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Independent Pakistan: A Prisoner of Its own Ideology?

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Independent Pakistan: A Prisoner of Its own Ideology?

Moeed Pirzada | Khaleej Times |

CALL it irony or comedy but the fact is that at its 61st anniversary Islamic Republic of Pakistan, that has always used the stick of religion to fight all separatist tendencies, now faces an Islamic threat to the survival of the state. Is there a limit to the jokes history can play? But then all of us have heard of Dr. Strangelove and black comedy. Prof. Michel Chossudovsky’s paper ‘The Destabilisation of Pakistan’ that first appeared after Benazir Bhutto’s death has become a must read in Pakistan. Could it be just a coincidence that in the last few weeks I found many a civil servant, army officers and media managers diligently pouring over it, often carefully with pencils in hands? Many others have kept copies on their office tables as part of their reading wish list.

Chossudovsky, a professor of economics at Montreal University, loves shocking his readers. Citing US National Intelligence Council and CIA (NIC-CIA) reports of 2005 he first explains the US strategic thinking of reconfiguring Pakistan, and then brings out futuristic maps, according to him being used by Pentagon for war games, that show an independent Baluchistan and large tracts of Pakistani NWFP and tribal areas incorporated in an expanded Afghanistan. This might have been scary enough for most people but he insists that the US may be providing covert support to some of the Islamic terrorists operating inside Pakistan to keep the pot burning to increase the ethnic, social and factional strife and to provide excuses for its own stay in Afghanistan and the region.

Interestingly, Chossudovsky’s rather colourful and overactive mental bladder looks heavily dependent upon the academic flows and streams of thought from Professor Stephen Cohen, America’s foremost scholar and policy expert on South Asia. Cohen in his 2004 book, Idea of Pakistan, while discussing the potential separatist threats to the Pakistani state had dealt at length the possibility of a Pashtun movement for independence egged on by Afghanistan and in time supported by India.

This week Cohen was a guest of Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) and we got the opportunity to sit for an exclusive interview for Geo TV. I asked Prof. Cohen of the possible plans and conspiracies afoot to destabilise Pakistan. Denying vociferously that the US can ever be part of any such moves against Pakistan he nevertheless agreed that other regional players may be involved. But he insisted that whatever they may do the Islamic extremists in Pakistan’s tribal areas represent a clear and present danger in their own right. And there is no denying that he has a point.

The fact is: ever since the 1971 creation of Bangladesh — as a result of political failure, civil war and Indian intervention — Pakistanis remain mortally afraid of any secessionist tendencies that may arise and the congenital enemies of Pakistan are continuously waiting, now for almost 37 years, for more break ups to happen.

These natural fears and dark hopes may be somewhat exaggerated for most new and developing states that continue to suffer from such centrifugal tendencies. And since the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistani state has successfully fought and warded off separatist movements in Baluchistan and Sindh.

However, the repeated Islamist mini-insurgencies in the federally-administrated tribal areas bordering Afghanistan — by obscure mullahs that sport beards of various sizes and possess state-of-the-art encryption technologies — are giving a new meaning to these historic fears and hopes. Fortunately or by design, the tribal insurgents, at least so far, have not demanded independence in unambiguous geographical terms. What they often demand is enforcement of Sharia law or the freedom to fight infidel Americans in the neighbouring Afghanistan. In other words what they want are separate ways and lives.

But the problem is: political configurations are like marriages. Any marriage to continue will need both partners — or in case of mullahs all five partners — to have a common world view. Once a common world view fails, or falters, most marriages — except of feudal and tribal cultures — end, unless you want to keep the other partner with a shot gun pointed at head or still better: chained in the basement. Islamist insurgents’ separate world view leaves Pakistani state with no real options except to fight them out in the short run and conquer the minds of their children.

Bangladesh separation in 1971 lead to the repeatedly asserted political aphorism that Islam was a weak bond or glue for state building. And many of those who publish maps of a reconfigured Pakistan, within the US, are relying upon the assumption that a break up into pure ethnic units guarantees greater stability. They are wrong, for there may be elements of truth in the mid-twentieth century paradigms but then the recent struggle inside Pakistani periphery is more complex; if anything this is a contest inside the mind of Islam between those who are exposed to modernity and those who have been left behind in the medieval age.

The assumption of all those who once fervently thought that Islam can be a unifying force was that one God, one book and one prophet provides a common ground for a shared world view. That may not be totally untrue and could certainly provide a basis to build something where nothing exists, but in this age of globalisation and You-tube much more is needed for sustaining a marriage — civil or political — than a simple agreement on basics.

Today Muslims living across the world have different world views, often sharing little beyond grievances against the West. Even within Pakistan world view differs from city to city but, however different it may be, it still has strong common themes that bind people like different coloured beads in a string. But Pakistani state, in the last 61 years, due to its administrative style, inherited from the British, failed to offer structures in the tribal areas that could have connected them with the rest of Pakistan beyond the historic bond of Islam.

No wonder tribal cultures have been left in a time warp, sharing little with the rest of Pakistan — except the age-old narrative of Islam, and a perennial distrust of the West. And here lies the communication challenge.

The events of the last few weeks, from Afghanistan to Bangalore to Kashmir, have made it obvious that the mutual accommodation which India and Pakistan had negotiated with each other in 2003-04 has broken down. Whosoever is at fault, there is no option but to come to a new arrangement. Islamabad needs India to stop meddling in its tribal areas, whatever quid pro quo it may take. But once it gets the political breathing space it has to work on developing the structures that provides the common world view. If it again failed, then Michel Chossudovsky’s maps and NIC-CIA reports will start to make increasing sense.

Whose Terrorists are They Anyway?

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Whose Terrorists are They Anyway?

Moeed Pirzada | Khaleej Times |

President Franklin D. Roosevelt had once said about Nicaraguan strongman, Anastosio Somoza, that: “he may be a son-of-a-bitch, but he is our son-of-a-bitch”. Since then American political jargon has become more black and white. These days instead of borrowing colorful and sexist expressions from animal world, all bad guys, with or without beards, are clubbed together under the term: terrorists. But trust me: ownership dispute is still there.

After the tragedy of 9/11 the smart Indians were the first who made clear to Washington that unless Kashmiri insurgents and their Pakistani sponsors are declared “terrorists” New Delhi is not stupid enough to let the Pentagon enjoy its video war games with its preferred set of terrorists. Realising that the crafty Indians have understood everything and mean serious business, especially with the rather bizarre attack on the Indian parliament, Bush administration winked and agreed to widen the definition to accommodate Indian concerns.

But now things are getting more complex, if not murkier. This week it was Pakistani military now accusing the US and Bush administration of playing double games, of encouraging, protecting and sponsoring its own set of terrorists in the region and inside the Pakistani territory.

How have we reached at this unbelievably interesting juncture? Well, the tensions were brimming under the surface since the bomb attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul in the first week of July. Both Kabul and New Delhi were quick to blame the Pakistani intelligence agency, ISI, to be the mastermind of these attacks. US, which initially hesitated, soon joined in the chorus, adding that it has evidence of the involvement of the ISI in the heinous act.

And then during the Pakistani Prime Minister’s trip to Washington, in the last week of July, this became the leading front page story in America’s largest paper. In what clearly looked like a deliberate leak by the Bush administration, New York Times claimed that CIA Dy. Director Stephen Kappes had recently travelled to Pakistan to point out to the Pakistani military that it has evidence of ISI’s contacts with Taleban and its possible involvement in the Kabul bombings.

ISI thanks to a cocktail of earlier successes, its headiness and stupidities, cries of its political victims at home and a strategically targeted propaganda by its regional counterparts enjoys such a nasty reputation that virtually anything blamed on it will look credible. So when Mr. Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US, after the appearance of New York Times story, demanded that if Washington accuses then it should provide “hard evidence”. My first thought was: “My God! Mr Ambassador: What if they have it?”

But it now appears that Haqqani as a diplomat knew something which we in the media don’t have access to. Pakistani military might not have those noisy drones but shocked at the betrayal of “friends & masters”, it faithfully served over sixty years it decided to hit back with its own leaks. This week one of the largest English papers, The News, carried a story: “US told not to back terrorism against Pakistan” by the veteran journalist Kamran Khan, who is known for inside access to the mind of the defence establishment.

This story should have been more appropriately titled: “What CIA did not tell New York Times?” for it claimed that when the Stephen Kappes, Dy. Director CIA and Mike Mullen, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US travelled to Islamabad to present their case, they were given a counter briefing by the President Musharraf and top officials of the military and ISI. And Pakistanis wondered: why has their version never reached New York Times?

Basically the Pakistani side has no problem in admitting that ISI does maintain channels of communication with groups inside the Taleban resistance. But it argues that it does so for strategic reasons in the same fashion that British and NATO officials do. And this is how it recently managed to obtain release of its abducted Ambassador to Afghanistan. But it insists that evidence of such links hardly amount to any kind of culpability.

But then the Pakistani side raises its own set of awkward questions to the American side. Questions which to the minimum raise the possibility, that the US may be playing a double game. This has been a growing theme in Pakistani chatter mills for the past two years that the US activities, under the broader panoply of the war against terrorism, are fast becoming a regional agenda of diverse strategic gains and that the Indians are increasingly part of it. What the story in the The News has done is that: it has suddenly given a degree of legitimacy to the questions which were hitherto only part of the conspiracy theories.

For instance why the US has never taken notice of the fact that Baluch insurgents playing havoc with Pakistan’s energy infrastructure maintain close links to Afghan intelligence, and repeatedly visit India? After all if this is true then what are the objectives? Second, why US has failed to take action against some one like: Baitullah Mehsud, the notorious leader of the Taleban movement inside Pakistan? Even when it was provided precise actionable intelligence by the Pakistani military and when it had the clear ability to do so?

There is ample evidence to suggest that both Washington and London have refused treating Baloch insurgents as terrorists despite the mayhem they are causing. Till last year some British think tanks, allied with the ruling Labour party, were openly inviting some of the Baloch leaders, that incite violence, to address seminars in London. This is the classical example of selective definition of “terrorist”. There is no denying that Baloch militants represent separatist groups but then so are the Kashmiris in India?

But the accusations related to Baitullah Mehsud, become even more intriguing. Could it be possible that the Bush administration has its own assets among Pakistani Jihadists? Could there be a strategic logic for this? Despite the bizarre nature of these accusations these impressions, these unanswered questions have now gained wider currency.

US Double Standards

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US Double Standards

Moeed Pirzada | The News |

The turn of events since the bombings of the Indian embassy in Kabul should be of interest to anyone interested in international relations. Acts of symbolic value such as these, where clearly identifiable perpetrators exist and in which powerful forces quickly and unambiguously plead the case of one side, set the stage for re-configuring strategic equations.

Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, has now demanded that India and Afghanistan need to present hard evidence to back up their allegations against the ISI. This may be the correct logical position, but then Mr Haqqani will know more than anyone else that realpolitik is not based on hard evidence but strategic decisions.

The problem is that the ISI today — thanks to a cocktail of earlier successes, its own stupidities and strategically-targeted propaganda – enjoys such a colourful reputation that virtually anything blamed on it will look credible. Yet without knowing the inside story there are certain issues that need to be raised. First, who are the accusers here? Since Afghanistan, for all practical purposes, is a US-run territory, in reality there are two accusers: the US and India. But then one could ask what their own credibility in such matters is.

The Bush administration for its part created a smokescreen of deliberate lies, disinformation and propaganda to justify a naked war of aggression against a helpless third world country and its people. I don’t know if we can call them white collar criminals, thugs or simply modern day western politicians but irrespective of that it is important to remember that the war against Iraq and everything related to it was approved as being kosher in pursuit of America’s strategic interests – as defined by George Bush and company.

If the western world was half as just as its media and think-tanks would want us to believe, then the likes of Bush and Cheney and many of their associates would have been standing, heads down, along with Radovan Karadzic in the Hague facing a war crimes tribunal.

One may wonder if the US media – thought to be very inquisitive and questioning – provides checks and balances on the strategic designs of the US government. As far as I remember after the Iraq war some of the most prestigious news publications in America expressed remorse that they had been initially misled. And this they did for an illegal war that led to more than a million Iraqi deaths.

The bottom line here, however, is strategic interest. And the current moment has an eerie resemblance to December 2001 when in response to a rather stupid and unbelievably amateurish attack on the Indian parliament the-then Indian government took the unusual step of declaring a general mobilization against Pakistan, that was still in the motions of asking for evidence of it being implicated in the attack. Did the Bush administration, which quickly lent its support to New Delhi at that time, demand ‘hard evidence’? The subsequent case which the Indian prosecution put forward in the courts – apart from its gaping holes and inconsistencies – was hardly convincing of the regional conspiracy for which a country would create an international crisis and risk a nuclear war.

Six years later, many still wonder if there could have a war between India and Pakistan in the summer of 2002. The American view is that it mediated to prevent just such a conflict from erupting. Unfortunately a critical reading of the events draw only one conclusion: that Washington and New Delhi worked in concert to pressurized a then-besieged Musharraf into making concessions. By ordering a general mobilization, New Delhi was able to correct the regional balance which it assessed was under risk due to the events of 9/11. This also ensured that India expanded its political space in the Jammu and Kashmir where for the first time since 1989 it was able to hold a reasonably marketable election.

It will be extraordinarily naive to think of the current crisis as just an attack sponsored by ISI. It appears to have all the contours of a joint India-US initiative to wrest more concessions from Islamabad, to adjust regional balance at another new level, and this will only unfold in the next few weeks. Ironically it also timed well with the progress in the India-US nuclear deal.

The sad thing is that events since 9/11 have only served to prove correct right-wing politicians and Islamists who have said all along the anti-Pakistan India-US alliance was more or less inevitable. The liberals, who thought that America would have the sense to seek balanced ties between both Islamabad and New Delhi, have been proved wrong.

Obama: Trapped in Afghanistan?

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Obama: Trapped in Afghanistan?

Moeed Pirzada | Khaleej Times |

BARACK Obama’s whirlwind trip to Afghanistan, Iraq and the world was to burnish his credentials as the ‘would be’ Commander in Chief of the world’s sole superpower. But it ended up raising interesting questions; questions which Obama team must grapple with before it is too late.

Let’s look at the three key foreign policy issues: Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran. Obama had been, for quite sometime, articulating newer positions which raised eyebrows in the traditional establishment but earned him increased political space. The fact that Bush administration and the McCain campaign had to make important adjustments testified to the effectiveness of Obama’s political communication. But 4th November is still a hundred days ahead, and premature success can have its own problems; especially since Republicans have been successful in bringing “National Security” to the centre stage and are now prepared to dance with Obama in a tightly — embraced tango.

First look at Iraq. Obama no doubt scored fresh points when the Iraqi PM Noori Al-Maliki supported his 16-month time table for withdrawal. But his critics will never fail to point out that since Obama’s earlier positions on Iraq and his lack of enthusiasm for General David Petraeus’s “Surge” he had to revise his position. And as everyone can see he has effectively moved from left of the political field to the centre because there was no denying that “Surge” indeed delivered: violence is down and the Sunni tribes are indeed co-operating with the US forces.

Barack Obama had jolted many by arguing that, if elected, he will offer direct negotiations with enemies like Iran and Syria without pre-conditions. But now Bush administration suddenly comes up looking very reasonable by offering a face-to-face meeting with Iran without direct negotiations. And if it still does not lead to anything substantial, which probably it will not, then McCain campaign will have more mud to paint Obama as naïve.

But Afghanistan might turn out to be the most sobering experience for Obama’s foreign policy aides. Senator Obama, sharing breakfast, and empathising with the US soldiers in a canteen in Kabul, and patting affectionately on the shoulder of an Afro-American lady in uniform, made real good TV viewing. But Obama, the sharp observer, must have reflected upon other things happening in the region.

Is it just a mere co-incidence that Nato is hinting at large and more intensified actions in Pakistan’s tribal areas? Or it has something to do with the fact that for almost a year Barack Obama has been firing his little musket upon Bush administration for not doing enough in the right war: Afghanistan? No One really knows. But if between now and the US presidential election a more robust Nato action takes place inside Pakistani territories it will have its own interesting implications — and not necessarily to the advantage of Obama campaign.

It is being speculated inside Pakistan that action will take place between September and October and might not only be surgical strikes but will see Nato troops stage landing from gunship helicopters and briefly engaging the Taleban inside the Pakistani territories. I am sure all this, if happens, will generate interesting TV footage, from Pentagon cameras for Fox and CBS screens. But such action, even a limited trailer for American TV, will parade two well known realities: One, it will quickly demonstrate limitations of the use of force of which Bush administration was always aware of and which Obama team somehow finds difficult to fathom; second, the human response from the Pakistani side — with media broadcasts showing the scenes of women and children fleeing from the tribal areas — will generate its own destabilising waves across Pakistan further complicating the long term solutions for everyone including the next US administration.

The upshot of all this — from Iraq to Iran to Afghanistan — will soon be the Republicans pointing out the inexperience of Obama campaign to grapple the complexity of foreign policy. His aides can upset this specter, but they need to research more and react fast to changing circumstances and they must come up with a more nuanced understanding of regional issues.

Obama certainly displayed his ability to grasp the regional dynamics — something shown at times by the US think-tank experts but seldom by the politicians — when in a news conference in the Jordanian capital, Amman, he pointed out that US needs to work to improve trust between India and Pakistan for a lot of trouble across the Afghanistan border may be due to the Pakistani concerns regarding India.

The challenge for the Obama team however remains to show that in the context of Afghanistan while he will intensify the hunt for real culprits he also has a vision and understanding bigger than bombs, missiles and attack helicopters; that he is looking for sustainable solutions that can bring stability to this region rather than merely being reactive.

Finally, Barack Obama has a mystique. Within the US part of his popularity — and may be the fears he generates among his detractors — comes from the widely held belief that he will change the way America and the world interact with each other. And add to this: Barrack Obama today is almost as popular across the world as the likes of Bill Clinton and John F Kennedy have been, if not more. Yet, as Von Marschall, the Washington bureau Chief of German newspaper, Der Tagesspiegel, points out that he has not granted a single interview to any foreign mediaperson. Is this champion of internationalism afraid of international media?

It is true that the US Presidential candidates have to get their votes from the Americans back home and that their fate will be decided by the swings in the Mid West. But it is also a fact that the American public wants to know how successful their new President will be in dealing with the world. And what better way there could have been to demonstrate to the Americans and to the world that Barack Obama could deal with international media on issues concerning the US and the world? Unfortunately during his trip to Afghanistan his campaign team, in protecting him as their one and the only son, again displayed their lack of confidence, and this will be another issue that will haunt them in the days to come, especially since John McCain is comfortable in talking to the world.

Obama and the World

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Obama and the World

Moeed Pirzada | The News |

US Presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama, sharing breakfast with the US soldiers in a canteen in Kabul, and patting affectionately on the shoulder of an African-American female soldier in uniform, was definitely a good PR stunt. America’s next potential commander-in-chief in action establishing his credentials from a war zone. Yet the trip to Afghanistan, Iraq and the world raises interesting questions; questions which Obama team must grapple with – before it is too late.

Let’s look at it one by one: first Iraq. Obama certainly scored points when Iraqi Prime Minister Noori Al Maliki supported his 16-month timetable for withdrawal. The senator has effectively moved from the left of the political spectrum to the centre because there is no denying that the surge in Iraq has delivered: violence is down and the Sunni tribes are indeed co-operating with US forces.

Before looking at Afghanistan which is my main interest here it will be interesting to have a quick look at what is happening with Iran. The recent decision of Condoleeza Rice to allow Undersecretary of State William Burns to sit in ‘five-plus-one’ talks with Iran is an intriguing decision, especially its timing. Barack Obama had created a stir by taking a position – which he then later slightly modified – that he will offer direct negotiations with enemies like Iran and Syria and without pre-conditions. But now the Bush administration comes up looking very reasonable by seen to be participating in a face-to-face meeting without direct negotiations. If this still does not lead to anything substantial, which probably will be the case, then the McCain campaign will have more ammunition to blast Obama camp with.

But Afghanistan might become the most sobering experience for Obama’s foreign policy aides. Is it just a mere coincidence that NATO is hinting at larger and more intensified actions in Pakistan’s tribal areas? Or does this have something to do with the fact that for almost a year Obama has been criticizing the Bush administration for not doing enough in the right war, i.e. Afghanistan? No One really knows. But if between now and the US presidential election a more robust NATO action takes place inside Pakistani territories it will have its own implications.

It is being speculated by some quarters in Pakistan that action on this score could well happen in the coming months and might not only be surgical strikes but could also be NATO troops briefly engaging the Taliban on Pakistani soil. If this were to happen, there may be several consequences. The Bush administration must be aware that there will be a human response to any such action by NATO and American troops and scenes shown on TV such as of women and children fleeing from the tribal areas will have profound ramifications.

As for Obama’s advisers, they will probably like to demonstrate that in the context of Afghanistan he has a vision and understanding bigger than bombs, missiles and attack helicopters; that he is looking for sustainable solutions that bring stability to this region rather than merely being reactive.

In Kabul, this past weekend, he hinted at more comprehensive strategies but he needs to explain more. Also if he listens to Hamid Karzai – who has his own peculiar point of view – is he now going to give the same time to Pakistan’s visiting prime minister who will be in the US at the end of this month? Or still better, will he grant audience to Pakistan’s envoy Hussain Haqqani in Washington to hear the Pakistani perspective on these complex issues? Or will he do the same which John McCain accuses him off: announcing policy prescriptions without verifying the facts on the ground?

Within the US part of his popularity stems from the widely-held belief that he will change the way America and the world interact with each other. Add to this the fact that he is almost as popular across the world as Bill Clinton and John F Kennedy have been –if not more. Yet as a senior German journalist based in Washington has recently pointed out, the senator from Illinois has yet to give an interview to a foreign journalist – which makes one wonder whether or why this champion of internationalism is afraid of the international media?

It is true that the US Presidential candidates have to get their votes from the Americans back home and that their fate will be decided often by voting swings in certain battleground states, especially in America’s midwest. But it is also a fact that the American public wants to know how successful their new president will be in dealing with the world. And what better way there could have been to demonstrate to the Americans and to the world that Barack Obama can deal with international media on issues concerning the US and the world? Unfortunately during his trip to Afghanistan his campaign team again displayed their lack of confidence, and this may well become an issue that could haunt them in the days to come – particularly since John McCain is comfortable in talking to the world.

Will the US Finally Attack Pakistan?

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Will the US Finally Attack Pakistan?

Moeed Pirzada | Khaleej Times |

Great powers tend to commit great blunders. But will the US be stupid enough to destabilize Pakistan, one of the most resilient states British Empire left behind? If I have to bet whatever dollars I am left with, I will say: No. Yet Pakistani print and electronic media are abuzz with the speculations about a large scale US-lead NATO attacks inside Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Many will wonder what has brought us to this stage and what will these tactics achieve?

We are lead to believe that the immediate context may be the killing of nine US soldiers in a daring Taleban attack on a military post in Eastern Afghanistan. And Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, whose scripts and theatrics compete with most in the Bollywood, is also beating his chest blaming Pakistan and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for the recent deadly bomb attacks at the Indian embassy in Kabul.

Karzai government has also suspended various bilateral meetings with Pakistan due in Dubai, Islamabad and Kabul within the next few weeks. Amidst this fury — shared in Kabul and New Delhi — no one is prepared to remember that even in the most third-rated of the Hollywood thrillers, the most obvious suspect is usually not the murderer; while in Bollywood, mostly the usual suspect is a part of the set-up of the real villains. But this is not a piece about overrated ISI, its equally dumb enemies and those who believe in its widely-exaggerated, almost magical powers, to operate without being caught — despite under continuous surveillance by the old friends and tutors in the CIA.

Well, let me admit: this is a rather dull and dreary piece to analyse the real context of the US manoeuvring in Afghanistan. It is the election year in Washington, you know! And as expected both sides are drawing blood on the question of “National Security”. Barack Obama had always asserted that Iraq was the ‘wrong war’ that diminished American security, damaged its standing in the world and ruined its economy and his punchline has always been that it affected America’s performance in the ‘good war’ that is: Afghanistan.

Republicans wanted to fight this election on their credentials for national security and the good old John McCain, the Vietnam War veteran, was the perfect candidate in what is referred, by President Bush, as “elections in time of war”. But it appears that Obama was increasingly successful in putting McCain and the Republicans on defensive on Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is true that even Obama moved to the right on the issue of Iraq, after he had to admit that the surge under Gen. David Petraeus has shown results; but now under attack from fellow democrats, who accused him of changing his earlier stance, he has remerged on the issue with a recent Op-Ed piece in New York Times, “My Plan for Iraq”. And his plan for Iraq is intimately-linked to his plan for Afghanistan; because he wants to divert troops and resources to the ‘good war’.

The horizontal pressure, for political adjustments, being generated by Republican election machinery should be obvious from McCain’s responses. During the recent campaign stops in Albuquerque, New Mexico, the Vietnam War veteran agreed with Obama’s assertion that Bush administration had pursued a failed strategy in Iraq, though disagreed on how to proceed. But even more interesting were his comments on Afghanistan, when he agreed that security has deteriorated and the status quo is not acceptable.

It is this paradigm shift — its anticipation by the administration and the Pentagon, over the last many months, and its steep buildup over the last few weeks — that is affecting the dynamics of the military manoeuvers in Afghanistan. By now both sides fully agree that as the US forces will be withdrawn from Iraq, more of them will be sent to Afghanistan.

But what will constitute victory? This is far from clear.

First, what is needed is to differentiate between Al Qaeda and Taleban. Second, it is important to appreciate that since the US occupation and military operations post-9/11, newer realities have emerged.

The state of incessant conflict, the presence of the foreign troops in the area, repeated military operations by Pakistani forces, mounting Pashtun casualties and the inter-play of various internal and external stake-holders and regional interests have lead to new faultlines between those who represent western-style modernity and those who oppose it. Large pockets of populations who had nothing inherently against the US or the West or Islamabad have been compelled to take positions on all sorts of religious, cultural and social issues they would have ignored altogether in the absence of conflict in the region.

US forces have in the last few years attacked several times; someone argues almost 46 times. Hundreds have perished in such attacks. But it has only exaggerated the polarisation in this area. Fresh and larger attacks will further destabilize elected governments, ensure a longer running conflict, and send waves of Pashtun immigrants to other parts of Pakistan, most notably Karachi — which, many will not know, is world’s largest Pashtun city.

These days everyone, from journalists in Rocky Mountains to taxi drivers in New Mexico, has developed a license to point out the failures of the Pakistani state. But little do they realize that Pakistan has successfully absorbed the shockwaves of four decades of internecine conflict in the region; which only testifies to the resilience of the state structures British had left behind.

Hot pursuits will help in creating the right impressions of something being done in Afghanistan; in an election year, it will look mighty good on the screens of Fox and CBS; the only problem is it won’t offer any sustainable solution on the ground — if anything, it will increase the burdens on the strained state structures of Pakistan that are still standing after four decades of war in the neighbourhood.

Making Sense of Nuclear Divide in Musharraf Country

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Making Sense of Nuclear Divide in Musharraf Country

Moeed Pirzada | Khaleej Times |

Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr AQ Khan’s recent pronouncements implicating President Musharraf and the army in clandestine nuclear proliferation, and the storm that erupted once again demonstrated the country’s deeply polarised politics.

Western writers and columnists had often referred to Allah, Army and the Atom bomb as the uniting factors in Pakistani consciousness. Now it appears as if even this is questionable; nothing is above politics and there is no definition of national interest- not anymore.

Dr Khan’s statements are not being treated as an individual act of desperation. Far from it. The ease of restrictions upon him after the Feb 18th elections; his repeated interviews with national and international press and his recent utterances all point to that context of deliberate encouragement and moral support in which he has launched his salvos against Musharraf, army and thus by implication the state of Pakistan. But who are the people egging him on? This “motley crowd” includes the politicians whose hatred of Musharraf extends beyond the necessities of politics; ultra-nationalist retired army officers and the Islamists like Qazi Hussain Ahmed who treat Musharraf as an American appendage and the civil society activists who think that exit of Musharraf will reduce American influence, cut army to its size and will strengthen constitutionalism. All of these have at one time or the other used AQ Khan as a symbol of whatever was wrong with Musharraf. Except for the politicians whose reasons against Musharraf are purely emotional; the common uniting theme among the other groups is distrust of the United States and hatred of Musharraf, whom they see as a vital component of the American design in Pakistan.

AQ Khan’s utterances that have progressed in a very calculating fashion since the easing of restrictions upon him are supposed to meet two strategic objectives:

One, to malign Musharraf in Pakistani politics providing popular symbols of hatred against him now that the Chief Justice has started to fade; Second is the hope that this “disclosure” will put Musharraf’s sympathisers within the US on defensive, will shrink his support and will help in kicking him out.

But will this really happen? Lets look at the second possibility: international scene.

These ‘disclosures’ come almost eight years after the alleged transfer of centrifuges to North Korea. And these eight years have changed the field and issues in many ways.

|There’s no denying that in his mind — and to some researchers looking for sensational topics for new books — Dr Khan, itching to speak out ‘the truth’ is still very important. But many others, who are actually interested in the subject of non-proliferation rather than obsessed with the so-called Muslim bomb, will remember that since he was removed as head of the KRL laboratories in 2001, he has little real relevance to the networks that now exist. Also, the six-party talks with North Korea have moved much ahead. And though both sides still have reservations, North Korea has agreed in principle to dismantle its nuclear installations and the US has agreed in principle to take it off the list of “states sponsoring terror”.

President Bush has already announced easing trade sanctions imposed on North Korea.

And given the tacit understanding between the Bush administration and Musharraf that whatever happened did happen in the past, the biggest requirement of the US and the international community has been that Pakistan should strengthen its export controls and oversight abilities.

And repeatedly the visiting US officials and non-proliferation experts have expressed their confidence in Pakistan’s institutional controls, put into place with the establishment of Strategic Planning Division.

In this respect, the recent testimony of Michael Kreppon, of the Henry L. Stimson Center, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, is worth reading.

Also, a very significant development has been the proposed Indo-US nuclear co-operation deal that is once again being given a shot before the end of the Bush presidency. It has changed the whole discussion of non-proliferation in a considerable fashion.

Now it is true that some researchers, over-zealous non-proliferation experts, writers and certain lobbies and interest groups that are passionate about this issue as it provides an opportunity to curtail the autonomy of the Pakistani state will certainly raise temperature inside Washington within the next few weeks.

However, many others will also be reading the real intentions and ideological leanings of the ‘motley crowd’ that is pushing the agenda against Musharraf, which in this instance, has strong overtones of anti-Americanism and disregard for international concerns. Now coming back to the first possibility: the domestic scene; it is apparent that people on the street see Dr. Khan as a national hero humiliated by Musharraf following America’s orders.

This can certainly strengthen the hands of the anti-Musharraf forces as they make another fresh bid to throw him out by a show of raw street power.

However, by employing Dr. Khan as a symbol of political unity they are again going to demonstrate their serious disconnect with the world around them. This is a repeat of the confusion seen on the eve of the Lal Masjid crisis.

Musharraf’s mother might have been rightly worried for his academic future; and many politicians may be right when they describe him as a reasonably standardized military officer with the “war, women and wine” kind of vision you imbibe from military academies.

Problem is after Benazir’s sudden exit and the antics of the political lot since Feb 18, he has started to look like a visionary; at least someone with a coherent world view.

And by attempting to use Dr. Khan as a political symbol, his opponents might force his supporters internally and externally to cling more desperately around him thus giving him longevity. This is called the law of unintended consequences.

Finally, the net outcome of all the mud- slinging can be an increased leverage of the US over the Pak army forcing the military to make even bigger concessions in the war against terrorism. And this alone testifies to the worldview of the ‘motley crowd’ that encouraged the wizard of the KRL to launch his missiles.

Nuclear Divide of Politics

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Nuclear Divide of Politics

Moeed Pirzada | The News |

Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan’s statements are being treated as an individual act of desperation. Far from that the ease of restrictions upon him after the Feb 18th elections, his repeated interviews with national and international press and his recent utterances all point to that context of deliberate encouragement and moral support in which he has launched his salvos against Musharraf, army and thus by implication the state of Pakistan.

But who were the ones egging him on? This “motley crowd” consists of the politicians whose hate of Musharraf extends beyond the necessities of politics; ultra-nationalist retired army officers and the Islamists like Qazi Husain Ahmed who treat Musharraf as an American appendage and the civil society activists who think that exit of Musharraf will reduce American influence, cut army to size and will strengthen constitutionalism. Except for the politicians whose reasons against Musharraf are purely emotional; the common uniting theme among the other groups is mistrust of the United States and hatred of Musharraf.

Khan’s utterances –that have progressed in a very calculating fashion since the easing of restrictions upon him- are supposed to meet two strategic objectives: One, to malign Musharraf in Pakistani politics providing popular symbols of hatred against him now that the chief justice has started to fade; Second is the hope that this “great disclosure” will put Mascara’s sympathizers within the US on defensive, will shrink his support and will help in kicking him out.

But will this really happen? Let’s look at the second possibility: international scene. This “great disclosure” comes almost eight years after the alleged transfer of centrifuges to North Korea. And these eight years have changed the field and issues in many ways. No denying that in his mind–and to some researchers looking for sensational topics for their new books, or second editions – Dr. Qadeer, itching to speak out to announce his truth, is still very important. But many others- who are actually interested in the subject of non-proliferation rather than obsessed with Muslim bomb-will remember that since he was removed as head of the KRL laboratories in 2001, he has little real relevance to the networks that now exist.

Also the six–party talks with North Korea have moved much ahead; and though both sides still have reservations but North Korea has agreed in principle to dismantle its nuclear installations and the US has agreed in principle to take her out of the list of the “Axis of Evil”. President Bush already announced easing trade sanctions imposed against North Korea under the “Trading with the Enemy Act”.

And given the tacit understanding between the Bush Administration and the Mush government, after Khan’s dramatic confessions in 2004- that whatever happened did happen in the past – the biggest requirement of the US and the international community has been that Pakistan should strengthen its export controls and oversight abilities. And repeatedly the visiting US officials and non-proliferation experts have expressed their confidence in Pakistan’s institutional controls, put into place with the establishment of Strategic Planning Division. (SPD). Also a very significant development has been the proposed Indo-US nuclear civil co-operation deal that is once again being given a shot before the end of the Bush Presidency and that has changed the whole subject and discussion of non-proliferation in a considerable fashion.

Now it is true that to some this issue provides an opportunity to curtail the autonomy of the Pakistani state by raising temperature inside Washington beltway within the next few weeks. However many others will also be reading the real intentions and ideological leanings of the motley crowd that is pushing the agenda against Musharraf.

Now coming back to the first possibility: the domestic scene; it is apparent that people on the street see Dr. Khan as a national hero humiliated by Pervez Musharraf under American tutelage. This can certainly strengthen the hands of the anti-Musharraf forces as they make another fresh bid to throw him out through show of street force. However by employing Dr. Khan as a symbol of political unity they are again going to demonstrate their serious disconnect with the world around them. This is a repeat of the confusion seen at the eve of the “Lal Masjid crisis”.

Musharraf, and as we look at the fruitless antics of the political lot since February 18, has started to look like a visionary; at least someone with a coherent world view. And by attempting to use Dr Khan as a political symbol, this “motley crowd” might force his supporters internally and externally to cling more desperately around him thus giving him longevity. Finally the net outcome of all the mud wrangling can be increased leverage of the US over Pakistani army forcing the army to make even bigger concessions in the war against terrorism. And this alone testifies to the worldview of the “motley crowd” that encouraged the wizard of the KRL to launch his missiles.

Why the Israelis are Afraid of a Peaceful Iran

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Why the Israelis are Afraid of a Peaceful Iran

Moeed Pirzada | Khaleej Times |

Israeli cabinet has done a very interesting thing. Almost two years after the Second Lebanon war of 2006 it has approved a prisoner swap with Hezbollah.

Remains of the two Israeli soldiers — Edud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev — will be exchanged for Lebanese prisoners including Samir Kantar. The deal, we hear, has been mediated by the German foreign minister: Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

Ironically, these two Israeli soldiers were captured by Hezbollah for the unequivocal purpose of prisoner exchange including Samir Kantar in the July of 2006. While the Israeli PM, military chief and the Israeli cabinet had declared war against Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah had warned that “not war but indirect negotiations” will lead to the release of the soldiers.

So is it that after two years of this disastrous war to recover its two soldiers — that destroyed Lebanon and killed almost 1300 civilians half of them children — Israeli cabinet has finally agreed to the proposal of Hassan Nasrallah? Only to receive the remains of the Goldwesser and Regev?

But before you reach any conclusions, remember that Israelis are the best masters of deception; they may say one thing and do another.

So look at this counter-narrative: 2006 Lebanon war was never to release the soldiers. It was an attempt to destroy the Hezbollah. Israel not only failed but also ended up risking IDF’s otherwise formidable reputation as a war machine.

It grudgingly accepted Hezbollah’s resilience but reached the conclusion that it is Iran that needs to be dealt with and once it is fixed the rest of the regional challenges will fade into insignificance.

Now fast forward to June of 2008: Israel is maintaining a tense peace with the Palestinians in Gaza, indirect talks with Syrians and swapping prisoners with Hezbollah. Quiet lovey-dovey; so where is the real catch?

We hear of Israel’s unprecedented military exercises over Mediterranean with 100 F-15?s and F-16?s displaying its ability to hit targets inside Iran; we read the scoops of Samuel Hirsch in New Yorker and we read the repeated rumours of the Israeli plans to attack Iran all by itself — rumours that are skillfully released in media throughout the cross-Atlantic world.

But notwithstanding Israel’s show of power and its military prowess; we now know that any attack on Iran — however controlled and surgical in nature — will have repercussions that cannot be managed without the help of the US. And Israelis know that. So what is happening?

Could there be a connection to the forthcoming US elections? Though Barack Obama is now tempering his earlier statements of direct talks with Iran and Syria without pre-conditions, Israelis instinctively understand that his coming to power — which increasingly looks likely — may mean a change in the US approach to the Middle East and Iran. But what is at stake?

Israel is the dominant military and political power in the Middle East. And given its clout in the US, no US administration will ever allow Iran or any other Middle Eastern power to pose a threat to Israel.

The US National Intelligence Estimate had assessed that Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons programme in 2003; Israel does not agree with the conclusions. According to its own estimate, Iran is two years away from developing a nuclear device. So what is driving Israel crazy at this moment?

One of the greatest proponents of a preventive war against Iran is: Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

In August last year, he was invited to BBC’s Heckler’s programme at Chatham House, UK’s prominent think tank.

His argument was: “It’s better to have a war with Iran than a nuclear Iran.” The opponents of Patrick Clawson took the position that even a nuclear Iran can be managed and made to behave through the traditional balance of power approaches. Clawson’s argument was that this does not apply to clerical Iran as it is an irrational player.

And then right in front of our eyes, this neo-con shot himself in the foot.

Someone pointed out that at the terminal end of Iran-Iraq war in 1988, if Iran were irrational it would have extended the war into Saddam’s Iraq. An excited Clawson shouted that the shooting down of the Iranian civilian airliner by the US Navy sent the right message to Imam Khomeini.

But the moment Clawson uttered that he realised his own mistake: in a flash he had admitted that Iran even under the supposedly evil influence of Imam Khomeini was not irrational enough to confront the US might. The debate ended. Could it be that what Israelis fear most is a normal-looking Iran? An Iran that is no more classified as the Axis of Evil? An Iran that is subject to balance of power and has the potential to normalise relations with a new US administration in Washington?

The reality is: despite Israel’s self-serving exaggerations and misplaced pride of some Muslim commentators, Iran is at best a developing state with serious limitations.

If it becomes nuclear it will still not constitute an existential threat to Israel; for it will be subject to the age old constraints of the balance of power.

However, with its 75-million population and a political system that is more broad-based than all other Middle Eastern states, it constitutes a geo-strategic balance. And with normalised relations with the US and the EU it will erode Israel’s pre-eminence in Middle East.

Now this is definitely the threat that the smart minds in Tel Aviv understand pretty well.

Ironically, the current Israeli attempts to force a showdown in Middle East may resonate well with the Republicans and their neocon remnants.

Let’s not forget Bush was granted first victory by the daddy’s hand-picked Supreme Court; second was on the wave of misplaced American patriotism due to the imagined threat from the conquered “Iraq and its Al Qaeda”. And now Republicans may well be saved from a sure short electoral rout by another fresh conflict in the Middle East. We need to take the assertions of Samuel Hirsh seriously.

But this combined neocon and Israeli attempt may thus be as much against Iran as it is against the interest of the US voters who desire and deserve a change. It is time to revisit John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s The Israel Lobby. The interests of the US and the lobby may not always be the same.

A Forgotten President and Shape of Things to Come

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A Forgotten President and Shape of Things to Come

Moeed Pirzada | Khaleej Times |

Gen. Musharraf, once the darling of the mini-screen, has gradually disappeared from the Pakistani television. Some days ago even the most primitive of the ships, the state broadcaster, was asked to dump him. But then last week he staged a comeback. And of all the screens, on Geo TV, his nemesis.

Geo had acquired the rights to Sabiha Sumar’s internationally recognised documentary: “Dinner with the President” Sabiha is a Pakistani but her co-producer Dr. Sathanathan is of Sri Lankan origins, working together they are able to fuse an internal view with an external comment.

The film was recently awarded the grand jury prize at the UAE film festival and short-listed at the Sundance Cinema Competition. But to most Pakistanis these were issues of secondary importance. To them, it was shocking that the hero of this cinematographic product whom narrator approached again and again in her quest to understand the country was Pakistan’s President: Pervez Musharraf.

Part of the answer lay in the fact the documentary was conceived at a time when he was indeed at the centre stage; but then all novels, films and documentaries deal with slices of history and end up raising questions.

Sabiha Sumar’s documentary serves an important function: It takes us back to an era in which Musharraf was the darling of the liberals and public at large was wary of the corrupt politicians. So we end up with at least two basic questions: One, was Musharraf ever really popular in Pakistan? And second, if yes, then how the maligned politician staged a comeback?

Reflecting back on all those years I think that we have to admit that Musharraf was at the crest of at least two waves of popular sentiments:

One, in October of 1999 when he kicked out Nawaz Sharif’s government that was constitutionally strong but had lost all political steam; Second, immediately after 9/11 when he was seen as a messiah by the chattering liberal classes for taking a quick decision to align himself with the United States against Taleban.

The American connection once formed Musharraf’s support base. But gradually it became his biggest liability as well as he was increasingly seen as an American stooge, perceived to be against the interests of Pakistan.

Ultimately, all governments and regimes suffer from anti-incumbency feelings, so there is hardly any point shedding tears for their demise. But for our understanding of the second question as to how politicians strike a comeback, it is important to emphasise that Musharraf’s popularity was essentially a function of the media, the civil society NGOs and liberal chattering classes. That is, in other words opinionated and opinion-making sections of the society but the politician’s support base remained intact backed by the chatter of these opinionated circles — thanks mostly to the feudal vote banks.

No doubt votes are almost always cast on local issues and affiliations but feudal vote banks are captured territories where large pockets of populations remain trapped in age-old narratives of religion, ego and respect. This becomes most obvious when we look at the PPP’s support base.

All negative discussions emanating from print and electronic media produced very little dents in the PPP vote banks in Sindhi and Saraiki belts; which may be disappointing to liberals like Sabiha Sumar who want democracy to be a tool for opening up the political landscape for change.

However, Nawaz Sharif’s vote bank represents somewhat of an interesting change and may be an indication of the times to come.

Even looking casually at the results of the 2008 elections we can see that Nawaz skilfully created a wave in the large Punjabi heartland from Pindi in the north to the Lahore in the South and up to Faisalabad.

A historian like Ayesha Jalal or political scientists at LUMS should study its real significance but I see an interesting pattern developing. In the United States, they use the term Bible belt, to allude to the influence of religion and televangelists. In the context of Pakistan we should consider a new term: “Media belt”.

Sharif seems to have derived support from areas clustered around the old GT road with large pockets of populations, which in the context of Pakistan, are more affluent, literate if not educated, upwardly mobile and also absorb the maximum impact of Urdu print and electronic media and thus have been the focus of the lawyers movement.

So can we argue that a new kind of voting belt is being created where people are more aware of the larger issues, of national causes and increasingly form opinions under the spell of Urdu media?

If this is true then the long term strategic importance of some media groups to make Lahore their operational base should be analysed seriously.

So whereas PPP is seen as a liberal party, because of the presence of better-educated, more anglicised leadership at the top, the likes of Aitzaz Ahsan, Sherry Rehman, Raza Rabbani and the support of the old left-leaning intellectuals in the print media; the overall vote bank of PPP is generally rural, more under-developed and isolated from the larger currents of consciousness. They persist with an internal narrative of Islam, ego, respect and gender roles that has not been penetrated effectively by the mass media.

But then this is the trend that may frighten many in the liberal circles. Sabiha Sumar’s documentary saw Sharif as the PM who was in pact with the Islamists to make the Holy Quran the supreme law of the land.

And I do hear the chatter especially by the Western and American diplomats that Nawaz and the PML (N) represent a sophisticated face of the Islamists. This fear may be exaggerated, especially when it is used as an assessment of Sharif or his associates, but has certain elements that are interesting.

Sabiha had identified her documentary as a personal journey; populations have political journeys. And when they move out of the stranglehold of feudalism, as Sharif supporters are doing — and as PPP voters will do at some stage — they pass through phases of nationalism or religious identities. The US diplomats and Pakistani liberals may be right in seeing a connection, and a continuum, between Nawaz Sharif’s support base and religious parties but they may themselves be responsible for pushing things in that direction.

Dinner with the President?

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Dinner with the President?

Moeed Pirzada | The News |

This week, hundreds of thousands of people across Pakistan ended up watching the documentary “Dinner with the President” co-produced by acclaimed filmmakers Sabiha Soomar and Dr Sathanathan.

Sabiha is Pakistani but her co-producer, Dr Sathanathan, is Sri Lankan in origin. Working together they are able to fuse an internal view with an external comment. The film was recently awarded the Grand Jury Prize at the UAE Film Festival and shortlisted at the Sundance Cinema Competition. But that is not why it looked shockingly different; it was different because its hero, whom the narrator approached again and again in her quest to understand the country, was Pakistan’s president, Gen (retired) Pervez Musharraf.

Given the changed times and moods it is not easy to predict how most Pakistanis viewed this film. But I am sure one man, one retired general, was watching somewhere sitting in Army House, thinking, what went wrong?

Sabiha Soomar’s documentary introduces Musharraf as the hero who had replaced a prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, and takes us back to an era in which Musharraf was the darling of the liberals and the public at large wary of the corrupt politicians. So we end up with at least two basic questions: One, was Gen Musharraf ever really popular in Pakistan? And how the maligned politicians staged a comeback?

Gen Musharraf was at the crest of at least two waves of popular sentiments: One, in October of 1999 when he kicked out Nawaz Sharif’s government that was constitutionally strong but had lost all political steam; two, immediately after 9/11, when he was seen as a messiah by the chattering liberal classes for taking a quick decision to align himself with the United States against Taliban.

The American connection was Musharraf’s support base but gradually it was his biggest liability as well, as he was increasingly seen as a stooge perceived to be against the interests of Pakistan. For our understanding of the second question, as to how politicians strike a comeback, it is important to emphasise that Musharraf’s popularity was essentially a function of the media, the civil society NGO’s and the chattering liberal circles – in other words, opinion-making sections of the society – but the politicians’ support base remained intact, thanks mostly to the feudal vote banks.

Feudal vote banks are captured territories where large pockets of populations remain trapped in age-old narratives of religion, ego and respect. This becomes most obvious when we look at the PPP’s support base. All negative discussions emanating from the print and electronic media produced very little dents in the PPP vote banks in the Sindhi and Saraiki belts. However, Nawaz Sharif’s vote bank represents somewhat of an interesting change and may be an indication of the times to come.

Even looking casually at the results of the 2008 elections we can see that Nawaz skilfully created a wave in the large Punjabi heartland from ‘Pindi in the north to Lahore in the South and up to Faislabad. In the United States they use the term Bible Belt to allude to the influence of religion and televangelists. In the context of Pakistan we should consider a new term: “Media Belt.”

Nawaz seems to have derived support from areas clustered around the old G T Road with large pockets of populations, which in the context of Pakistan are more affluent, literate if not educated, and upwardly mobile, who also absorb the maximum impact of Urdu print and electronic media and thus bore the brunt of the lawyers’ movement. So can we argue that a new kind of voting belt is being created where people are more aware of the larger issues of national causes and increasingly form opinions under the spell of the Urdu media? If this is true, then the long-term strategic importance of some media groups to make Lahore their operational base should be analysed seriously.

So, whereas the PPP is seen as the liberal party – because of the presence of the better educated, more anglicised leadership at the top: the likes of Aitzaz Ahsan, Sherry Rehman and Raza Rabbani, and the support of the old left intellectuals in the print media – the overall vote bank of the PPP is generally rural, more under-developed and isolated from the larger currents of consciousness. They persist with an internal narrative of Islam, ego, respect and gender roles which has not been penetrated effectively by the mass media.

Sabiha Soomar’s documentary saw Nawaz Sharif as the prime minister who was in pact with the Islamists to make the Quran the supreme law of the land. And I do hear the chatter that western diplomats, especially the Americans, feel that Nawaz and the PML(N) represent a sophisticated face of the Islamists. This fear may be exaggerated, especially when it is used as an assessment of Nawaz or his associates, but it has certain elements that are interesting.

Sabiha had identified her documentary as a personal journey. Populations have political journeys. And when they move out of the stranglehold of feudalism – as PPP voters will do at some stage – they pass through phases of nationalism or religious identities. US diplomats and Pakistani liberals may be right in seeing a connection between Nawaz Sharif’s support base and the religious parties, but they may themselves be responsible for pushing things in that direction.

Fighting the Wrong War

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Fighting the Wrong War

Moeed Pirzada | The News |

With the confirmation of Sen Barack Obama as the Democratic nominee for the US presidential election and with President Bush’s last official trip across Europe, a clear mood of change has set in. With this the strategic relationship Pakistan and the United States had forged after 9/11 has also reached a point of transition. It is true that change offers opportunities but is almost always fraught with difficulties. And the transcript of the last few days does not reflect very well.

The key events of these days–the hearing of the US Senate committee on Homeland Security; US air attacks against a Pakistani border post, resulting in the deaths of 11 Pakistani soldiers; unusually belligerent statements of Afghan president Hamid Karzai, and the series of reactive comments that have emanated from the Pakistani side–have all resonated in this atmosphere of mutual suspicion and insecurity.

Democratic Sen Thomas R Carper, who presided over the Senate hearings, seemingly forgot that he was a member of the US upper house and spoke more as if he were on Fox TV. With a classic mix of hyperbole and irresponsibility he borrowed colourful expressions from the US media to describe Pakistan as the most dangerous country in the world. Since septuagenarian Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution looms large in the minds of the Pakistani media, his cynical comments almost drowned out the more professional testimonies offered by Donald Camp, deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry Stimson Centre and Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation.

As for the attack in Mohmand Agency, it could be that it was nothing more than a tragic mistake. Unfortunately, in most Pakistani minds this is a non-verbal communication from the US. This perception has been strengthened by the kind of attitude with which it was treated. First the Americans defended it on technical grounds, then a video was about to be released, but it was soon discovered that the video was not complete; finally, to shelve the matter, a joint enquiry has been ordered.

Gen Dan K McNeil, the outgoing NATO commander, gave a press conference at the UN a few days after this tragedy. He was summing up the challenge in Afghanistan but, among other things, he narrated how he was “forever scarred” by what he described as the killing of an American major and another soldier by Pakistan’s Frontier Constabulary in 2007 and 2002, respectively. He was right; lives are scarred when such tragic accidents happen. However what most on the American side fail to realise that hundreds and thousands of lives have also been scarred on the Pakistani side and while those who perished might merely be numbers for the Americans, for their families and communities they were also fully human, like the American major who was killed. And such repeat losses do translate into political problems for Pakistan–despite all the insensitivity or helplessness of its ruling elite.

The aggressiveness of the ongoing US diplomacy also reflected in the truculence of the comments that were issued through Hamid Karzai; who defended his right to attack Pakistani territory. And despite the fact that few in Pakistan take Mr Karzai as anything but a US spokesman, President Bush, standing next to Gordon Brown in London, affirmed support to Mr Karzai, precisely on this point.

So what has changed? Yes, there is a new government in Islamabad and Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N that supports the government from the outside is trying to get rid of President Musharraf, and that might be far too quick or upsetting in the US calculus. It is also true that the new government has tried offering peace deals to the militants in FATA and Swat, much to the dislike of America. But I suspect more than all these causes there is a paradigm shift taking place inside Washington, and that relates to withdrawing from the wrong war – Iraq – and focusing on the right war–Afghanistan–as Barack Obama has been saying all along on his campaign trail.

The very fact that the outgoing administration of George Bush seems to be embracing this idea testifies to the increasing political space gained by the Democrats, forcing the Republicans to make adjustments. Last week, while still in Europe, President Bush warned the British prime minister against setting any timetable for troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, and then he managed to extract promises of even more British troops.

If Britain can be cajoled against the better judgment of its government, think-tanks and media, then Pakistan’s fate is for it to be pushed and kicked into giving in more on the issue of Afghanistan–even if it violates its own deeply held understanding of the ground realities. Sadly, it still only promises a longer conflict in the region, without any hope of a sustainable resolution. Afghanistan may be the right war, but many wonder if it is not being fought for the wrong ends.

US Diplomacy of Desperation?

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US Diplomacy of Desperation?

Moeed Pirzada | Khaleej Times |

US Ambassador to Pakistan, Ms. Anne Patterson, was distributing awards in a ceremony organised by Roots College International in Islamabad when a former student, Sarmad Khurram, now at Harvard, refused accepting his award. He was protesting against the unprovoked US air strike inside Pakistan’s tribal areas. This must have been a rare “Rosa Parks” moment in Ambassador Patterson’s period in rather obedient Pakistan.

Young students were protesting against last week’s US air attacks on Pakistani territory in which 11 Pak soldiers including a senior officer died. Though Ms. Patterson, a seasoned career diplomat, told the protesting students what every diplomat will that America deeply regretted the incident there was little evidence, on the ground, to support that.

I would like to believe too that the attack on the Pakistani post could have been a pure tragic mistake. But in most Pakistani minds, this is a message, a stern warning, from the US to Pakistan, its people, the new democratic government and key institutions to keep them on the track in what is commonly referred to as the war on terrorism.

This perception has been strengthened by the kind of attitude with which this incident and the loss of Pakistani lives was treated. First the Americans defended it on technical grounds, then a video was released to confirm the US version. But soon Pentagon realised that the video did not back its claim. Finally to shelf the matter, a joint enquiry has been ordered.

When immediately after 9/11, Hamid Karzai first appeared on the international scene as a hybrid of history and modernity with that beautiful mix of his traditional Afghan shawl and American accent, British author Tariq Ali, while speaking as a guest of late Edward Said, at Columbia University, New York, had predicted that he will soon end up in Milan fashion show.

Last week Karzai, following up on the air strike was issuing threats of attacking his nuclear-armed neighbour. Now it is hardly a secret that when Karzai speaks, the world listens because it knows that whereas video is coming from Kabul, the audio is being played by Washington. So there was hardly any need for the US President to support Karzai’s assertions while standing next to Gordon Brown in London. So much for Ms. Patterson’s regrets. Sometimes I really feel sorry for highly educated career diplomats — especially when you have to serve a dyslexic president.

But before I conjecture as to why the US diplomacy is fast exhibiting symptoms of desperation, look at this irony!

Gen. Dan McNeil, the outgoing NATO Commander did a Pentagon news conference soon after this tragedy. He was summing up the challenge in Afghanistan but among other things he narrated how he was “forever scarred” by what he described as the assassination of Maj. Larry J Bauguess and the killing of another soldier by Pakistan’s frontier constabulary in 2007 and 2002 respectively. He was right; lives are scarred when such tragic accidents happen.

However, what most on the US side fail to realise that hundreds and thousands of lives have also been scarred on the Pakistani side and while those who perished might merely be numbers for the Americans, for their families and communities they were fully human like Maj. Larry Baughuess. And such repeat losses do translate into political problems for Pakistan — despite all the insensitivity or helplessness of its ruling elite.

So what has changed? True, there is a new government in Islamabad and Nawaz Sharif’s PMLN that supports the government from the outside is trying to get rid of President Musharraf and that might be far too quick or upsetting in the US calculus.

It is also true that the new government has tried offering peace deals to the militants in FATA and Swat that looks like a risky initiative to the US. But I suspect these are toppings on the ice cream; in reality there is a paradigm shift taking place inside Washington, and that relates to withdrawing from the wrong war, that is, Iraq and focusing on the ‘right’ war in Afghanistan — as Barack Obama has been shouting all along during his campaign.

The very fact that the outgoing Republican administration of George Bush seems to be embracing this idea testifies to the increasing political space gained by the Democrats forcing Republicans to make adjustments. Last week, President Bush while he was still in Europe warned the British PM against setting any timetable for troops with-drawl from Afghanistan and then during their joint press conference in London he managed to extract promises of even more British troops.

If Britain can be cajoled against the better judgment of its government, think tanks and the media then Pakistan’s fate is to be pushed and kicked into giving in more on the issue of Afghanistan — even if it violates its own deeply held understanding of the ground realities. Sadly, it still only promises a longer conflict in the region, without any hope of a sustainable resolution. Afghanistan may be the right war, but many wonder if it is being fought for the right ends and by right means?

This was precisely the question raised simultaneously by two Brits: Editor Philip Stephen and Professor Anatoly Lieven of the Kings College London. Writing in Financial Times, on the eve of the Donors Conference for Afghanistan in Paris, both wondered: What will constitute victory for the West in Afghanistan?

Lieven was amazed at the contrast between the western governments’ public stance of “defeat in Afghanistan unthinkable” and private admissions of “defeat inevitable” and advised to come up with a narrowly defined victory objectives like the killing of OBL.

Lieven observes that any sustained peace in Afghanistan will be impossible unless its immediate neighbours do not have a stake in it. And here you come across a troubling question: Has US ever seriously pondered what is at stake for Pakistan in Afghanistan?

Without asking some of the fundamental questions, I am afraid a new US administration will waste another five years, chasing ghosts of imagined and real enemies across the mountains of Afghanistan in search of a Pyrrhic victory for the whole western alliance.

Making Sense of the Long March of Lawyers

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Making Sense of the Long March of Lawyers

Moeed Pirzada | Khaleej Times |

Words are not just words. They are powerful symbols and often pregnant with historical images. And the genie of those images may un-bottle itself to play havoc. That is why I wonder in amazement as to what is the true meaning and perhaps more importantly what will be the implications of Pakistani lawyers’ long march on Islamabad?

Aitzaz Ahsan, the unquestioned architect of the Lawyers Movement, is more aware of the history of 20th century than most others who are commenting on the Long March right and left and must have given some thought before deciding to borrow this historic term. Yet it appears the tiny incongruities between the two realities might have escaped his attention.

The Long March of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai was a massive and long military retreat by the Red Armies of the Communist party to escape the stranglehold of Koumintang; only one fifth survived the hardships of battle, weather and terrain.

The televised saga of Pakistani lawyers could not have been more different. In our minds, the Long March represents travails over distance and determined struggle but also some form of advancement and attack to victory. And that is precisely what the Pakistani lawyers ably assisted by the media are trying to implement. Some comparisons will help to see the interesting contrasts.

Mao’s communists were running from the prospects of annihilation by Chiang Kai-shek’s troops in the south to the safety of north and west. Pakistani lawyers are advancing from the south, in air-conditioned sport utility vehicles, enjoying the hospitality of Pakistan’s largest provincial government- Punjab- in full glare of 24/7 electronic media against a besieged President Musharraf and the PPP-led federal government in the north that is hiding itself behind red, blue and yellow shipping containers and barricades.

At times it is obvious that TV cameras are straining hard to give an exaggerated view of the marching lawyers whose ranks are swollen by the large presence of media and security personnel. Not only this, but when a panicked government in Islamabad asks its largest federating unit to send police reinforcements to beef up the security in the capital, the Punjab government politely refuses.

But ironically the contrasts do not end here. The Pakistani lawyers, through their Long March, are trying to restore a sacked judiciary and the spirit of constitutionalism; and are striving to impose the will of the civil society. What about Mao Zedong and his comrades?

Communists in 1930?s were struggling to establish a new social and economic order which when they finally did lead to one of the worst and most tyrannical dictatorships in twentieth century. True, their revolution led to large scale economic development and betterment and ultimately evolved into a welfare state and in the last two decades into a thriving civil society- but as the realists will argue it essentially passed through a long and painful dictatorship — but isn’t this what Musharraf and his team have been arguing all along?

The overall context also needs some attention. The lawyers brigade, and its accompanying media-created extravaganza, is advancing on Islamabad at a time when Mian Shahbaz Sharif has taken oath as the Chief Minister of Punjab inspiring hopes of better administration. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and kingmaker Zardari were both in Saudi Arabia where before offering Umra, they were begging the Saudis for deferred payments on oil transactions.

Pakistani envoy in Washington is trying to arrange other support funds; budget was being presented in which it was accepted that whereas rising costs of oil have ballooned the deficit for the first 10 months from $11 billion to $17 billion, the food inflation is at 15 per cent and economic growth has slowed from 6.8 per cent to 5.8 per cent.

This context should focus our minds on larger realities but a spokesperson for the lawyers movement was seen and heard arguing on a popular TV programme that under Article 6 President Musharraf should be impeached and executed.

Interestingly, all those enamoured of the spectre of Musharraf being impeached have predetermined the outcome as well. What if given the eccentricities of his personality and stolen spirit of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk he decides to contest the charges against him? All impeachments don’t succeed.

Let’s not forget that despite all the money that Kenneth Starr and the Republicans burnt, the more juicy details of the Clinton’s relationship with Monica Lewinsky were never proved for reasons of law. And yet the televised impact of that impeachment drama made most women in America fall in love with that warm-hearted lover: Bill Clinton. Sometimes you get the opposite of what you desire.

Aitzaz Ahsan, the writer and the astute student of history, must not forget that there is also a law of unintended consequences. The success of the historic Long March was that it enabled Mao Zedong and Zhu Enlai to establish themselves as leaders of the party and revolution. The lawyers movement will ultimately be a great success of the civil society if it forces Musharraf to retire on the edges of Bosphorus and imposes a rule of constitutionalism in Pakistan but someone else will be succeeding if as a result of all this the PPP government at the centre falls prematurely.

He will remember Tudeh party and the leftists were the ones who braved Savak and had an important role in undermining the Shah regime in Iran but it was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini whose brand of governance succeeded. The good barrister, even as he enjoys the hospitalities on a warm summer during the march, needs to look over his shoulder.

Change and Challenge in Washington

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Change and Challenge in Washington

Moeed Pirzada | Khaleej Times |

This is both a moment for inspiration and challenge for Pakistan. But whereas the inspiration is theoretical, the challenge is far more real and lies in near future. Interestingly, Pakistan too has just appointed a new envoy in Washington. The impending change will now become the biggest one in the rather interesting career of Prof. Hussain Haqqani.

The child of a marriage between a black intellectual from Kenya and a white anthropologist from Kansas is ready for the most powerful office on the planet. One has to be deaf, dumb and blind not to appreciate what a gigantic change it represents. Most US media are referring to it as a great victory for the African American who was an unknown State senator just four years ago.

But I think it is a victory for the US. For it celebrates the tremendous ability of its political and social system for change; for evolution. This is a victory of hope against realism, of change against inertia, of the future against past. The fact that apart from African Americans, Obama derives support from the college- and university-educated white middle classes and from young women say a lot about the power of American education to transform the minds. In short, this is the American moment; one that must make the world pause and respect America.

Agreed; the road ahead for the Democrats is still fraught with uncertainty. It will become a contest between McCain’s experience versus Obama’s youth; Republican argument for staying the course versus Democratic desire for change inside the US and in the world. But in this media-driven world of images and oratory, of the power of hope and words the chances of a 72-year-old McCain with serious disadvantages of articulation compared to the Baptist, almost messianic kind of persuasions, of Obama the chances of McCain look thin to me.

Also, in a climate where American voters are angry over the rising gasoline prices, collapsing mortgages and the un-ending Iraq war, the promise of hope and change in the future is far more seductive than the arguments of experience and serving in Vietnam some forty years ago. Unless Republicans pull something out of the ordinary in the form of a new conflict with Iran or a campaign that becomes vitriolic on the question of White versus Black; Obama could become the next President in November.

But then what is the challenge? Well, this coming soon after Pakistan’s own transition may add to its problems.

Though the US political system is different from the traditional powers in the sense that it is imbued with idealism. But even then, this aspect is more developed in the case of Democrats. Republicans are more accepting of the world the way it exists, and more willing to exploit it in pursuit of power arrangements; in this respect they are more of realists.

Democratic ideals often impose inabilities upon them in dealing with asymmetries that militate against their sensitivities or those of their support base. And they have found it difficult to strike harmony with a Pakistan that they see as dominated by military, by men, and conservative Islam that restricts women and minorities. And whatever Pakistan may do for this fashion parade, it may fail the changing benchmarks of their various constituencies.

Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan’s new envoy, then represents an interesting point man in Washington. His detractors have often condemned him as a turncoat who started his career from Jamaat-e-Islami, then damaged Benazir’s political campaign as a Nawaz lieutenant. Benazir later appointed him as Pakistan’s ambassador to Sri Lanka.

I am on the contrary fascinated by the intellectual journey of a middle class Pakistani who in a quarter century moved full circle from the fringe of religious right wing – Jamaat — to the centre — Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League — and then veered to the left to join PPP. And he did not stop there either, but expanded his horizons and consciousness to become part of internationally respected academic circuit in the US. His intellectual struggle can be aptly summed up as: from Maleer to Washington in one lifetime.

Pakistani envoys are introduced in Washington circuit when they are appointed by Islamabad; Haqqani on the contrary created his space by his work with Carnegie Endowment and John Hopkins University, with his countless articles in international publications like New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and International Herald Tribune to name just a few. His book, Pakistan: Between Mosque and the Military” established his cerebral credentials and won him a tenure track position at Boston University; a rare achievement at his age.

It is his understanding of Washington and the beltway politics, his grasp of the way issues are framed by special interests and his years of interaction with key figures that shape the US foreign policy will now be of great help to him in his job. But with the probable Democratic Party victory, Haqqani will face the most uphill challenge of his career so far. His comments, his writings and his academic work critical of the military regime were welcomed by the liberals, intellectuals, think tank and policy wonks for it was part of their mental flow; and thus constituted a natural alliance.

But now he has to represent the whole country, including the institutions he had severely criticised in the past and has to befriend and neutralize several of those special interests and lobbies whose issues with Pakistani state and concerns for democracy, women and minorities are often an attractive cover for other unsaid agendas.

I recently had an opportunity to interview Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, in London, for GEO TV. She had been Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington twice; including during the difficult period of 9/11. Despite her caution in reflecting on every word she said in front of the cameras, she admitted different strategic interests US and Pakistan might have in this region. She also told me that the media and diplomacy have one big commonality and that is: both are in the business of communication.

No one-including the prominent anchor Dr. Shahid Masood- has any doubt about Prof. Haqqani’s communication skills; but with Obama and Democratic wave the challenge for Pakistan’s able point man will now be to win over the unwilling ears and fight the unsaid agendas. He is certainly up to the task, and we must wish him Good luck!

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