Twitter
Home Blog Page 76

Lost history …!

Moeed Pirzada
-
0

Moeed Pirzada |

Lost History: The Enduring Legacy of Muslim Scientists, Thinkers and Artists. By Michael Hamilton Morgan, (National Geographic) – Anyone interested in reading a brilliant analytical account of what happened between Islam and West and when, where and why? needs to read this. It is difficult to keep it down.

Last night I read about how Charles Martel in 731AD, was able to defeat or reverse a superior Andalusian Cavalry at Tours near PARIS – but mostly by accident, otherwise the Muslim invaders from South of France (now both France & Spain) inspired awe amongst Franks who saw them as representing the sophistication of Rome & Byzantine with a state of art cavalry and interestingly this is the point where Europe of 8th century gets introduced to Cavalry and Shock Troopers, Mounted Horsemen and Knights in shining armor and the use of Stirrups.

Read more: Why you must read: ‘Animal Farm’ by George Orwell?

Europeans examined the Muslim Andalusia weapons, Stirrups and tactics just like today Iranians open up American drones to understand the technology…this book should be available in book stores in Pakistan and for those abroad: Amazon Books Zindabad….

Here is an excerpt: “European attraction to Muslim technology and intellect, and fear of Muslim power and religion would mark the relationship between Europeans and Muslims all the way into the Renaissance and beyond. It would not change until the Europe became the global imperial power in the 16th century and the Muslim golden ages wound to a close. Then a Eurocentric rewriting of history would expunge the greatness of the Muslim golden ages and exclusively credit Europeans for creating modern mathematics, astronomy, medicine, science, technology, statecraft and a humane pluralistic society..”

 

Moeed Pirzada is prominent TV Anchor & commentator; he studied international relations at Columbia Univ, New York and law at London School of Economics. Twitter: MoeedNj. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy. This piece was first published in Moeed Pirzada’s official page. It has been reproduced with permission.

Lost History …!

Admin
-
0
Lost History …!

Moeed Pirzada | FB Blog |

Lost History: The Enduring Legacy of Muslim Scientists, Thinkers and Artists. By Michael Hamilton Morgan, (National Geographic) – Anyone interested in reading a brilliant analytical account of what happened between Islam and West and when, where and why? needs to read this. It is difficult to keep it down. Last night I read about how Charles Martel in 731AD, was able to defeat or reverse a superior Andalusian Cavalry at Tours near PARIS – but mostly by accident, otherwise the Muslim invaders from South of France (now both France & Spain) inspired awe amongst Franks who saw them as representing the sophistication of Rome & Byzantine with a state of art cavalry and interestingly this is the point where Europe of 8th century gets introduced to Cavalry and Shock Troopers, Mounted Horsemen and Knights in shining armor and the use of Stirrups. Europeans examined the Muslim Andalusia weapons, Stirrups and tactics just like today Iranians open up American drones to understand the technology…this book should be available in book stores in Pakistan and for those abroad: Amazon Books Zindabad….

Here is an excerpt: “European attraction to Muslim technology and intellect, and fear of Muslim power and religion would mark the relationship between Europeans and Muslims all the way into the Renaissance and beyond. It would not change until the Europe became the global imperial power in the 16th century and the Muslim golden ages wound to a close. Then a Eurocentric rewriting of history would expunge the greatness of the Muslim golden ages and exclusively credit Europeans for creating modern mathematics, astronomy, medicine, science, technology, statecraft and a humane pluralistic society..”

Growing Question: Afghanistan & Region Beyond 2014?

Admin
-
0
Growing Question: Afghanistan & Region Beyond 2014?

Moeed Pirzada |Pakistan Today|

Grappling with the puzzle

What will happen in Afghanistan once the US and allies withdraw the bulk of their forces? Will Afghan Security Forces hold and for how long? Will Taliban overrun the periphery? Will Kabul be under-siege? For how long the US Congress will be willing to cough up $18-20 billion a year for a war in a remote forgotten part of the world? And how whatever happens in Afghanistan will it affect its neighbours?

What will neighbors then do to use the new space and power vacuum to interfere across borders, to squeeze each other or to prevent their interests and affiliates? How that competitive paranoid relationship, affect Afghanistan, its politics and society in turn? And how this chaos will affect the US interests in the region? These questions were being asked for the past several years but now more and more people, experts, publications and institutions are getting involved to grapple with this puzzle.

The Council on Foreign Relations is blue planet’s foremost think tank and Foreign Affairs is its prestigious and most sought after publication. If one searches the term Afghanistan on its website, several dozen pieces spring up in few seconds.

This is natural given the presence of US and international forces in the region since 9/11. Such essays and articles could be diverse, dealing with a huge variety of issues from corruption to drug trade to human rights. However ever since President Obama has announced complete withdrawal by end 2014, such analytical pieces have increasingly shared one theme in common and that is: what will happen to Afghanistan and the region around it once the US power withdraws? One such piece, Ending the War in Afghanistan appeared in the issue of Sept/Oct 2013; it was written by Prof Stephen Biddle who teaches at the George Washington University.

Biddle argued that basically the US is now only left with two options: One, is to spend political capital at the Hill to engage Taliban in open ended negotiations with a view to achieve a settlement that can bring Taliban in a power sharing arrangement in Kabul. Second, to prepare itself for what Kissinger had calculated as a decent interval in Vietnam, before the set-up Washington leaves in Kabul collapses under the weight of insurgency and its own incompetence, this is what Biddle referred to as final defeat.

In this respect ironically, Biddle writing from George Washington University at the edge of Potomac and Gen. Hameed Gul, Ex DG ISI and now convener of Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DFC) are perhaps on the same page except that Biddle had argued this in 2013 and Gen. Gul has been saying this for the past several years.

But increasingly this debate is not restricted to the pages of Foreign Affairs or Foreign Policy or the likes of Prof Biddle and Gen. Hameed Gul. Now this question: what will happen in Afghanistan and how it may affect the region around is on many institutional minds. The Istanbul Process of which many have casually heard without much thought is one such example of a growing collective thinking.

This ministerial engagement between countries of South and Central Asia and Middle East supported by the US and twenty other countries had been trying to grapple with this question since Nov 2011. The third such ministerial referred to as Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan in April of 2013. A joint declaration at the outset of this impressive congregation that also saw delegates from Saudi Arabia and the UAE = affirmed a regional interdependence.

The Joint Declaration argued that the region plays a vital role in ensuring a stable peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan, while long term stability and prosperity in the region in turn requires peace and stability in Afghanistan. It then argued that our shared interests are best served by cooperation rather than by competition. The next ministerial will take place in China this year.

But running parallel to the Istanbul Process has been another kind of institutional vision a Track-II engagement created by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), the leading German think tank affiliated with the Social Democrats in Germany. The FES created a process of engagement between the policy makers, officials and intellectuals of the region; this took the form of four key Policy Groups (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Central Asia) taking shape in the mid-2012.

These policy groups worked on creating dialogue at three levels: One, internal or national within their countries; second, regional with each other and third with experts in Iran, Russia and China.

Bilateral meetings between these policy groups and draft of policy papers led to inter-regional summit in Dubai in Nov 2012. Throughout 2013 meetings took place in several parts of the world including Tehran, Beijing and Berlin. In Tehran the FES delegation shared its policy papers with the Institute of Political and International Studies (IPIS) and in Beijing, the Afghan and Indian Policy Groups briefed Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and other leading Chinese experts at Renmin University.

Series of meetings followed between all groups including the Indian and Pakistani Policy Groups in Dubai leading to a second meeting of Conveners, Facilitators and Experts in Berlin. During this meeting the overview of a Joint Declaration was presented and feedback was given by regional conveners and experts. Finally after a second meeting between the Indian and Pakistan Policy Groups in Dubai in late October of 2013 the final declaration was vetted and agreed upon by all.

Just like the Istanbul Process with which it has many intellectual overlaps but perhaps in a more pronounced fashion, the FES Joint Declaration on regional peace and stability admits that neighbouring countries around Afghanistan may have conflicting interests in Afghanistan; and what is needed is to replace the competitive model that has defined their relationships historically with a cooperative framework for future.

The goal is to turn Afghanistan into an asset for all in its period of transformation from 2014 till 2023. What distinguishes FES Joint Declaration from the Declaration of Istanbul Process is its recommendation of a Security-bound Neutrality framework to draw upon the Swiss, Austrian and other models and then developing mechanisms to protect that neutrality framework not only through the crosscutting regional mechanisms but also through the United Nations Security Council on behalf of the international community with enforcement mechanisms.

This FES Joint Declaration had a national launch in Kabul, followed by a presentation in Istanbul in end 2013. It will now be presented to Pakistan’s Foreign Office in the second week of Jan 2014 in Islamabad in an event attended by all the regional Policy Groups and by large number of foreign policy and security experts, development bodies, civil society organizations and Pakistani and international media based in the capital city. This will be followed by a seminar with presentations and question answers.

This will be an opportunity not only to learn from the regional narrative but also to critically examine the assumptions it is built upon. Like the Istanbul Process, the FES Joint Declaration keeps on referring to mutual interest, trade, energy sharing but terms like conflict, work of High Peace Council (HPC) and legitimate opposition, appear without a hint of the dreaded T’ word, but many Pakistanis especially from media will wonder: how do we understand or define legitimate and illegitimate opposition in a country under foreign occupation?

Biddle, writing from George Washington University was more honest in admitting to the presence of Taliban when he admonishes that basically the US has no real option but to engage Taliban in a meaningful dialogue, spend political capital in the Congress to make it permissible and find a sustainable power sharing settlement in Kabul. If experts engaged in conceptualizing a regional framework and that too backed by the UN enforcement mechanisms can ignore the destabilizing aspect of un-reconciled Taliban which intellectually unites a Professor in Washington with a General in Pindi then something has been missed in the Joint Declarations. The conference in Islamabad may be an opportunity to debate some of these issue.

Afghanistan Beyond 2014?

Admin
-
0
Afghanistan Beyond 2014?

Moeed Pirzada|The Nation|

Council on Foreign Relations is blue planet’s foremost think tank and “Foreign Affairs” is its prestigious and most sought after publication. If one searches the term “Afghanistan” on its website, several dozen pieces spring up in few seconds.

This is natural given the presence of US and international forces in the region since 9/11. Such essays and articles could be diverse dealing with a huge variety of issues from corruption to drug trade to human rights.

However ever since President Obama has announced complete withdrawal by end 2014, such analytical pieces increasingly share one theme in common and that is: what will happen to Afghanistan and the region around it once the US power withdraws? One such piece, “Ending the War in Afghanistan” appeared in the issue of Sept/Oct 2013; it was written by Prof Stephen Biddle who teaches at the George Washington University.

Biddle argued that basically the US is now only left with two options: One, is to spend political capital at the Hill to engage Taliban in an open ended negotiations with a view to achieve a settlement that can bring Taliban in a power sharing arrangement in Kabul,. Second, to prepare itself for what Kissinger had calculated as a “decent interval” in Vietnam, before the set-up Washington leaves in Kabul collapses under the weight of insurgency and its own incompetence, this is what Biddle referred to as “final defeat”.

In this respect ironically, Biddle writing from George Washington University at the edge of Potomac and Gen Hameed Gul, Ex – DGI ISI and now convener of Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DFC) are perhaps on the same page – except that Biddle had argued this in 2013 and Gen Gul has been saying this for the past several years.

But increasingly this debate is not restricted to the pages of Foreign Affairs or Foreign Policy or the likes of Prof Biddle and Gen Hameed Gul. Now this question: what will happen in Afghanistan and how it may affect the region around is on many institutional minds. “Istanbul Process” of which many have casually heard without much thought is one such example of a growing collective thinking. This ministerial engagement between countries of South and Central Asia and Middle East supported by the US and twenty other countries had been trying to grapple with this question since Nov 2011.

The third such ministerial referred to as “Heart of Asia” Ministerial Conference took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan in April of 2013. A joint declaration at the outset of this impressive congregation – that also saw delegates from Saudi Arabia and UAE – affirmed a regional interdependence.

Joint Declaration argued that region plays a vital role in ensuring a stable peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan, while long term stability and prosperity in the region in turn requires peace and stability in Afghanistan. It then argued that our shared interests are best served by cooperation rather than by competition. The next ministerial meeting will take place in China this year.

But running parallel to Istanbul Process has been another kind of institutional vision – a Track-II engagement – created by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, (FES) the leading German think tank affiliated with the Social democrats in Germany. FES created a process of engagement between the policy makers, officials and intellectuals of the region; this took the form of four key Policy Groups (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Central Asia) taking shape in the mid-2012.

These policy groups worked on creating dialogue at three levels: One, internal or national within their countries, second, regional with each other and third with experts in Iran, Russia and China.

Bilateral meetings between these policy groups and draft of policy papers lead to inter-regional summit in Dubai in Nov 2012. Throughout 2013 meetings took place in several parts of the world including Tehran, Beijing and Berlin. In Tehran the FES delegation shared its policy papers with the Institute of Political and International Studies (IPIS) and in Beijing, the Afghan and Indian Policy Groups briefed Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and other leading Chinese experts at Renmin University.

Series of meetings followed between all groups including the Indian and Pakistani Policy Groups in Dubai leading to a second meeting of Conveners, Facilitators and Experts in Berlin. During this meeting the overview of a Joint Declaration was presented and feedback was given by regional conveners and experts. Finally after a second meeting between the Indian and Pakistan Policy Groups in Dubai in late October of 2013 the final declaration was vetted and agreed upon by all.

Just like the Istanbul Process – with which it has many intellectual overlaps – but perhaps in a more pronounced fashion the FES Joint Declaration on regional peace and stability admits that neighboring countries around Afghanistan may have conflicting interests in Afghanistan; and what is needed is to replace the competitive model that has defined their relationships historically with a cooperative framework for future.

The goal is to turn Afghanistan into an asset for all in its period of transformation from 2014 till 2023. What distinguishes FES Joint Declaration from the Declaration of Istanbul Process is its recommendation of a “Security-bound Neutrality framework” to draw upon the Swiss, Austrian and other models and then developing mechanisms to protect that neutrality framework not only through the cross-cutting regional mechanisms but also through the United Nations Security Council on behalf of the international community with enforcement mechanisms.

This FES Joint Declaration had a national launch in Kabul, followed by a presentation in Istanbul in end 2013; it will now be presented to Pakistan’s Foreign Office in the second week of Jan 2014 in Islamabad in an event attended by all the regional Policy Groups and by large number of foreign policy and security experts, development bodies, civil society organizations and Pakistani and international media based in the capital city. This will be followed by a seminar with presentations and question answers.

This will be an opportunity not only to learn from the regional narrative but also to critically examine the assumptions it is built upon. Like the Istanbul Process, FES Joint Declaration keeps on referring to mutual interest, trade, energy sharing but terms like conflict, work of High Peace Council (HPC) and legitimate opposition, appear without a hint of the dreaded “T word”, but many Pakistanis – especially from media – will wonder: how do we understand or define legitimate and illegitimate opposition in a country under foreign occupation?

Biddel, writing from George Washington University was more honest in admitting to the presence of Taliban when he admonishes that basically the US has no real option but to engage Taliban in a meaningful dialogue, spend political capital in the Congress to make it permissible and find a sustainable power sharing settlement in Kabul.

If experts engaged in conceptualizing a regional framework – and that too backed by the UN enforcement mechanisms – can ignore the destabilizing aspect of “un-reconciled Taliban” which intellectually unites a Professor in Washington with a General in Pindi then something has been missed in the Joint Declarations. Conference in Islamabad may be an opportunity to debate some of these issues.

Analysis: Govt needs to avoid polarisation

Admin
-
0
Analysis: Govt needs to avoid polarisation

Moeed Pirzada | Express Tribune |

ISLAMABAD: Former president Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf, as per his lawyers, will not appear in court today (Monday). Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s statement on Saturday – the first of its kind regarding the ongoing Musharraf trial – appears to be an attempt to stand firm and signal to the visiting Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal that he is not prepared to listen to any arguments on the issue. But it is also a calculated internal political communication to dispel the impressions of any compromise.

It appears that the government attaches far too much importance to allegations of “deal, compromise, muk-mukka” by certain strongly opinionated quarters. The risk is that in this ‘selective listening’, it may end up ignoring the larger political field – not only the military but civil society and educated middle classes – which have many dissenting voices and where this process is being seen as patently unfair.

Once elected, governments transcend party lines and support bases; they become custodians of the state and society and they have to take all sides along in search of a common future. This is where the quality of leadership lies. Nawaz’s popularity, mass appeal and public connect have been validated by the process of history. Now he faces the challenge of delivery. Any ill-conceived moves that take him on a slippery path sharply polarising society – between his supporters and opponents – will be harmful to his legacy and to Pakistan.

The Nawaz government’s strategy in trying Musharraf for November 2007’s brief emergency and avoiding the original sin of 1999 is not only to avoid a Pandora’s Box from being opened but also to give impression that this is not a ‘personal vendetta’ but a constitutional and legal matter and courts have to decide as Nawaz once again asserted in his statement of January 4, when he said that the “state and constitution are the real petitioners in this case”. Unfortunately for the government, this facile and clumsy argument to force Pakistan’s troubled politics inside the container of law and court fails to convince anyone — neither the critics nor supporters.

Anyone who had achieved the age of consciousness by October 1999 remembers that Nawaz Sharif and family’s exit to Saudi Arabia in December 2000; gradual move to London in 2005 and 2006 and return to Pakistan in 2007; the NRO which BB struck with Musharraf courtesy the Americans and midwifed by Gen Kayani, were all political decisions and compromises by different sides.

Also the lawyer’s campaign; it’s able steering by Aitzaz Ahsan; final restoration of the Chaudhry Court through a political putsch by PML-N and again midwifed by Gen Kayani, are all political decisions much bigger than the process of courts and the municipal law. Where we stand today, with all its benefits of relative stability, and promise towards a better future under the stewardship of Nawaz Sharif, are fruits of a long-drawn political struggle laced with necessary compromises by all sides; PML-N, PPP and the army and external stakeholders like the US and Saudi Arabia. Suddenly turning around and arguing that a special court appointed with the blessings of ex-chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry will sit on the judgment of complex and difficult issues of political divide in Pakistan is unfair, unwise and fraught with dangers to say the least.

Real objectives appear to be, first, revenge and, second, assertion of moral authority over the military.

One cannot belittle the feelings or desires for revenge, given how badly twice elected prime minister and some of his colleagues were treated and humiliated in 1999. However Nawaz and his close colleagues – their resilience, patience and ability to hold and spring back – have been vindicated by the process of history. As far as sending message to the military goes, one need not look beyond Egypt.

If Nawaz avoids “selective listening”, he will realise that beyond PML-N loyalists, a group of lawyers and vocal voices in the media – with personal grudges against Musharraf – there are innumerable Pakistanis in the educated middle classes, business community and minorities who may not be impressed by Gen Musharraf’s delusions of grandeur and political mumbo jumbo but do see him as someone who had provided able leadership at a very difficult time after 9/11; good economic governance, revolutions in the media and telecommunication and a clean government at the top without allegations of him or his family siphoning billions.

If this case advances, all these arguments taking shape will open up old wounds, pitch strong opinions against each other and polarise the political field. These feelings are very strong in the city of Karachi. Also, while the top leadership of the military cannot and will not speak on the subject, the rank and file officers are perturbed; the Urdu translation of traitor (ghaddar) is far too strong and disturbing for most soldiers and officers who pledge their lives – literally blood and flesh – around loyalty to the state.

The challenge now is not to prove one tough by settling old scores but to move ahead by taking everyone along. This is called ‘mature politics”. Top decision makers are often surrounded by armies of sycophants, and in this milieu even honest and sincere critics of government actions can be seen as enemies. But the quality of leadership lies in listening to sane advice and finding “solutions”.

The writer is group analyst for the Express Media Group.

Exclusive Interview Gen (R) Pervez Musharraf with Dr. Moeed Pirzada – 29th December 2013

Admin
-
0
Exclusive Interview Gen (R) Pervez Musharraf with Dr. Moeed Pirzada – 29th December 2013

Gen. Musharraf’s famous interview on Express News on 29th Dec, 2013. This was Moeed Pirzada’s first program after joining Express News. It was arranged by Express’s MD, Yousaf Baig Mirza and quite contrary to popular belief the first time Moeed Pirzada ever met retired General. Moeed Pirzada starts by asking Gen. Musharraf, “What were the most difficult moments of your life: 9/11 when you had to side with America against Taliban; October 1999 when you removed an elected PM, Nawaz Sharif; 03 Nov 2007 when you imposed emergency and detained judges of Supreme Court or now December 2013 when Nawaz Govt has decided to indict you for treason?”. This fast paced discussion at an important juncture of Pakistani history will assume archival value for students of Pakistani history and politics. What Musharraf said about role of Gen Kiyani, of Ex-Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudry and what Asif Ali Zardari is upto when he says “Billa phans gaya hay, isay janay na dain” Who is the billa? Is billa: Pervaiz Musharraf or Billa is Pakistan Army? How Musharraf reflects on the media he empowered? and much more.

Lecture on Police Media Relations

Admin
-
0
Lecture on Police Media Relations

Dr. Moeed Pirzada was invited at National Police Academy,Islamabad on 23rd December 2013, to discuss the very important topic “Police-Media Relations”.

He explained Media and Police relationship in past and in present. The Lecture was very useful and informative for the under training officers. He also given suggestion to improve the relationship of media and Police.

Break-up of Pakistan & Creation of Bangladesh; Rethinking after 40 years of the Fall of Dacca?

Admin
-
1
Break-up of Pakistan & Creation of Bangladesh; Rethinking after 40 years of the Fall of Dacca?

Moeed Pirzada | FB Blog |

This relates to today’s program (Sat, 17th Dec) This program had a limited and defined focus on certain key aspects and questions related to the break-up of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in Dec 1971. These are the kind of questions and themes which are often debated in Pakistan without making an overall sense so I only wanted to focus on them; discussing everything was not possible, therefore there is a feeling that I have not discussed this or that. So let me explain what was discussed and why?

First, this needs to be understood that the basic structure of the State of Pakistan as it existed in 1971 was essentially flawed. A poor developing world country, in two parts, seperated from each other by 1000 miles of enemy territory in between did not make any sense. This whole notion of sentiments and feelings expressed repeatedly are not enough for good statecraft; states need ‘geographical contiguity’. A rich powerful state like United States can have an appendage like Alaska but a poor West-Pakistan could not have not an “East-Pakistan” certainly not for long.

Second, this was a flawed design but was the result of a flawed partition that should not have ever happend or certainly not on the grounds it finally happened. Jinnah’s arguement for Pakistan was to win a legal arrangement within the larger context of an India. He always referred to India as the overall overarching entity, umbrella entity that contained both Hindustan and Pakistan. Pakistan in that legal arrangement was different from Hindustan only in the sense of being a collection of Muslim majority provinces or States in the East (today’s Bangladesh with Calcutta) and West (today’s Pakistan but with whole Punjab and Kashmir) but with its own Hindu, Sikh and Christian minorities. This was actually the way India was before British came and brought a new political model which started seeing Hindus and Muslims as majorities and minorites. It was this political concept against which Jinnah militated for he argued that British have placed a political system upon India which will reduce Muslims into a minority and will work against their socio-economic interests and growth. Jinnah was merely arguing for a looser confederation of Muslim majority and Hindu majority provinces inside the framework of an overarching India. In this model, if it was approved, there was no possibility or fear of the bloody migrations and killings that took place in 1947, because Jinnah never argued for the division of provinces and States. Punjab and Bengal were not to be divided.Muslims and Hindus had to live and work where they were living and working.

Third, this did not happen because Nehru and Patel (but not Ghandi and Azad) had started believing that such a looser confederation will deprive them of the powerful center which they needed in Delhi to create a bigger power. It was Nehru who argued and was able to win support of Mountbatten for the division of provinces on the basis of Hindu and Muslim Districts. This was the June 3rd Plan which was shared with Jinnah only a few weeks before the actual partition on 14th Aug, 1947. It was this partition of Punjab and Bengal that lead to migrations, and killings. And it was these killings that produced the hatred and mind set in which the states of India and Pakistan defined their relations. And it is these ‘poisonous relations’ from which we can not emerge since then; imagine if we cannot emerge above this hatred and mistrust within the virtual reality of this facebook then what are the chances that we can over come this hatred and mistrust in the real physical world that exists outside..??

Fourth, If the political formula agreed by Jinnah in the Cabinet Mission Plan of Dec 1946 had been agreed overall, and a loose confederation of Indian Provinces and States would have emerged in 1947 or 1948 then India today would have been like the European Union and it was quite possible that, without the acrimony of the migrations and killings, its various components pulling apart in 1947 would have developed deeper institutional relations, bonding and inter-dependence thus bringing them closer together in a volunatary fashion the way we see happening in Europe. Alas it did not happen that way, but bottom line is that the ‘migrations and killings of 1947’ were not part of the Pakistan plan of Jinah or its effect; these were the effect of the division of Punjab and Bengal, the concept advanced by Nehru and Mountbatten.

Fifth, Once the ill fated and ill-designed partition happened, the East Bengal/East Pakistan and now Bangladesh should then have been an autonomous entity from the beginning; if it was not, then it was only lack of political vision. Problem was that Karachi/Islamabad had inherited the power of British Raj the way it devolved upon Delhi in India and Bengal minus Calcutta was literally a weak limb to begin with in 1947. My arguement is that even after partition if the State of Pakistan had been an organic political system with a vision then with each five year plan or election the former East Pakistan would have gained more autonomy untill it was virtually free and on its own the way Australia or Canada have evolved into independent states from dominions of Great Britain.

Sixth, Emergence of East Pakistan into an independent Bengali State was thus inherent in that flawed model. Whatever happened in 1970 – 71 could have either happened earlier or later. Even if India had not instigated an insurgency, and supported it through a military intervention Bengal would have gained its autonomy from West Pakistan sooner or the later; though without much violence. The massive violence that took place was an outcome of the Indian plan. The Indian State’s narrative of an innocent India affected by the Pakistani brutalities and thus forced to intervene is essentially flawed for the reason that Indian Intelligence (RAW) was actively working to create the insurgency and the circumstances that will force Pakistani military to deal more and more harshly with the Bengali nationalists and insurgents thus setting the stage for the larger conflict that will get out of hand and will become politically unmanageable, thus setting the stage for India’s military intervention. (This is precisely how Pakistani military later frustrated Indian militatry in Kashmir and India’s own complaints of Pakistani support from across the borders should help understand the dynamics of such actions. The difference is that Pakistan, given its overall weaker position, could never afford to support the Kashmiri insurgency the way India could do in East Pakistan; this is a long discussion we should do separately).

Seventh, Sarmilla Bose is not the first one to narrate that how four or five armed groups were fighting each other in Bengal in 1971; this has always been known. Sarmilla Bose has only added the death figures through research. Pakistani military and citizens of West Pakistani origin and Bengalis aligned with the Pakistani state were being attacked by Indian supported Mukhti Bahni and other Bahnis. And Pakistani military had in turn created the militias like Al-Badar and Al Shams. Later after March 1971 the Bengali officers of Pakistani military joined the insurgents thus further increasing their fire power. In this conflict people died from all sides; it was not killing by one side of the other but was happening from all sides.

Eighth, What India gained?….India gained every thing; it was in Dec 1971 that India for the first time emerged as the clear and unquestioned dominant power of South Asia, inheritor of the Raj, relegating its principal foe (and once its own part) to a much reduced position and embarked on a journey to ask the world to accept its position in the region and beyond. However in the process it created more insecurities in the region from which we all, including Indians, suffer and keep on shouting at each other without realizing from where all this is coming from…!

Whereas given the hostility between India and Pakistan we cannot blame India for their role in 1971; they saw an opportunity and exploited it, however all of us- Indians and Pakistanis – ought to be aware of what we did or did not. Lets not be like those idiots who feel perverse happiness on 9/11 tragedy and fall of Twin Towers and then blame Americans for doing it…Indias and Pakistanis both ought to live upto their own actions in shaping a painful and difficult history from which we must emerge…with understanding of what we have done…

Break-up of Pakistan & creation of Bangladesh; rethinking after 40 years of the fall of Dacca?

Moeed Pirzada
-
0

Moeed Pirzada |

This relates to today’s program (Sat, 17th Dec) This program had a limited and defined focus on certain key aspects and questions related to the break-up of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in Dec 1971. These are the kind of questions and themes which are often debated in Pakistan without making an overall sense so I only wanted to focus on them; discussing everything was not possible, therefore there is a feeling that I have not discussed this or that. So let me explain what was discussed and why?

First, this needs to be understood that the basic structure of the State of Pakistan as it existed in 1971 was essentially flawed. A poor developing world country, in two parts, seperated from each other by 1000 miles of enemy territory in between did not make any sense. This whole notion of sentiments and feelings expressed repeatedly are not enough for good statecraft; states need ‘geographical contiguity’. A rich powerful state like United States can have an appendage like Alaska but a poor West-Pakistan could not have not an “East-Pakistan” certainly not for long.

Whereas given the hostility between India and Pakistan we cannot blame India for their role in 1971; they saw an opportunity and exploited it, however all of us- Indians and Pakistanis – ought to be aware of what we did or did not.

Second, this was a flawed design but was the result of a flawed partition that should not have ever happend or certainly not on the grounds it finally happened. Jinnah’s arguement for Pakistan was to win a legal arrangement within the larger context of an India. He always referred to India as the overall overarching entity, umbrella entity that contained both Hindustan and Pakistan. Pakistan in that legal arrangement was different from Hindustan only in the sense of being a collection of Muslim majority provinces or States in the East (today’s Bangladesh with Calcutta) and West (today’s Pakistan but with whole Punjab and Kashmir) but with its own Hindu, Sikh and Christian minorities.

This was actually the way India was before British came and brought a new political model which started seeing Hindus and Muslims as majorities and minorites. It was this political concept against which Jinnah militated for he argued that British have placed a political system upon India which will reduce Muslims into a minority and will work against their socio-economic interests and growth. Jinnah was merely arguing for a looser confederation of Muslim majority and Hindu majority provinces inside the framework of an overarching India. In this model, if it was approved, there was no possibility or fear of the bloody migrations and killings that took place in 1947, because Jinnah never argued for the division of provinces and States. Punjab and Bengal were not to be divided.Muslims and Hindus had to live and work where they were living and working.

Read more: Has anyone been held accountable for the catastrophe that created Bangladesh

Third, this did not happen because Nehru and Patel (but not Ghandi and Azad) had started believing that such a looser confederation will deprive them of the powerful center which they needed in Delhi to create a bigger power. It was Nehru who argued and was able to win support of Mountbatten for the division of provinces on the basis of Hindu and Muslim Districts. This was the June 3rd Plan which was shared with Jinnah only a few weeks before the actual partition on 14th Aug, 1947. It was this partition of Punjab and Bengal that lead to migrations, and killings. And it was these killings that produced the hatred and mind set in which the states of India and Pakistan defined their relations. And it is these ‘poisonous relations’ from which we can not emerge since then; imagine if we cannot emerge above this hatred and mistrust within the virtual reality of this facebook then what are the chances that we can over come this hatred and mistrust in the real physical world that exists outside..??

Fourth, If the political formula agreed by Jinnah in the Cabinet Mission Plan of Dec 1946 had been agreed overall, and a loose confederation of Indian Provinces and States would have emerged in 1947 or 1948 then India today would have been like the European Union and it was quite possible that, without the acrimony of the migrations and killings, its various components pulling apart in 1947 would have developed deeper institutional relations, bonding and inter-dependence thus bringing them closer together in a volunatary fashion the way we see happening in Europe. Alas it did not happen that way, but bottom line is that the ‘migrations and killings of 1947’ were not part of the Pakistan plan of Jinah or its effect; these were the effect of the division of Punjab and Bengal, the concept advanced by Nehru and Mountbatten.

Fifth, Once the ill-fated and ill-designed partition happened, the East Bengal/East Pakistan and now Bangladesh should then have been an autonomous entity from the beginning; if it was not, then it was only lack of political vision. Problem was that Karachi/Islamabad had inherited the power of British Raj the way it devolved upon Delhi in India and Bengal minus Calcutta was literally a weak limb to begin with in 1947. My arguement is that even after partition if the State of Pakistan had been an organic political system with a vision then with each five year plan or election the former East Pakistan would have gained more autonomy untill it was virtually free and on its own the way Australia or Canada have evolved into independent states from dominions of Great Britain.

This whole notion of sentiments and feelings expressed repeatedly are not enough for good statecraft; states need ‘geographical contiguity’. A rich powerful state like United States can have an appendage like Alaska but a poor West-Pakistan could not have not an “East-Pakistan” certainly not for long.

Sixth, Emergence of East Pakistan into an independent Bengali State was thus inherent in that flawed model. Whatever happened in 1970 – 71 could have either happened earlier or later. Even if India had not instigated an insurgency, and supported it through a military intervention Bengal would have gained its autonomy from West Pakistan sooner or the later; though without much violence. The massive violence that took place was an outcome of the Indian plan. The Indian State’s narrative of an innocent India affected by the Pakistani brutalities and thus forced to intervene is essentially flawed for the reason that Indian Intelligence (RAW) was actively working to create the insurgency and the circumstances that will force Pakistani military to deal more and more harshly with the Bengali nationalists and insurgents thus setting the stage for the larger conflict that will get out of hand and will become politically unmanageable, thus setting the stage for India’s military intervention. (This is precisely how Pakistani military later frustrated Indian

The Indian State’s narrative of an innocent India affected by the Pakistani brutalities and thus forced to intervene is essentially flawed for the reason that Indian Intelligence (RAW) was actively working to create the insurgency and the circumstances that will force Pakistani military to deal more and more harshly with the Bengali nationalists and insurgents thus setting the stage for the larger conflict that will get out of hand and will become politically unmanageable, thus setting the stage for India’s military intervention. (This is precisely how Pakistani military later frustrated Indian militatry in Kashmir and India’s own complaints of Pakistani support from across the borders should help understand the dynamics of such actions. The difference is that Pakistan, given its overall weaker position, could never afford to support the Kashmiri insurgency the way India could do in East Pakistan; this is a long discussion we should do separately).

Read more: Bangladesh Politiking to Commemorate March 25 as ‘Genocide Day’

Seventh, Sarmilla Bose is not the first one to narrate that how four or five armed groups were fighting each other in Bengal in 1971; this has always been known. Sarmilla Bose has only added the death figures through research. Pakistani military and citizens of West Pakistani origin and Bengalis aligned with the Pakistani state were being attacked by Indian supported Mukhti Bahni and other Bahnis. And Pakistani military had in turn created the militias like Al-Badar and Al Shams. Later after March 1971 the Bengali officers of Pakistani military joined the insurgents thus further increasing their fire power. In this conflict people died from all sides; it was not killing by one side of the other but was happening from all sides.

Eighth, What India gained?….India gained everything; it was in Dec 1971 that India for the first time emerged as the clear and unquestioned dominant power of South Asia, inheritor of the Raj, relegating its principal foe (and once its own part) to a much reduced position and embarked on a journey to ask the world to accept its position in the region and beyond. However in the process it created more insecurities in the region from which we all, including Indians, suffer and keep on shouting at each other without realizing from where all this is coming from…!

Whereas given the hostility between India and Pakistan we cannot blame India for their role in 1971; they saw an opportunity and exploited it, however all of us- Indians and Pakistanis – ought to be aware of what we did or did not. Let’s not be like those idiots who feel perverse happiness on 9/11 tragedy and fall of Twin Towers and then blame Americans for doing it…Indias and Pakistanis both ought to live upto their own actions in shaping a painful and difficult history from which we must emerge…with understanding of what we have done…

 

Moeed Pirzada is prominent TV Anchor & commentator; he studied international relations at Columbia Univ, New York and law at London School of Economics. Twitter: MoeedNj. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Global Village Space’s editorial policy. This piece was first published in Moeed Pirzada’s official page. It has been reproduced with permission.

Perception Management

Admin
-
0
Perception Management

Dr. Moeed Pirzada participated in a seminar at National Defence University,Islamabad on 26 November 2013.

The Seminar was held on “Perception Management”, Dr Moeed in that seminar discussed the role of media in perception making, conceptual dimensions and application against Pakistan:Players, themes and Narratives.

Hangu Strike: Why Imran Khan is Right?

Admin
-
0
Hangu Strike: Why Imran Khan is Right?

Moeed Pirzada | The Nation |

The latest US drone strike in Hangu, within the “settled areas of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” has raised altogether new challenges for the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, for the politics of Imran Khan and for Pakistan’s military establishment.

This drone strike has made bonkers, at least in public consciousness, of whatever assurances Nawaz team received in Washington during meetings with Obama or whatever Sartaj Aziz had understood. Imran Khan may have overreacted on the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud, but now at this moment he is right; implications of “Hangu Drone Strike” for KPK and Pakistan run much wider and deeper. It is quite possible that like 2008, this drone strike in Hangu was an odd exception, a dire tactical need in Atlanta or Langley. But elements aligned with Afghan Taliban or TTP may be hiding in different cities across Pakistan and if this trend is not questioned, challenged and check mated at this stage it has the potential of throwing asunder the whole societal fabric, the very architecture that underlies the edifice of Pakistani politics. And it won’t even serve the wider, long-term interests of United States in this region.

Despite this the Pakistani politicians and opinion makers in general have not grasped the true nature of this challenge. Divided amongst themselves, on one hand they are fighting turf battles even on this issue and yet at another level in their helplessness they are fueling ever greater feelings of despondency and thus anti-Americanism. In our foreign and national security policy, we have struggled for more than 60 years – despite all odds – to stay on the right side of American power and treating United States as an enemy is not an option. What politicians need is: a united front, cerebral investment in understanding the imperatives in Washington behind the drone policy and the need to create a two-fold dialogue; an external one with United States and an internal one with the military and religious parties and groups.

Since 9/11 CIA has transformed itself from a cold war intelligence agency into a paramilitary organisation with prison facilities and expanded drone programme. It is increasingly competing for power, influence and funding not only within the US intelligence community but also within the whole framework of US foreign policy for 21st century. For instance it has gobbled up almost $16 billion out of the $53 billion budget of the intelligence community and its drone programme –currently at $2.3 billion – according to Washington Post is set to quadruple or quintuple within the coming decade. In theatres of conflict like AfPak CIA has turned US diplomatic missions and USAID into cartoons of irrelevance.

Farid Zakaria in his policy piece, “Future of American Power” in Foreign Affairs (June 2008) had argued that US has become the most powerful nation since Imperial Rome. That was an understatement; Imperial Rome was a ‘puny’ as compared to the reach, penetration and unilateralism of Washington in the beginning of 21st century. Romans despite all their majesty had to pay a price for their adventurism; their ability to awe or decimate the Celts, Carthaginians, Iberians or Thracians was limited by the challenges of distance and their own capacity to shed precious Roman blood and absorb material losses. US’s adventurism in the beginning of 21st century is a “no cost affair”. Today perhaps with the exception of Russia and China, Pentagon has the ability to make ‘pulp’ of any conventional military before sunset. So while there are no conventional challenges to this power; drone programmes fit as ‘weapons of choice’ in a new world order where ever increasing power for its depth now needs precision, economic efficiency and low political costs at home.

Drone policy is shrouded in mystery. So despite Pakistani pleas of restraint, Hakimullah Mehsud can be eliminated because he was a high value target; Dr Naseeruddin Haqqani can be mysteriously murdered near Islamabad for provided financial support and Hangu attack can be justified – as some embarrassed PML-N stalwarts were trying to do on TV programmes – as an attack on Afghan Taliban and not TTP. Similarly future attacks despite some new assurances can be on other foreigners: Chechens, Arabs or Tajiks; and finally in any new situation it could be: Haqqani’s trusted accountant, cook, or lover or “none of the above”. This is what happens when you combine plaintiff, prosecutor, judge and executioner into one behemoth that is: CIA. So we don’t need to waste our time in finding ever new nuances in a policy that is primarily based on crude political calculations in a complex web of power and influence that Washington is. In 2012, Dennis Blair, former director of national intelligence (DNI) had summed up the logic of drones when he said: “It is the politically advantageous thing to do – low cost, no US casualties, gives the appearance of toughness…it plays well domestically, and is unpopular only in other countries. Any damage to the national interest shows up over the long term”

CIA argument of tactical effectiveness is sound but the efficacy of the policy and its results have to be seen in the overall context of US role in the region, where Washington also spends hundreds of millions on development, education, civil society, and media and so on. Since 2004, CIA has conducted a total of 365 drone strikes inside Pakistan and the number kept on fluctuating not with the challenge in the war theatre but with the political mood and exigencies in Washington. Pakistani politicians need to examine all that. What we need now is a three-fold negotiation: An external one specifically with the US intelligence to come to some understanding on red-lines; an internal one with the military establishment that either Afghan Taliban be pushed to the negotiation table as the US wants or pushed out of Pakistan’s settled areas; finally with the religious parties and groups inside Pakistan to bring their rhetoric within the framework of a nation state.

Fighting Terror Through the Lens of Conspiracy Theorists

Admin
-
0
Fighting Terror Through the Lens of Conspiracy Theorists

Moeed Pirzada | PIQUE Magazine |

The past few weeks have not been kind to the politics of Imran Khan. After the high-water mark of APC in the second week of September, where all parties agreed – once again – to a dialogue for peace with the Pakistani Taliban, PTI’s Khan Sahib looked like knight on a white horse, leading Pakistani politics from the front.

But that impression itself was something of anoxymoron: it was probably the seventh such marathon political event of its kind in the past five years. All parties had again reaffirmed their belief in the need for dialogue, but public narratives are never scientific. Pundits and citizenry alike, with mixed sentiments of both love and spite, credited Khan, who–for a few days, at least – found himself riding on the crest of a newfound popularity.

Unfortunately, this moment did not last long. TTP’s IED – which assassinated the GOC Swat –also ruptured Imran Khan’s balloon of dialogue and peace. But that was just the beginning of the nightmare. Reality dawned with the chilling attack on the All Saints Church, in which eighty innocent worshippers perished in what was perhaps the worst attack on a Christian minority in the history of South Asia.

A bewildered Imran wondered, “Isn’t it strange that whenever peace talks are pursued, these attacks take place?”

Such musing aloud was ill advised; to many it sounded a defense of Taliban. Angry Christian crowds demonstrated against PTI; and a blogger for the Express Tribune – Sameera Rashid – wrote, “Dear Imran Khan, where were you when my church was attacked?”Rashid claimed it was a letter inspired by a teacher at a Catholic Missionary School in Peshawar. Whether this was true or not, it certainly summed up the feelings of the moment.

While the humiliated leadership of the ANP and PPP were trying to garner legitimacy by attacking Khan’s apparent appeasement of the Taliban, Khan suggested – from the doorsteps of the Lady Reading Hospital – that the TTP should be invited for dialogue. This gave Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman the opportunity to accuse Khan of naivety, pointing out that giving TTP a formal office will foster an undeserved political legitimacy.

The days that followed brought an unprecedented wave of criticism and ridicule against PTI’s leader, especially through social media, where he was – even before this recent turn of events – the scapegoat for all that was wrong with Pakistan’s war against the TTP.

Though his agenda even before the APC stated that military tactics should be deployed against those who are not amenable to dialogue, the suggestion of force as an option has become more and more prominent in his impromptu ramblings.

But does that really change anything on the ground? A motley crowd of politicians, bloggers, columnists, TV anchors and failed generals make their arguments –especially when talking to diplomats or international media –in a manner that suggests we have Khan to thank for the very idea of dialogue. You’d be forgiven for thinking that, without him, the Pakistani army would have marched, outmaneuvered and decimated the also-rans of Pakistani history, that it is only the naïve Imran Khan who has stood between them and the bugles of victory.

Is this true? Is it only Khan who is giving rise to delusions of “estranged Pashtun brothers”, ideas of “living happily ever after” and the “conspiracy theories” of the CIA, the Indian hand, ISI assets, fears of denuclearisation, good Taliban and bad Taliban… and so on, or does the rot run deeper and wider than that? The tragedy of contemporary Pakistan is that its happenings can’t be examined as nonfiction. Perhaps an examination of the conspiracy theories and fears of its various stakeholders will offer a better chance of excavating the truth.

The joint declaration to the APC this September is reminiscent of consensus resolutions passed by the joint sitting of parliament in October 2008, May 2011, April 2012; of the recommendations of the APC convened by PM Yousaf Raza Gillani in September 2011, of the APC convened by ANP in February 2013 and of the APC convened by JUIF the same month.

Most of these consensus resolutions or recommendations did talk of sovereignty and condemned US drone attacks, but did they ever talk of a decisive fight against TTP or other such outfits? If anything, the last two items in that formidable list pointedly asked for peace through dialogue, and were supported by all other major and minor parties. If that was a maneuver to gain the sympathy of TTP-types before the elections, it certainly failed: ANP was their biggest target; but that does not mean that ANP ever had a plan to fight them. Being a victim by default does not make you a fighter by choice.

So who are the determined fighters? Who had the nerve and vision for a war, but were held back? In a recent seminar in Islamabad on conflict and peace, which I was moderating and where representatives of all political parties were present, each was condemning the others by making references towards a euphemistic ‘we’and the establishment for failures in fighting the Taliban.

I asked the ex-DG ISPR, Gen. Athar Abbas how he explains the military’s dismal performance in this conflict? His stern reply – in a hall packed with politicians, diplomats, executives of development bodies and NGOs – was interesting. He reminded us all that the military was sent to Swat in 2007 and started its operations, but the then MMA government, which consisted almost exclusively of religious parties, asked the operation to be stopped: first for peace through dialogue, and then to produce the right atmosphere for elections.

After the 2008 elections, it was the then provincial government of ANP that wanted to give peace a chance. The general stated that, once all peace efforts had visibly failed, the military launched its operations – in the summer of 2009. I looked around for any politician to counter his explanation; none mustered the courage.

No one asked the general that day why the military hasn’t entered North Waziristan to remove the TTP, despite the cocktail of flirtatious cajoling and threats by the Americans. But that does not mean there are not others ready to offer juicy conspiracy theories of why the military has not done so.

A Popular Drone Strike: Paradox & Implications?

Admin
-
0
A Popular Drone Strike: Paradox & Implications?

MOEED PIRZADA |THE NATION |

Hakimullah Mehsud’s death in Danday Darpakhel by US hellfire missiles on 1st Nov, 2013, is clearly the first palpably popular use of drone strike by CIA. However there is an equally fierce and shrill reaction from the government, media and political stakeholders. This paradox needs understanding to make sense.

Never since the death of Baitullah Mehsud in Aug 2009 there has been a drone strike that has clearly split the Pakistani public opinion. Generally speaking: the deep-seated suspicions – in which Pakistani public, media, civil servants, army officers and politicians view US intentions, and the role of CIA, in the region (Pakistan, Afghanistan & India) – have dominated the discussion about drone strikes. So drones have not been seen as “precision weapons” against “inaccessible enemies of state” but as part of a larger US design about which there is no clarity. The confusion, ambivalence and never ending theorizing regarding: elemental nature, possible motivations, covert links, and especially the “overall composition with the presence of proxies” of the thirty plus insurgent militant groups that together constitute TTP also adds to the climate in which Pakistani public and stakeholders – including the opinion aligned around Imran Khan and PTI – debate the American drones.

But since Friday, I have spent two days reading what common Pakistanis have written in their comments in newspapers, TV websites, blogs and including more than 150 comments on my Facebook page and there is a clear, unmistakable shift in favour of the use of the kind of drone strike that perished Mr Mehsud and his fellow henchmen. We don’t know if this potential “shift of opinion” was part of the calculus of the CIA and NSA teams when they decided to pounce on the actionable intelligence or not but they have caused – at least momentarily – a “public opinion split” But there are other interesting implications, which we need to understand.

First, Nawaz government has been caught with its pants down. It is obvious that either the Nawaz and team have been slapped on full face by the Obama administration or they themselves were on board with the Americans in some ‘fresh thinking” and are now doing the usual song and dance for the consumption of public, media and the opposition – especially PTI that was driving the agenda of APC. The killing opportunity for opposition is huge since the Nawaz government had gone on front foot painting an extraordinarily rosy picture of their discussions in Washington on the issue of drone strikes. Some key officials and ministers went to the extent of suggesting that Nawaz has now the confidence and support of Obama administration for its dialogue with the TTP. To suspicious analysts, the government exuberance about “peace process” had a strange feeling of “artificiality” but all of this has now crashed with the Interior Minister calling this “murder of the peace process”. This clearly presents the new government with its first serious domestic and foreign policy challenge and it remains to be seen how, with what compromises and in what form and shape, and with what kind of cuts and bruises will it emerge out of it.

Second, this creates a cocktail of political opportunities and huge strategic risks for Imran Khan and PTI. PTI’s base – with almost 80% of that located in Punjab – is young, impressionable, nationalistic and generally speaking more educated and politically aware of any other large mass grouping in Pakistan. They have been traumatized and extremely upset about the impotence of the Pakistani state in face of TTP’s savagery – especially after the killing of GOC Swat and the attacks on All Saints Church and its outfall for the national image. Imran’s appeal to his turbulent base is his promise to buy peace through negotiations, he emerged as the defining leader of APC, kept intact the faith of his supporters even after the recent savagery by TTP and his argument – shared by most politicians, media and public – is that continuing drone strikes will make the peace impossible; and it was with this fear in mind that Imran had been threatening “blockade of NATO supplies” if drone strikes interfered with peace talks. But to the supporters of Imran Khan the news and the visual imagination of Hakimullah Mehsud and its hated lieutenants groaning in blood and flesh is also hugely satisfying – even if by an American drone. Imran is now caught between his promise, audacity of his threat and the need to act wisely within the political theatre to save his leadership. The next few days will be equally crucial for him.

Media: Need for Regulatory Policy, Ministry of Information, Islamabad, 29th October 2013

Admin
-
0
Media: Need for Regulatory Policy, Ministry of Information, Islamabad, 29th October 2013

Dr. Pirzada gave a talk on the ‘Media: Need for Regulatory Policy’ to the officers and probationers of the Information Academy at the Information Services Academy, Ministry of Information, Islamabad. The event was organized at Islamabad on 29th October, 2013.

He explained the history, achievements and challenges faced by Pakistani media.  The role that the government should play in ensuring a free and fair media was also discussed.  Cross-ownership rules, time allocated to advertisements as well as foreign models of media regulations.

Death Penalty: Taliban Fear or EU Blackmail ?

Admin
-
0
Death Penalty: Taliban Fear or EU Blackmail ?

Moeed Pirzada |The Nation|

Nawaz government’s continuing moratorium on “death penalty” is getting more and more confusing. Public and media have still not understood what is happening? Is it EU’s blackmail stitched with its GSP-Plus or is this the fear of Taliban who have threatened the ruling family? In order to show its determination to fight the crime, government – only this month – has brought forward two ordinances in the space of just eleven days and the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013 does mention death penalty; but privately government officials admit that given EU’s arm twisting and the power of human right groups funded by western countries, this continuing moratorium will now never be lifted.

“Death penalty” is a philosophical and moral debate that goes to the heart of a community and state. By all means Pakistanis should have this debate and should be able to form a mind. Should criminals be executed? What crimes warrant the ultimate punishment? Should a state have the power to execute its citizens? Is death penalty a deterrent? Why death penalty is not a deterrent when arrests, fines, and other punishments are? What about our whole modern governance system based on studied methods of incentives, disincentives and rewards? Is there a credible research that distinguishes the deterrence value of capital punishment from other punishments? Could that research – counterintuitive on the face of it- suffer from cultural and other limitations? How do victims get closure? How do we ensure that loved ones of the victims not take law into their own hands? Why extra-juridical killings happen? How do we ensure that innocent are not executed? Who should be pardoned? Should there be a concept of blood money? Societies have argued, fought and debated these issues for decades if not centuries and it has also dovetailed with the political, economic and social conditions of the times, with the kind of challenges a society was facing.

Giving you a snapshot: China for instance saw a brief period of abolition in 8th century, Russian Bolsheviks banned death penalty in 1917; in modern Europe Netherlands abolished capital punishment in peace times in 1878 but for wartime in 1983. In UK, a European country of much relevance to Pakistan, Sir Samuel Romilly had started the process of reduction in death penalty in 1808. But the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1864-66 could not decide to abolish the death penalty though it did away with public executions. In 1938 a parliamentary bill was to be debated for an experimental five year suspension but then the climate and feelings generated by the beginning of Second World War made it impossible. In 1949, once Nuremburg trials were out of way, another Royal Commission on Capital Punishment examined the matter but advised against abolishment. Finally in 1965 a five year moratorium was placed on experimental basis almost 160 years after Romilly had started to reform the punishment. In almost every European country, abolishment followed a similar intense debate, reform of the system and adjustment of the defense of life and property through other parallel enactments.

Pakistanis – children of a lesser God – however, were not trusted with this debate; they were not allowed to form their own mind. So in 2008, an indirectly elected President – Asif Zardari – without any input from criminal justice system, district managers, police officers, prosecutors, prison officials, senior civil servants and judiciary, and without any debate in parliament, placed a moratorium on death penalty. Under Article 45 of the constitution of Pakistan, President had the power to pardon, reprieve, respite, remit, suspend and commute sentences on case to case basis but could he suspend the whole system, and a constitutional and religious provision forever? This question becomes all the more important if we keep in mind that unlike the governors in the US who are directly elected – with definite campaign commitments – Pakistani president was an indirectly elected head of the state in a country and political system that was not debating capital punishment; and someone –as his critics point out with mixed indignation and relish– who was always running away from law. It is widely believed that President Zardari took this unusual decision because he was made to believe that this will help burnish his moderate and liberal credentials across EU. Ironically, in his limited, innocent, naïve world view – and what may appear as a joke to serious students of international relations – Pakistani President also saw EU as some sort of balance and leverage against the US; in May 2012 for instance he collected all EU Ambassadors – poor souls – in presidency on EU day ostensibly to send a message to Washington before the Nato summit in Chicago. Americans could have popped up champagne bottles to celebrate the Pakistani perception of the new world order.

Nation states have to decide on policy prescriptions keeping in view their peculiar circumstances and challenges; they have to take into consideration their history, religion, public opinions and requirements of providing security to families, businesses and property; Is not this what nations of Europe did themselves, at every stage in their own history?

Look at Pakistan: In the three years between 2010-2012, around 41,000 murder FIR’s were registered; in the same time period more than 46,000 attempted murders, around 60,000 cases of abduction, almost 400,000 crimes against property and almost 1,000 cases of gang rape were registered. Police officers believe that due to technical issues of computation, these gruesome figures still does not include the mass victims of terrorism, and murder in Karachi is underreported. Pakistan has a homicide rate of 7.6 as compared to 1 for China and Saudi Arabia and 1.2 for UK. Is this a situation in which Pakistani governments and bureaucracies can allow themselves to flirt and toddle with untested ideas? And that too, without the application of their own independent mind? Is this fair?

Most EU diplomats have privately argued that abolishment of death penalty or continuing moratorium is a not a condition for GSP-plus and they have merely pointed out that a sudden flurry of executions in Pakistan can create an unfriendly atmosphere in Brussels and member countries at this stage. But EU missions need to come out more clearly on the issue. Flexing the muscles of Pakistani governments, directly or through NGO’s sponsored by the several European government and other western organisations – against the interests and judgments of Pakistani people defies the very basis of democracy. Pakistanis need to decide for themselves and this needs a broad based process.

Nawaz government, cabinet ministers and top civil servants have to remember that the first and the foremost responsibility of state and the elected governments is to provide better governance, and ultimately all world – including EU – will measure them on that yardstick. In 1979, the whole western world –including the peaceniks of Europe – encouraged us to fight soviets in Afghanistan by selling us false theories of “Next Domino”. Forty years later, we are paying the price and they lecture us to fix our realm. Isn’t this what President Obama just did to PM Nawaz in Washington?

1...757677...90Page 76 of 90