to have a private life but, to a certain extent, they are public property as well. Eventually, they need to come up with strategies to have a balance between the needs of promotion and private life.
Is PM’s Life Private?
“No public figure, least of all a prime minister, can claim that his or her ‘private affairs’ are out of the scope of public scrutiny especially if they impinge on matters covered by Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan,” Sethi recently tweeted, quoting an excerpt from his article. In his piece, he also mentioned that the channel has been asked: “to immediately appear before its Complaints Committee and defend itself”.
Later, he questioned PEMRA order through a tweet saying that the authority “did not give us [Channel-24] an opportunity to defend this statement”. He went on to say “Kindly let us know which statement Imran Khan finds untrue and objectionable. Also, very strange that you did not give us an opportunity to defend this statement! In fact, what if it turns out to be true later? Will you pay us Rs 10 lacs?”
Keeping the federal cabinet news and its final outcome in view, some question when the reports like “PM Imran vows to stay with Bushra Bibi ‘till last breath’” do not attract or lead to a controversy then why the ones that trigger debate end up in the legal land.
They say the way PM Khan’s married life and political journey go hand in hand and are frequently discussed now, life of Princess Diana – Prince William’s mother – and the affairs of the royal family were earlier discussed. In fact, press coverage on Diana still stir the debate as to what is the actual limit of the public figures’ private life in digital era. For public figures, it would be safe to say, affording privacy in the digital era invites for more debate and finding new ways.
Prominent Indian journalist, Praveen Swami, in his groundbreaking piece, “India’s Secret War” (Frontline, 16 February 2018) raises an interesting question: “Thirteen Indians are being held in Pakistan on espionage charges, and 30 Pakistanis are in Indian jails, but there is not a single case has either country officially concerned itself with its agent’s fate”.
Swami’s question becomes even more relevant when you consider the Global Village Space (GVS)’s brief research contained in a stand-alone piece, “Those who came before Jadhav” that shows that at least 11 Indian agents since early 1970s were arrested, tried, sentenced – and most returned to India after their sentences or pardon.
What makes the Indian naval officer, Jadhav so important? How has India landed in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when most nation-states, in conventional practice, will like to negotiate or settle such matters behind the scenes through exchanges of prisoners or concessions through the diplomatic channels?
Swami himself ponders on this question in great length. His six-page-long seminal research – for which journalists and informed citizens across India and Pakistan, and historians across the world owe him a debt of gratitude – addresses this question on more than one occasion.
What ties Indian government and its state agencies irrefutably with Jadhav is the fact that while he finds mention in official ‘Gazette of India’ as a naval officer (joined 1987) his retirement and pension records do not exist.
At one point he admits, “the possibility that Jadhav is still a serving naval officer is precisely what makes this case different”. At another point, he quotes an unnamed Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) officer who comments upon the details of Jadhav case by saying, “basically, it makes it impossible for India to deny he (Jadhav) is whom he says he is, which is a basic element of tradecraft”.
At yet another point, Praveen Swami himself ends up concluding, “the questions over Jadhav’s passports, the opacity of his business operations and most importantly, the lack of transparency about his connection to the Indian Navy have all made it difficult for the Government of India to dissociate itself from his cause – the usual necessary fate of the spy”.
In many ways, Swami’s piece is all about Jadhav’s identity and his investigation for which he spoke to several diplomats and intelligence officers across three countries (India, Pakistan, and Iran) leaves little doubt in the mind of a reader that Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav is a serving Indian officer who was on a mission authorised at the highest level from the Indian government – though Swami, the careful Indian journalist does not say this in these words.
Swami’s research corresponds well with what many of us were able to understand through our interactions with Pakistan Foreign Office, intelligence and other government sources including many off-the-record briefings.
Most of that is now in public knowledge; though many things were not known when I wrote, “Kulbhashan Jadhav had also planned the attack on Pakistani Consulate in Zahedan” (GVS, 25 December 2017), almost two months before Swami’s piece appeared in the Frontline.
Pakistani agencies have obtained his actual pay slips as a serving officer, till 2016, as was hinted by the Pakistani counsel during the ICJ trial.
Now it is common knowledge that Jadhav, a senior officer in Indian Navy (Navy No: 41558Z), recruited in Navy in 1987, was placed in Iran somewhere in 2003, he was assigned to RAW from 2013 onwards. He was carrying Indian passport (No: L9630722) when he was arrested from a compound in Mashkel, in the Pakistani province of Balochistan, in an area not far from the Iranian border in March 2016.
A visibly shocked Indian government first denied before admitting that he was indeed an officer with Indian Navy – but then insisted that he had retired and lived at the Iranian port of Chabahar on his own as a businessman.
Diplomatic circles were planted with the idea that Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has seized him from high seas; social media sites in the region speculated that Afghan Taliban may have captured him and handed him to Pakistanis; after all “his carrying his passport with him on a covert mission makes no sense”. It must be mentioned that Praveen Swami, like the Indian government, also asserts that Jadhav was seized from the Iranian province of Saravan, close to the Pakistani border.
Fiction of Abduction from Iran and Retirement from the Navy?
However, inside the ICJ courtroom, in February 2019, Pakistani counsel, Prof Khawar Qureshi placed on record that when during the February 2018 visit of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Indian media questioned the Indian government, “if India has raised the issue of Jadhav’s abduction from Iran” then they were curtly informed that this was “not part of bilateral discussions” and this does not fall in this domain.
In other words, the Indian government and its agencies planted the idea of “Jadhav’s abduction from Iran” in media space but never formally raised the issue with Iran. During the ICJ trial in February 2019, Pakistani counsel kept demanding any evidence of due process initiated by the Indian government in Iran on this fictional abduction but the Indian side remained silent.
The Indian government was never able to explain and it kept dodging these questions since March 2016 and throughout the trial at the ICJ.
Pakistani sources had, however, confirmed that Iranians acted against the small cell that Jadhav operated under the cover of “Kaminda Trading” and his associates were made to leave Iran. From Swami’s piece, we know that Iranian officials had meticulously looked into the affairs of Kaminda Trading and were surprised that it never behaved like a normal business in terms of the volume of trade or banking relations.
Indian government and media have, however, kept the fiction of “abduction from Iran” alive for domestic consumption – and many commentators on television and newspapers keep repeating this without any evidence. On matters regarding Jadhav’s status (whether he was a retired or serving official) Pakistani sources and Swami’s piece have no dispute.
Pakistani Letter of Assistance (LOA) in January 2017, before the finalisation of trial against Jadhav had demanded to see evidence of his retirement from Indian Navy, statement of his former Naval reporting officer and as to how he was in possession of an Indian passport under the Muslim name of “Hussain Mubarak Patel”, an identity he used for entering Iran. The Indian government was never able to explain and it kept dodging these questions since March 2016 and throughout the trial at the ICJ.
Jadhav: A Lingering Embarrassment for India, why?
Why Jadhav creates an unusual challenge, a lingering embarrassment for the Indian government is thus not difficult to understand. All those – spies, saboteurs or terrorists – who came before him were junior intelligence operators who were cloaked, effectively covered under the conventional practice of “plausible deniability”; even when seized agents confessed and admitted like in the cases of Ravindra Kaushik, Gurbaksh Ram, Vinod Sawhney, and others it did not compel Indian government to accept their claims or take responsibility for their actions because Pakistanis had nothing material to connect them with the Indian state.
Swami’s research corresponds well with what many of us were able to understand through our interactions with Pakistan Foreign Office, intelligence and other government sources including many off-the-record briefings.
Vinod Sawhney later, after his release and repatriation to India, (in 1988) created “Jammu Ex-Sleuth Association” that was specifically created for the welfare of those former agents who worked for the Indian intelligence agencies but were later disowned. Sawhney has given several press interviews explaining how government and intelligence disowned him and others. His association now has around 60 members.
Army Public School, Peshawar
Kashmir Singh who kept denying his identity and role while in a Pakistani prison, later confessed his role as an agent for the Indian government, “I was a spy and I did my duty” in interviews with Press Trust of India (PTI). But all these did not change the overall situation – as the publications of books and articles in the Western world about covert operations by the US, the UK or Israeli agencies do not create much of an issue for the governments.
But the fact that Kulbhushan Jadhav holds an authentic Indian passport on a fake identity, a passport which was renewed in 2014 and on which he travelled 17 times in and out of India creates a situation that is difficult to explain. But if this is difficult then what ties Indian government and its state agencies irrefutably with Jadhav is the fact that while he finds mention in official “Gazette of India” as a naval officer (joined 1987) his retirement and pension records do not exist.
Pakistani agencies have obtained his actual pay slips as a serving officer, till 2016, as was hinted by the Pakistani counsel during the ICJ trial. So, whatever the Indian government may claim, and however loud its media may protest it is not possible for them to deny that Jadhav was a serving Indian officer reporting to the highest decision-makers in the intelligence agency, RAW.
This makes him an instrument of the Indian state and Indian state becomes responsible for his actions – as explained by international law expert, Ahmer Bilal Soofi, in another piece for this publication. During the Mumbai terrorism, November 2008, all what the Indian government had was a captured Ajmal Kasab whom they claimed, with reasonable confidence, was a born Pakistani citizen.
Sawhney has given several press interviews explaining how government and intelligence disowned him and others. His association now has around 60 members.
Though there is some lingering controversy in Pakistan if the man in confessional video from hospital bed was the real Ajmal Kasab from Farid Kot but Indian government had a powerful case to impress upon the world and to place Pakistan in a difficult corner for the next 10 years; a process that still continues to haunt subsequent Pakistani governments.
But in the person of naval commander Jadhav, Pakistanis have a serving uniformed officer, of the Indian state, that was, according to his confession, taking instructions from the top of the Indian intelligence agency, from its number one or two.
During the process of trial at the ICJ, Pakistan also submitted in a sealed envelope names of 13 top Indian officials who were interacting with Jadhav regarding his assignments – these names included Ajit Doval, India’s current National Security Adviser (NSA) and Alok Joshi, former RAW chief; both of whom worked closely with Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Kulbhushan Jadhav: What is at Risk for India?
This cannot be understood without understanding the fundamentals of Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan. Since the early 1990s the cornerstone of Indian state policy has been to ensure that the world sees India as an innocent victim of an irresponsible, unstable terror-sponsoring state of Pakistan – what is sometimes referred to as the “Rao Doctrine” (ascribing to PM Narasimha Rao).
India for past 25 plus years is working step-by-step to get Pakistan declared a “terrorist state” or a “terror-sponsoring state”; there is much-documented evidence of Indian position and initiatives on this strategy, in recent years, after the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), it has become more and more pronounced; though it will be incorrect to consider it a BJP-specific agenda, since it has all the hallmarks of a grand national strategy with considerable bipartisan consensus.
Key Indian officials – including top politicians, ex-diplomats and strategic thinkers – keep harping on this theme. Most of India’s strategic efforts may remain hidden from public eye, but one component visible in the public space appears in the form of sustained efforts to create circumstances and arguments for an unstable Pakistan’s isolation from the world, especially Western world and opinion-making circles in Washington, New York, London, Brussels, Hague, and so on.
The Mumbai terrorism, November 2008, all what the Indian government had was a captured Ajmal Kasab whom they claimed, with reasonable confidence, was a born Pakistani citizen.
Apart from Indian government agencies and departments many if not most in the Indian media, think tank community, academia and Bollywood have been busy furthering this agenda. Even, the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) has been very aggressive on this front to ensure that international cricketing events do not take place in Pakistan.
The central point of this strategy is to build a continuous growing narrative that proves Pakistan not only as a “terror-sponsoring state”, but also a “failing or failed state” a twin-headed narrative that is of use not only in the global centres of power (Washington, London and Brussels, etc.) and the United Nations but also in the specialised forums like Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which has again put Pakistan into its grey list since June 2018 and the Indian government is working hard to ensure that Pakistan is pushed into what is called, “blacklist”.
The objective of this multi-pronged strategy is to isolate Pakistan and to deal or negotiate with a very weakened, internally divided, literally prostrate Islamabad.
Data Darbar, Lahore
While this strategy has not fully delivered and Pakistani state keeps on emerging back as it demonstrated by defeating the various insurgencies in erstwhile Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (Fata), Swat valley and Balochistan and by breaking the back of urban militancy in its largest port city of Karachi or when it recently started facilitating direct dialogue between the Trump administration and the Afghan Taliban – but no serious student of international relations can deny that India has succeeded to a great extent in marginalising Pakistan’s influence and in containing it.
But all this architecture of “narrative control” around Pakistan now faced its first serious challenge in the form of “Kulbhushan Jadhav.”
Jadhav and Indian ‘Doctrine of Offensive-Defense’
But where does Jadhav, a mere naval officer, fit into all this? In his piece, “India’s Secret War” (Frontline, February 2018) Praveen Swami, while explaining the origins of Jadhav’s little operational cell, (under the cover of Kaminda Trading) mentions that from 2013 Indian government and intelligence became more aggressive in using covert operations, inside Pakistani territory.
He mentions “assassination of Lashkar Chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed’s security boss, Khalid Bashar” penetration of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)’s rank and file, tit-for-tat arming of Baloch insurgents as examples of RAW’s forward offensive operations. The thrust of Swami’s argument fits well with the overall Indian narrative; India, a victim of Pakistani terrorism was compelled to act in self-defense.
Pakistan’s isolation from the world, especially Western world and opinion-making circles in Washington, New York, London, Brussels, Hague, and so on.
Both Israel and the United States, from the 1980s onwards, have been preaching similar high moral ground while intervening inside other state territories. On 26th February 2019, Modi government again defended its air force strike into Pakistani territory of Balakot, in the province of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), (an unusually risky, irresponsible and aggressive action designed to create a new balance of power in South Asia) as a preemptive strike against “350 militants” who were about to launch an attack inside India.
While the whole world, including most in Indian media, may now believe that these “350 militants sitting on a hilltop on a cold night ready to launch an attack” was a political fiction taken from the script of Barry Levinson’s “Wag the Dog”, but emphasising upon these absurd lies of Modi regime misses the point.
And the point is that India has meticulously invested in creating a systematic narrative and that narrative now allows it to undertake and justify such bizarre, outrightly risky actions which can enjoy the support of at least three P-5 countries (US, UK, and France – their reasons for this is a separate story).
Pakistanis could see an Indian “Strategy of Destabilisation”
But Pakistani government agencies, strategic community, and the Foreign Office had been seeing something totally different. Within few months after 9/11, by the beginning of 2003, many on this side of the divide had started observing a pattern of intelligent strategic mindset, logistic support, and financing behind the actions of various groups that started identifying themselves as Pakistani Taliban (TTP).
Similar patterns emerged when Baloch insurgency suddenly broke out in several districts from 2006 onwards. Urban militancy in Karachi exhibited similar patterns and Pakistani law enforcement agencies traced the existence of training camps for Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) militants in South Africa.
Islamabad Marriott Hotel
It was obvious that a well-developed strategic mindset was playing with Pakistan’s fault lines and creating a specter of widespread chaos, instability, collapsing governance and thus the picture of a “failing state”. Most of the violence against Pakistani forces in the erstwhile Fata, Balochistan and against targets all over Pakistan was directed by cells operating from inside Afghanistan.
In off-the-record briefings, Pakistani intelligence and other officials complained that while they have reasons to believe that Indian RAW is deeply penetrated into Afghan intelligence, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the existence of multiple independently operating cells and use of local Pashto or Dari speaking operatives makes it very difficult to break the cover of “plausible deniability.”
Jadhav: Takes Away India’s mask of Innocence
This brings us back to the question: Where does Jadhav, the polite speaking Indian Naval officer deputed to RAW, captured from Mashkel, Balochistan, fits into all this? The answer is: Jadhav ran out of luck, was given away by Baloch collaborators, at a time when Pakistani agencies had already achieved upper hand in their counter-insurgency in both Fata and Balochistan and were aware of the existence of several cells operating from inside Afghanistan and Iran.
Jadhav’s arrest only provided a face, a material proof of the role being played by Indian state and its agencies for the past several years – he did not represent the starting point or an end-stage of Indian strategic ambitions.
The thrust of Swami’s argument fits well with the overall Indian narrative; India, a victim of Pakistani terrorism was compelled to act in self-defense.
Jadhav was merely running one operational cell, with a small team. His task was principally to support insurgents in Balochistan and destabilisation around Gwadar but he was merely a cog in the larger machine of Indian agency set up (RAW and the IB) that was working to achieve multiple goals inside Pakistan.
But do states not use spies, infiltrators, saboteurs against other states? US publications, newspapers and magazines are full of juicy stories of the US and Israeli covert operations against several Middle Eastern states – and at times operations inside friendly countries.
What is so special if India were using a naval officer deputed to its intelligence agency, RAW? Problem lies in India’s development of a fully-structured narrative, of an innocent India, victim of Pakistani interventions on its soil, of a strong but tolerant India, patiently waiting for the United Nations and the Western world to punish Pakistan or to grant it the same privilege of “preemptive strikes” which the US and Israel have been enjoying.
On 26th February 2019, Indian strikes inside Pakistan enjoyed the full support of the United States, UK, and France – this reflected the power of narrative India had been shaping for the past quarter-century.
But Jadhav in Pakistani custody with all his details (passport, service record, and confessions of his reporting line) proves to the world and more importantly to the aware and educated Indian intelligentsia that India was playing the same dirty game which all states play, and for which it had continuously blamed Pakistan. In other words, both India and Pakistan may have been waging “secret wars” against each other.
India in ICJ: To win a war of Narratives?
India’s stated reason for approaching the ICJ is that Jadhav faced imminent risks of execution. But Pakistan has never executed an Indian agent, even when they exhausted their appeal process and Jadhav still had the option of appeals before the high court and supreme court that could take years.
Executing a senior Indian officer is, in any case, something that Pakistan does not afford – given its negative publicity. Jadhav saga, in the end, can only be settled by bilateral talks, or hidden negotiations or exchanges between the two countries. So, why India rushed to the ICJ?
Jadhav’s arrest only provided a face, a material proof of the role being played by Indian state and its agencies for the past several years – he did not represent the starting point or an end stage of Indian strategic ambitions.
Most Pakistani analysts believe that India is not in the ICJ to save Jadhav’s life but to save its three-decade-old narrative of “innocent India under attack from a belligerent Pakistan”. Indian institutions have worked diligently and invested massively in building this narrative and Jadhav saga, of India’s own “Secret war against Pakistan”, suddenly emerged as a weak link that risk undermining the whole architecture of this narrative of “Innocent India”.
Indian counsel at ICJ, Harish Salve, later blamed Pakistan for using Jadhav for grandstanding. Pakistanis are certainly using Jadhav as an asset in the war of narratives but, it is India that has arrived at the ICJ to browbeat this challenge, to win this “war of narratives” through narrow technicalities.
India that finds itself unable to respond to any questions, on the origins and motivations of Jadhav aka Hossain Mubarak Patel in Pakistan or even in Iran, intends to turn tables around by building its whole case around, “lack of consular access”.
India hopes, with good reasons that if its arguments are accepted at ICJ, then a fresh trial will take place that will help India to turn around the whole narrative of its state intervention – because consular access may encourage Jadhav to negate his earlier confession and statement of facts, regarding his reporting line to the top of Indian Government.
History of India and Pakistan at ICJ
If history is any witness, then India has always been successful in achieving its goals at the ICJ. Ganga Hijacking and Pakistani appeal at the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO): On 4th February 1971, an Indian plane, Ganga, was hijacked by two young Kashmiris to Lahore; passengers were safely returned but the plane was burnt down by the two hijackers in an act of unnecessary melodrama.
India reacted to this incident by blocking its airspace to Pakistani civilian aircraft. This was a huge challenge for Pakistan that needed this air corridor to maintain connections with its politically-troubled eastern wing (now Bangladesh) – where India supported an insurgency and later intervened militarily.
Pakistan, in September, lodged a compensation complaint at the ICJ, citing India’s shooting down of an unarmed surveillance plane.
Pakistan, on 3rd March 1971, challenged Indian action at the ICAO, citing International Civil Aviation Convention and the International Air Services Transit Agreement both signed in Chicago in 1944. India refused to accept ICAO’s jurisdiction; when it declared itself competent by decisions on 29 July 1971, India challenged its decisions in the ICJ where the matter remained pending till August 1972.
By the time ICJ finally decided the matter war had long ended, East Pakistan had become Bangladesh and later publications by ex-Indian officials revealed that hijacking of Ganga in February 1971 was an Indian intelligence plan to restrict air contacts between East and West Pakistan – while a war was being planned to support insurgency in former East Pakistan.
Atlantique and Marshall Island Cases
On 10th August 1999, Indian MiGs shot down, Atlantique, an unarmed Pakistani maritime patrol aircraft, over the Rann of Kutch, killing 16 Pakistani servicemen; this happened almost one month after the end of Kargil border conflict between the two states and there were no hostilities or state of war between them. Pakistan, in September, lodged a compensation complaint at the ICJ, citing India’s shooting down of an unarmed surveillance plane.
India argued that the ICJ had no jurisdiction over matters between two Commonwealth States and the ICJ decided that it had no jurisdiction. Some in the legal community, in India and Pakistan, attach great importance to the ICJ’s 2016 decision in rejecting Marshall Island’s claims against all nuclear nations. But realistically speaking it was more of an idealist drawing-room discussion rather than having any practical value.
India’s stated reason for approaching the ICJ is that Jadhav faced imminent risks of execution.
The tiny Marshall Islands were used, by the United States, between 1946 till 1967 for nuclear testing. The Marshall Islands filed a case in 1974; the US, Russia, China, France, and Israel never appeared before the court citing one or the other exception. Pakistan, India and the UK appeared, and in 2016 the court declared its lack of jurisdiction.
But any logical person needs to take a pause and ask himself: what would have happened if the ICJ had given any adverse decision? It was tiny Marshal Island’s need for grandstanding and publicity, and the possibility of major nuclear nations changing their strategic calculus because of the ICJ’s decision was highly unlikely – especially when the main culprit, the United States never appeared to defend itself.
Why did Pakistan land in ICJ?
Given the past history of the ICJ between India and Pakistan one naturally wonders why Pakistan decided to defend itself at the ICJ? Why the country, learning from past experiences, could not find a way to stay away from this Hague court. Many top legal experts in May 2017 had expressed surprise on the decision of the then Pakistani government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to defend itself at the ICJ.
These legal experts thought that Pakistan could have worked around exploring options to stay away from a forum where India, for various reasons, appears to enjoy significant influence. While there is no clear answer to this, but many suspects that Nawaz Sharif’s decision may have something to do with the sudden visit of Sajjan Jindal, the Indian businessman close to Narendra Modi on 28th April 2017.
PM Nawaz did this meeting, in the hill resort of Murree, without any note takers (and apparently in the open lawns) and was later unable to explain anything except that Jindal was a family friend –as claimed by his daughter, Maryam Nawaz. Pakistan’s English press that is getting more and more peculiar for its “dumbing down”, reported that Jindal had brought suggestions for a formal meeting between Nawaz and Modi at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Astana.
Supreme Court of Pakistan had already passed a serious adverse judgment, on 20th April 2017, in Panama Offshore Accounts case, setting up a multi-agency Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to examine Nawaz’s accounts – this process subsequently led to his disqualification on 28th July 2017. Indian establishment looking for a bilateral meeting between a seriously weakened Nawaz and Modi at that stage, after the Supreme Court preliminary decision, was highly unlikely.
As it happened, no bilateral meeting was ever scheduled between Nawaz and Modi; they merely shook hands and enquired about each other’s health on 8th June 2017 in Astana. However, India filed its case in the ICJ on 8th May 2017. The Hague court reacted to Indian application with a speed that can best be described as “unusual” and the Pakistani government quickly decided to appear to defend itself – rest is history.
Spies and Infiltrators: Those who came before Jadhav
Spies and infiltrators – or the accusations of that – between India and Pakistan is not something new. Since 1947, there might have been hundreds of those crossing from one to the other side; several were caught, tried, punished and later released. Many sources point out that Ajit Doval, India’s current National Security Adviser (NSA) himself served “undercover” in Pakistan for several years.
At times innocent citizens being at the wrong place at the wrong time may have been charged as “spies” and thus suffered for years. Both countries either ignored them or quietly negotiated for their release and succeeded in most instances – nothing landed in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). What then makes Kulbhushan Jadhav so important for India and Pakistan?
While hundreds have languished in jails, under accusations of spying, in both countries, 11 cases of Indian spies were much discussed in the Indo-Pakistani media after the arrest of Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav. Out of these eight were tried, punished, served their sentences or were pardoned halfway through and returned safely; two died in jail of natural causes and one – Sarabjit Singh – was murdered by angry inmates at a time when his release was imminent.
Most were ordinary cases of standard “spies,” junior functionaries in their organisations, sent under the principle of “plausible deniability,” never accepted, never claimed and who suffered on their own. An overview helps.
Ravindra Kaushik: arrested 1975; sentenced to death, but died in jail naturally.
Ramraj: entered 2004: sentenced for six years; returned to India in 2012.
Gurbaskh Ram: entered 1988, arrested and sentenced in 1990 for 14 years; returned in 2006.
Ram Prakash: entered 1994, arrested 1997; sentenced for 10 years; returned July 2008.
Vinod Sawhney: arrested 1977; sentenced for 11 years, released and returned in March 1988.
Suram Singh: arrested 1974; remained incarcerated for 13 years; released and returned 1988.
Balwir Singh: entered 1971; remained in jail for 12 years; released and returned to India in 1986.
Daniel: arrested 1993; served jail term; released and sent back to India in 1997.
Satpal: arrested during Kargil war in 1999; died of natural causes in jail, corpse returned to India.
Those who Created History
Most, as mentioned earlier, were ordinary spies no one remembers except their families; but four of them stood out for different reasons. Ravindra Kaushik was perhaps the most successful in terms of his profile and achievements; he was an unusually smart Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) officer sent to Pakistan in 1975.
He enrolled at Karachi University for a law degree (LLB), then managed to join Pakistan Army as a commissioned officer and rose to the rank of a Major. His luck ran out, when Inayat Masiha, another captured Indian spy gave him away. Kaushik was arrested, tried and sentenced to death but later it was reduced to life term.
In jail, he suffered from progressive tuberculosis (TB) and died of heart disease in November 2001 in Central Jail, Multan. Vinod Sawhney, 61, now heads the Jammu Ex-Sleuths Association, which he says was formed for the welfare of those who have worked as secret agents for Indian intelligence agencies but were later disowned by the State.
He falls in the same category where we can place Kashmir Singh, who kept denying, for 35 years, that he worked for Indian agency. Kashmir Singh once back in India – after pardon and release by General Musharraf in 2007 – proudly admitted to his role as a spy role in interviews to the Press Trust of India confessing “I was a spy and [I] did my duty.” Sarabjit Singh, a RAW agent, became famous because he was murdered in jail.
Before this, he was controversial since he was charged and sentenced for acts of terrorism that led to 14 deaths in Lahore and Faisalabad in 1990. Singh maintained that he was an innocent farmer and had inadvertently crossed over while working in his fields. He was given death penalty under the Pakistan Army Act, and the Lahore High Court had upheld the decision in 1991.
The Supreme Court had also dismissed a petition to review his death sentence in March 2006 as Singh’s lawyers failed to appear for the hearing. Indian government kept on arguing that he was a case of mistaken identity. On April 26, 2013, while he was languishing in Lahore’s Kot Lakhpat jail, some fellow inmates attacked and seriously injured him.
He died on May 2, 2013, at a hospital in Lahore. This was at a time when a decision to release him to India was imminent. Inmates have also murdered several Pakistanis accused of one or the other thing in Indian jails.
One day after Pakistan handed over Indian Air Force pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman — who was captured by Pakistan after his MiG 21 aircraft was shot down by a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jet in a gesture of peace to India at the Wagah border, body of Shakiruallh, Pakistani prisoner lynched by inmates in Central Jail, Jaipur arrived from the other side.
There were many other such lynching instances. Ajit Doval, current Indian NSA, spent 7 years in Pakistan, disguised as a Muslim. He kept passing vital information to the Indian military during his stay.
Prominent Indian journalist, Praveen Swami, in his groundbreaking piece, “India’s Secret War” (Frontline, 16 February 2018) raises an interesting question: “Thirteen Indians are being held in Pakistan on espionage charges, and 30 Pakistanis are in Indian jails, but there is not a single case has either country officially concerned itself with its agent’s fate”. Swami’s question becomes even more relevant when you consider the Global Village Space (GVS)’s brief research contained in a stand-alone piece, “Those who came before Jadhav” that shows that at least 11 Indian agents since early 1970s were arrested, tried, sentenced – and most returned to India after their sentences or pardon.
What makes the Indian naval officer, Jadhav so important? How has India landed in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when most nation-states, in conventional practice, will like to negotiate or settle such matters behind the scenes through exchanges of prisoners or concessions through the diplomatic channels? Swami himself ponders on this question in great length. His six-page-long seminal research – for which journalists and informed citizens across India and Pakistan, and historians across the world owe him a debt of gratitude – addresses this question on more than one occasion.
What ties Indian government and its state agencies irrefutably with Jadhav is the fact that while he finds mention in official ‘Gazette of India’ as a naval officer (joined 1987) his retirement and pension records do not exist.
At one point he admits, “the possibility that Jadhav is still a serving naval officer is precisely what makes this case different”. At another point, he quotes an unnamed Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) officer who comments upon the details of Jadhav case by saying, “basically, it makes it impossible for India to deny he (Jadhav) is whom he says he is, which is a basic element of tradecraft”. At yet another point, Praveen Swami himself ends up concluding, “the questions over Jadhav’s passports, the opacity of his business operations and most importantly, the lack of transparency about his connection to the Indian Navy have all made it difficult for the Government of India to dissociate itself from his cause – the usual necessary fate of the spy”
In many ways, Swami’s piece is all about Jadhav’s identity and his investigation for which he spoke to several diplomats and intelligence officers across three countries (India, Pakistan, and Iran) leaves little doubt in the mind of a reader that Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav is a serving Indian officer who was on a mission authorised at the highest level from the Indian government – though Swami, the careful Indian journalist does not say this in these words. Swami’s research corresponds well with what many of us were able to understand through our interactions with Pakistan Foreign Office, intelligence and other government sources including many off-the-record briefings.
Most of that is now in public knowledge; though many things were not known when I wrote, “Kulbhashan Jadhav had also planned the attack on Pakistani Consulate in Zahedan” (GVS, 25 December 2017), almost two months before Swami’s piece appeared in the Frontline. Now it is common knowledge that Jadhav, a senior officer in Indian Navy (Navy No: 41558Z), recruited in Navy in 1987, was placed in Iran somewhere in 2003, he was assigned to RAW from 2013 onwards. He was carrying Indian passport (No: L9630722) when he was arrested from a compound in Mashkel, in the Pakistani province of Balochistan, in an area not far from the Iranian border in March 2016.
A visibly shocked Indian government first denied before admitting that he was indeed an officer with Indian Navy – but then insisted that he had retired and lived at the Iranian port of Chabahar on his own as a businessman. Diplomatic circles were planted with the idea that Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has seized him from high seas; social media sites in the region speculated that Afghan Taliban may have captured him and handed him to Pakistanis; after all “his carrying his passport with him on a covert mission makes no sense”. It must be mentioned that Praveen Swami, like the Indian government, also asserts that Jadhav was seized from the Iranian province of Saravan, close to the Pakistani border.
Pakistani agencies have obtained his actual pay slips as a serving officer, till 2016, as was hinted by the Pakistani counsel during the ICJ trial.
Fiction of Abduction from Iran and Retirement from the Navy?
However, inside the ICJ courtroom, in February 2019, Pakistani counsel, Prof Khawar Qureshi placed on record that when during the February 2018 visit of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Indian media questioned the Indian government, “if India has raised the issue of Jadhav’s abduction from Iran” then they were curtly informed that this was “not part of bilateral discussions” and this does not fall in this domain. In other words, the Indian government and its agencies planted the idea of “Jadhav’s abduction from Iran” in media space but never formally raised the issue with Iran.
During the ICJ trial in February 2019, Pakistani counsel kept demanding any evidence of due process initiated by the Indian government in Iran on this fictional abduction but the Indian side remained silent. Pakistani sources had, however, confirmed that Iranians acted against the small cell that Jadhav operated under the cover of “Kaminda Trading” and his associates were made to leave Iran. From Swami’s piece, we know that Iranian officials had meticulously looked into the affairs of Kaminda Trading and were surprised that it never behaved like a normal business in terms of the volume of trade or banking relations.
Indian government and media have, however, kept the fiction of “abduction from Iran” alive for domestic consumption – and many commentators on television and newspapers keep repeating this without any evidence. On matters regarding Jadhav’s status (whether he was a retired or serving official) Pakistani sources and Swami’s piece have no dispute.
Pakistani Letter of Assistance (LOA) in January 2017, before the finalisation of trial against Jadhav had demanded to see evidence of his retirement from Indian Navy, statement of his former Naval reporting officer and as to how he was in possession of an Indian passport under the Muslim name of “Hussain Mubarak Patel”, an identity he used for entering Iran. The Indian government was never able to explain and it kept dodging these questions since March 2016 and throughout the trial at the ICJ.
Jadhav: A Lingering Embarrassment for India, why?
Why Jadhav creates an unusual challenge, a lingering embarrassment for the Indian government is thus not difficult to understand. All those – spies, saboteurs or terrorists – who came before him were junior intelligence operators who were cloaked, effectively covered under the conventional practice of “plausible deniability”; even when seized agents confessed and admitted like in the cases of Ravindra Kaushik, Gurbaksh Ram, Vinod Sawhney, and others it did not compel Indian government to accept their claims or take responsibility for their actions because Pakistanis had nothing material to connect them with the Indian state.
Swami’s research corresponds well with what many of us were able to understand through our interactions with Pakistan Foreign Office, intelligence and other government sources including many off-the-record briefings.
Vinod Sawhney later, after his release and repatriation to India, (in 1988) created “Jammu Ex-Sleuth Association” that was specifically created for the welfare of those former agents who worked for the Indian intelligence agencies but were later disowned. Sawhney has given several press interviews explaining how government and intelligence disowned him and others. His association now has around 60 members. Kashmir Singh who kept denying his identity and role while in a Pakistani prison, later confessed his role as an agent for the Indian government, “I was a spy and I did my duty” in interviews with Press Trust of India (PTI).
But all these did not change the overall situation – as the publications of books and articles in the Western world about covert operations by the US, the UK or Israeli agencies do not create much of an issue for the governments. But the fact that Kulbhushan Jadhav holds an authentic Indian passport on a fake identity, a passport which was renewed in 2014 and on which he travelled 17 times in and out of India creates a situation that is difficult to explain.
But if this is difficult then what ties Indian government and its state agencies irrefutably with Jadhav is the fact that while he finds mention in official “Gazette of India” as a naval officer (joined 1987) his retirement and pension records do not exist. Pakistani agencies have obtained his actual pay slips as a serving officer, till 2016, as was hinted by the Pakistani counsel during the ICJ trial. So, whatever the Indian government may claim, and however loud its media may protest it is not possible for them to deny that Jadhav was a serving Indian officer reporting to the highest decision-makers in the intelligence agency, RAW.
This makes him an instrument of the Indian state and Indian state becomes responsible for his actions – as explained by international law expert, Ahmer Bilal Soofi, in another piece for this publication. During the Mumbai terrorism, November 2008, all what the Indian government had was a captured Ajmal Kasab whom they claimed, with reasonable confidence, was a born Pakistani citizen.
Sawhney has given several press interviews explaining how government and intelligence disowned him and others. His association now has around 60 members.
Though there is some lingering controversy in Pakistan if the man in confessional video from hospital bed was the real Ajmal Kasab from Farid Kot but Indian government had a powerful case to impress upon the world and to place Pakistan in a difficult corner for the next 10 years; a process that still continues to haunt subsequent Pakistani governments. But in the person of naval commander Jadhav, Pakistanis have a serving uniformed officer, of the Indian state, that was, according to his confession, taking instructions from the top of the Indian intelligence agency, from its number one or two. During the process of trial at the ICJ, Pakistan also submitted in a sealed envelope names of 13 top Indian officials who were interacting with Jadhav regarding his assignments – these names included Ajit Doval, India’s current National Security Adviser (NSA) and Alok Joshi, former RAW chief; both of whom worked closely with Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
This cannot be understood without understanding the fundamentals of Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan. Since the early 1990s the cornerstone of Indian state policy has been to ensure that the world sees India as an innocent victim of an irresponsible, unstable terror-sponsoring state of Pakistan – what is sometimes referred to as the “Rao Doctrine” (ascribing to PM Narasimha Rao).
India for past 25 plus years is working step-by-step to get Pakistan declared a “terrorist state” or a “terror-sponsoring state”; there is much-documented evidence of Indian position and initiatives on this strategy, in recent years, after the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), it has become more and more pronounced; though it will be incorrect to consider it a BJP-specific agenda, since it has all the hallmarks of a grand national strategy with considerable bipartisan consensus.
Key Indian officials – including top politicians, ex-diplomats and strategic thinkers – keep harping on this theme. Most of India’s strategic efforts may remain hidden from public eye, but one component visible in the public space appears in the form of sustained efforts to create circumstances and arguments for an unstable Pakistan’s isolation from the world, especially Western world and opinion-making circles in Washington, New York, London, Brussels, Hague, and so on.
The Mumbai terrorism, November 2008, all what the Indian government had was a captured Ajmal Kasab whom they claimed, with reasonable confidence, was a born Pakistani citizen.
Apart from Indian government agencies and departments many if not most in the Indian media, think tank community, academia and Bollywood have been busy furthering this agenda. Even, the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) has been very aggressive on this front to ensure that international cricketing events do not take place in Pakistan.
The central point of this strategy is to build a continuous growing narrative that proves Pakistan not only as a “terror-sponsoring state”, but also a “failing or failed state” a twin-headed narrative that is of use not only in the global centres of power (Washington, London and Brussels, etc.) and the United Nations but also in the specialised forums like Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which has again put Pakistan into its grey list since June 2018 and the Indian government is working hard to ensure that Pakistan is pushed into what is called, “blacklist”.
The objective of this multi-pronged strategy is to isolate Pakistan and to deal or negotiate with a very weakened, internally divided, literally prostrate Islamabad. While this strategy has not fully delivered and Pakistani state keeps on emerging back as it demonstrated by defeating the various insurgencies in erstwhile Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (Fata), Swat valley and Balochistan and by breaking the back of urban militancy in its largest port city of Karachi or when it recently started facilitating direct dialogue between the Trump administration and the Afghan Taliban – but no serious student of international relations can deny that India has succeeded to a great extent in marginalising Pakistan’s influence and in containing it. But all this architecture of “narrative control” around Pakistan now faced its first serious challenge in the form of “Kulbhushan Jadhav.”
Jadhav and Indian ‘Doctrine of Offensive-Defense’
But where does Jadhav, a mere naval officer, fit into all this? In his piece, “India’s Secret War” (Frontline, February 2018) Praveen Swami, while explaining the origins of Jadhav’s little operational cell, (under the cover of Kaminda Trading) mentions that from 2013 Indian government and intelligence became more aggressive in using covert operations, inside Pakistani territory. He mentions “assassination of Lashkar Chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed’s security boss, Khalid Bashar” penetration of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)’s rank and file, tit-for-tat arming of Baloch insurgents as examples of RAW’s forward offensive operations.
Pakistan’s isolation from the world, especially Western world and opinion-making circles in Washington, New York, London, Brussels, Hague, and so on.
The thrust of Swami’s argument fits well with the overall Indian narrative; India, a victim of Pakistani terrorism was compelled to act in self-defense. Both Israel and the United States, from the 1980s onwards, have been preaching similar high moral ground while intervening inside other state territories. On 26th February 2019, Modi government again defended its air force strike into Pakistani territory of Balakot, in the province of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), (an unusually risky, irresponsible and aggressive action designed to create a new balance of power in South Asia) as a preemptive strike against “350 militants” who were about to launch an attack inside India.
While the whole world, including most in Indian media, may now believe that these “350 militants sitting on a hilltop on a cold night ready to launch an attack” was a political fiction taken from the script of Barry Levinson’s “Wag the Dog”, but emphasising upon these absurd lies of Modi regime misses the point. And the point is that India has meticulously invested in creating a systematic narrative and that narrative now allows it to undertake and justify such bizarre, outrightly risky actions which can enjoy the support of at least three P-5 countries (US, UK, and France – their reasons for this is a separate story).
Pakistanis could see a “Strategy of Destabilisation”
But Pakistani government agencies, strategic community, and the Foreign Office had been seeing something totally different. Within few months after 9/11, by the beginning of 2003, many on this side of the divide had started observing a pattern of intelligent strategic mindset, logistic support, and financing behind the actions of various groups that started identifying themselves as Pakistani Taliban (TTP). Similar patterns emerged when Baloch insurgency suddenly broke out in several districts from 2006 onwards.
Urban militancy in Karachi exhibited similar patterns and Pakistani law enforcement agencies traced the existence of training camps for Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) militants in South Africa. It was obvious that a well-developed strategic mindset was playing with Pakistan’s fault lines and creating a specter of widespread chaos, instability, collapsing governance and thus the picture of a “failing state”.
Most of the violence against Pakistani forces in the erstwhile Fata, Balochistan and against targets all over Pakistan was directed by cells operating from inside Afghanistan. In off-the-record briefings, Pakistani intelligence and other officials complained that while they have reasons to believe that Indian RAW is deeply penetrated into Afghan intelligence, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the existence of multiple independently operating cells and use of local Pashto or Dari speaking operatives makes it very difficult to break the cover of “plausible deniability.”
This brings us back to the question: Where does Jadhav, the polite speaking Indian Naval officer deputed to RAW, captured from Mashkel, Balochistan, fits into all this? The answer is: Jadhav ran out of luck, was given away by Baloch collaborators, at a time when Pakistani agencies had already achieved upper hand in their counter-insurgency in both Fata and Balochistan and were aware of the existence of several cells operating from inside Afghanistan and Iran. Jadhav’s arrest only provided a face, a material proof of the role being played by Indian state and its agencies for the past several years – he did not represent the starting point or an end stage of Indian strategic ambitions.
The thrust of Swami’s argument fits well with the overall Indian narrative; India, a victim of Pakistani terrorism was compelled to act in self-defense.
Jadhav was merely running one operational cell, with a small team. His task was principally to support insurgents in Balochistan and destabilisation around Gwadar but he was merely a cog in the larger machine of Indian agency set up (RAW and the IB) that was working to achieve multiple goals inside Pakistan. But do states not use spies, infiltrators, saboteurs against other states? US publications, newspapers and magazines are full of juicy stories of the US and Israeli covert operations against several Middle Eastern states – and at times operations inside friendly countries.
What is so special if India were using a naval officer deputed to its intelligence agency, RAW? Problem lies in India’s development of a fully-structured narrative, of an innocent India, victim of Pakistani interventions on its soil, of a strong but tolerant India, patiently waiting for the United Nations and the Western world to punish Pakistan or to grant it the same privilege of “preemptive strikes” which the US and Israel have been enjoying. On 26th February 2019, Indian strikes inside Pakistan enjoyed the full support of the United States, UK, and France – this reflected the power of narrative India had been shaping for the past quarter century.
But Jadhav in Pakistani custody with all his details (passport, service record, and confessions of his reporting line) proves to the world and more importantly to the aware and educated Indian intelligentsia that India was playing the same dirty game which all states play, and for which it had continuously blamed Pakistan. In other words, both India and Pakistan may have been waging “secret wars” against each other.
India in ICJ: To win a war of Narratives?
India’s stated reason for approaching the ICJ is that Jadhav faced imminent risks of execution. But Pakistan has never executed an Indian agent, even when they exhausted their appeal process and Jadhav still had the option of appeals before the high court and supreme court that could take years. Executing a senior Indian officer is, in any case, something that Pakistan does not afford – given its negative publicity. Jadhav saga, in the end, can only be settled by bilateral talks, or hidden negotiations or exchanges between the two countries. So, why India rushed to the ICJ?
Jadhav’s arrest only provided a face, a material proof of the role being played by Indian state and its agencies for the past several years – he did not represent the starting point or an end stage of Indian strategic ambitions.
Most Pakistani analysts believe that India is not in the ICJ to save Jadhav’s life but to save its three-decade-old narrative of “innocent India under attack from a belligerent Pakistan”. Indian institutions have worked diligently and invested massively in building this narrative and Jadhav saga, of India’s own “Secret war against Pakistan”, suddenly emerged as a weak link that risk undermining the whole architecture of this narrative of “Innocent India”. Indian counsel at ICJ, Harish Salve, later blamed Pakistan for using Jadhav for grandstanding.
Pakistanis are certainly using Jadhav as an asset in the war of narratives but, it is India that has arrived at the ICJ to browbeat this challenge, to win this “war of narratives” through narrow technicalities. India that finds itself unable to respond to any questions, on the origins and motivations of Jadhav aka Hossain Mubarak Patel in Pakistan or even in Iran, intends to turn tables around by building its whole case around, “lack of consular access”. India hopes, with good reasons that if its arguments are accepted at ICJ, then a fresh trial will take place that will help India to turn around the whole narrative of its state intervention – because consular access may encourage Jadhav to negate his earlier confession and statement of facts, regarding his reporting line to the top of Indian Government.
If history is any witness, then India has always been successful in achieving its goals at the ICJ. Ganga Hijacking and Pakistani appeal at the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO): On 4th February 1971, an Indian plane, Ganga, was hijacked by two young Kashmiris to Lahore; passengers were safely returned but the plane was burnt down by the two hijackers in an act of unnecessary melodrama.
India reacted to this incident by blocking its airspace to Pakistani civilian aircraft. This was a huge challenge for Pakistan that needed this air corridor to maintain connections with its politically-troubled eastern wing (now Bangladesh) – where India supported an insurgency and later intervened militarily. Pakistan, on 3rd March 1971, challenged Indian action at the ICAO, citing International Civil Aviation Convention and the International Air Services Transit Agreement both signed in Chicago in 1944.
India refused to accept ICAO’s jurisdiction; when it declared itself competent by decisions on 29 July 1971, India challenged its decisions in the ICJ where the matter remained pending till August 1972. By the time ICJ finally decided the matter war had long ended, East Pakistan had become Bangladesh and later publications by ex-Indian officials revealed that hijacking of Ganga in February 1971 was an Indian intelligence plan to restrict air contacts between East and West Pakistan – while a war was being planned to support insurgency in former East Pakistan.
On 10th August 1999, Indian MiGs shot down, Atlantique, an unarmed Pakistani maritime patrol aircraft, over the Rann of Kutch, killing 16 Pakistani servicemen; this happened almost one month after the end of Kargil border conflict between the two states and there were no hostilities or state of war between them. Pakistan, in September, lodged a compensation complaint at the ICJ, citing India’s shooting down of an unarmed surveillance plane. India argued that the ICJ had no jurisdiction over matters between two Commonwealth States and the ICJ decided that it had no jurisdiction.
India’s stated reason for approaching the ICJ is that Jadhav faced imminent risks of execution.
Some in the legal community, in India and Pakistan, attach great importance to the ICJ’s 2016 decision in rejecting Marshall Island’s claims against all nuclear nations. But realistically speaking it was more of an idealist drawing room discussion rather than having any practical value. The tiny Marshall Islands were used, by the United States, between 1946 till 1967 for nuclear testing.
The Marshall Islands filed a case in 1974; the US, Russia, China, France, and Israel never appeared before the court citing one or the other exception. Pakistan, India and the UK appeared, and in 2016 the court declared its lack of jurisdiction. But any logical person needs to take a pause and ask himself: what would have happened if the ICJ had given any adverse decision? It was tiny Marshal Island’s need for grandstanding and publicity, and the possibility of major nuclear nations changing their strategic calculus because of the ICJ’s decision was highly unlikely – especially when the main culprit, the United States never appeared to defend itself.
Given the past history of the ICJ between India and Pakistan one naturally wonders why Pakistan decided to defend itself at the ICJ? Why the country, learning from past experiences, could not find a way to stay away from this Hague court. Many top legal experts in May 2017 had expressed surprise on the decision of the then Pakistani government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to defend itself at the ICJ. These legal experts thought that Pakistan could have worked around exploring options to stay away from a forum where India, for various reasons, appears to enjoy significant influence.
While there is no clear answer to this, but many suspects that Nawaz Sharif’s decision may have something to do with the sudden visit of Sajjan Jindal, the Indian businessman close to Narendra Modi on 28th April 2017. PM Nawaz did this meeting, in the hill resort of Murree, without any note takers (and apparently in the open lawns) and was later unable to explain anything except that Jindal was a family friend –as claimed by his daughter, Maryam Nawaz. Pakistan’s English press that is getting more and more peculiar for its “dumbing down”, reported that Jindal had brought suggestions for a formal meeting between Nawaz and Modi at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Astana.
Supreme Court of Pakistan had already passed a serious adverse judgment, on 20th April 2017, in Panama Offshore Accounts case, setting up a multi-agency Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to examine Nawaz’s accounts – this process subsequently led to his disqualification on 28th July 2017. Indian establishment looking for a bilateral meeting between a seriously weakened Nawaz and Modi at that stage, after the Supreme Court preliminary decision, was highly unlikely. As it happened, no bilateral meeting was ever scheduled between Nawaz and Modi; they merely shook hands and enquired about each other’s health on 8th June 2017 in Astana. However, India filed its case in the ICJ on 8th May 2017. The Hague court reacted to Indian application with a speed that can best be described as “unusual” and the Pakistani government quickly decided to appear to defend itself – rest is history.
Spies and Infiltrators: Those who came before Jadhav
Spies and infiltrators – or the accusations of that – between India and Pakistan is not something new. Since 1947, there might have been hundreds of those crossing from one to the other side; several were caught, tried, punished and later released. Many sources point out that Ajit Doval, India’s current National Security Adviser (NSA) himself served “undercover” in Pakistan for several years.
At times innocent citizens being at the wrong place at the wrong time may have been charged as “spies” and thus suffered for years. Both countries either ignored them or quietly negotiated for their release and succeeded in most instances – nothing landed in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). What then makes Kulbhushan Jadhav so important for India and Pakistan? While hundreds have languished in jails, under accusations of spying, in both countries, 11 cases of Indian spies were much discussed in the Indo-Pakistani media after the arrest of Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav.
Out of these eight were tried, punished, served their sentences or were pardoned halfway through and returned safely; two died in jail of natural causes and one – Sarabjit Singh – was murdered by angry inmates at a time when his release was imminent. Most were ordinary cases of standard “spies,” junior functionaries in their organisations, sent under the principle of “plausible deniability,” never accepted, never claimed and who suffered on their own. An overview helps.
Ravindra Kaushik: arrested 1975; sentenced to death, but died in jail naturally.
Ramraj: entered 2004: sentenced for six years; returned to India in 2012.
Gurbaskh Ram: entered 1988, arrested and sentenced in 1990 for 14 years; returned in 2006.
Ram Prakash: entered 1994, arrested 1997; sentenced for 10 years; returned July 2008.
Vinod Sawhney: arrested 1977; sentenced for 11 years, released and returned in March 1988.
Suram Singh: arrested 1974; remained incarcerated for 13 years; released and returned 1988.
Balwir Singh: entered 1971; remained in jail for 12 years; released and returned to India in 1986.
Daniel: arrested 1993; served jail term; released and sent back to India in 1997.
Satpal: arrested during Kargil war in 1999; died of natural causes in jail, corpse returned to India.
Sarabjit Singh: convicted of terrorism; death penalty awarded in 1990; murdered in jail, 2013.Kashmir Singh: arrested 1973; spent 35 years in jail; pardoned by General Pervez Musharraf in 2007.
Those who Created History
Most, as mentioned earlier, were ordinary spies no one remembers except their families; but four of them stood out for different reasons. Ravindra Kaushik was perhaps the most successful in terms of his profile and achievements; he was an unusually smart Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) officer sent to Pakistan in 1975. He enrolled at Karachi University for a law degree (LLB), then managed to join Pakistan Army as a commissioned officer and rose to the rank of a Major.
His luck ran out, when Inayat Masiha, another captured Indian spy gave him away. Kaushik was arrested, tried and sentenced to death but later it was reduced to life term. In jail, he suffered from progressive tuberculosis (TB) and died of heart disease in November 2001 in Central Jail, Multan. Vinod Sawhney, 61, now heads the Jammu Ex-Sleuths Association, which he says was formed for the welfare of those who have worked as secret agents for Indian intelligence agencies but were later disowned by the State.
He falls in the same category where we can place Kashmir Singh, who kept denying, for 35 years, that he worked for Indian agency. Kashmir Singh once back in India – after pardon and release by General Musharraf in 2007 – proudly admitted to his role as a spy role in interviews to the Press Trust of India confessing “I was a spy and [I] did my duty.” Sarabjit Singh, a RAW agent, became famous because he was murdered in jail.
Before this, he was controversial since he was charged and sentenced for acts of terrorism that led to 14 deaths in Lahore and Faisalabad in 1990. Singh maintained that he was an innocent farmer and had inadvertently crossed over while working in his fields. He was given death penalty under the Pakistan Army Act, and the Lahore High Court had upheld the decision in 1991. The Supreme Court had also dismissed a petition to review his death sentence in March 2006 as Singh’s lawyers failed to appear for the hearing.
Indian government kept on arguing that he was a case of mistaken identity. On April 26, 2013, while he was languishing in Lahore’s Kot Lakhpat jail, some fellow inmates attacked and seriously injured him. He died on May 2, 2013, at a hospital in Lahore. This was at a time when a decision to release him to India was imminent. Inmates have also murdered several Pakistanis accused of one or the other thing in Indian jails.
One day after Pakistan handed over Indian Air Force pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman — who was captured by Pakistan after his MiG 21 aircraft was shot down by a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jet in a gesture of peace to India at the Wagah border, body of Shakiruallh, Pakistani prisoner lynched by inmates in Central Jail, Jaipur arrived from the other side. There were many other such lynching instances. Ajit Doval, current Indian NSA, spent 7 years in Pakistan, disguised as a Muslim. He kept passing vital information to the Indian military during his stay.
Moeed Pirzada is a prominent TV anchor and editor strategic affairs with GNN News Network, and a known columnist. He previously served with the Central Superior Services in Pakistan. He studied international relations at Columbia University, New York and Law at London School of Economics, UK as a Britannia Chevening Scholar. He has been a participant in Chaophraya Dialogue, has lectured and given talks at universities and think tanks including Harvard, Georgetown, Urbana Champaign, National Defense University, FCCU, LUMS, USIP, Middle East Institute, and many others. Twitter: MoeedNj. The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Global Village Space.
Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, Malaysian prime minister has taken keen interest in JF-17 fighter planes. After Pakistan Day Parade, in which he was national guest he took time to examine a JF-17 plane. Standing next to its cockpit he asked series of questions to PAF officers about fighter plane’s technical aspects, its agility and maneuverability.
This confirms the earlier assertion by Asad Umar, Pakistan’s Finance Minister, that Malaysia is interested in the JF-17 fighter planes and anti-tank missiles. Finance Minister was briefing media after the delegation level talks and told that JF-17 fighters will be showcased in the forthcoming Aviation Expo-Exhibition in Malaysia.
Umar had told the reporters that meeting stressed the fast implementation of the already signed agreement on Pakistan’s export of anti-tank missiles to Malaysia. Both countries have reached agreements on business deals and investments worth hundreds of millions of dollars in diverse fields. Similarly, both delegations also agreed to open branches of their banks in the two countries.
PM Khan and Dr. Mahathir also performed symbolic ground-breaking for the establishment of a Proton automotive assembly plant in Karachi in cooperation with Pakistan’s Al-Haj Group, under which cars and sport utility vehicles would be manufactured and its first car would hit the roads by June 2020.
Five memorandums of understanding (MoUs) for cooperation between the two countries’ private sector companies were also signed on the occasion on Friday. Three MoUs were signed between Malaysia’s Edotco Towers and Pakistan’s leading mobile companies Jazz, Telenor and Zong. CEO of Jazz, Amir Ibrahim also spoke on the occasion. Irfan Wahab, CEO Telenor and xyzzy, CEO Zong were also present on the occasion.
Reportedly Pakistan Board of Investment (BOI) headed by its Chairman, Haroon Sharif, has played an important role in facilitating these potential investments. The deal between Edotco Towers and Jazz was almost scrapped before the July elections for security reasons. Edotco, Malaysian telecom company, provides towers and related services to cellular companies and the deal now taking place between Edotco and three Pakistani companies is a new fresh initiative different from the one that was scrapped by August 2018 and Board of Investment has played an important role in facilitating this.
Significance of potential JF-17 Fighter Sale
The PAC JF-17 Thunder is a lightweight, single-engine, multi-role combat aircraft developed jointly by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) of China. The JF-17 can be used for aerial reconnaissance, ground attack and aircraft interception. Its designation “JF-17” by Pakistan is short for “Joint Fighter-17”, while the designation and name “FC-1 Xiaolong” by China means “Fighter China-1 Fierce Dragon”.
The JF-17 can deploy diverse ordnance, including air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, and a 23 mm GSh-23-2 twin-barrel auto-cannon. Fighter plane has a top speed of Mach 1.8. The JF-17 is fast becoming the backbone of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), complementing the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon at half the cost. Earlier planes were manufactured at the cost of around $25 million a unit, newer blocs with latest avionics may be manufactured at around $40 million a unit. New F-16s may cost over $100 million a unit.
Since its induction in 2011, the JF-17 Thunder has accumulated more than 20,000 hours of operational flight and has been seeing active military deployment. It was first used by the Pakistan Air Force to bomb militant positions in the War in North-West Pakistan, using both unguided munitions and guided missiles for precision strike capability. On 27th Feb, 2019 JF-17 planes were actively engaged in dog fight with India when two Indian planes (MIG 21 & SU-30) were shot down inside Pakistani airspace. Though Indian Air-force (IAF) insists that their planes were hit by missiles that could only be fired from F-16 planes.
Myanmar and Nigeria are already purchasing JF-17 planes and a potential deal with Malaysia will be significant. These fighter planes offer most advanced features of latest avionics at comparably much less cost. However Malaysia placing orders for Pakistani JF-17 planes will be a huge strategic affront to India. Reportedly Indian government had sent high level delegates to Malaysia to dissuade Dr. Mahathir Mohammad from his visit to Pakistan and his appearance at Pakistan Day parade, given India’s position post-Pulwama. However Dr. Mahathir Mohammad politely turned down Indian protests.
